The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy
This work-in-progress is inspired by and written in reply to "The Knife and the Wound Philosophy," published by my friend, Wolfgang Carstens. Constructive criticism, questions and discussion are always welcome. Contact here, via e-mail at ichthus77@hotmail.com or via blog at ichthus77.blogspot.com. Thanks, Maryann Spikes
Table of Contents
Why Ethics?
Moral Truth Litmus
A Natural Capacity for Discovering the Supernatural Standard
Gleaning through the Market Place of Competing Ethical Theories
How Should We Be? “Essentialist” Virtue
Classical (Greek) Virtue Theory
What Should We Do? Deontology
Deontology: “Don’t hate me ‘cause I’m dutiful.”
Morality and Legal Justice
What Should Result? Consequentialism
Utilitarianism
Free to Be or Not to Be…
Virtue Revisited
The Virtue of Authenticity—Existentialism
Consequentialism Revisited
Weeding out Egoism
Conduct Revisited
Weeding out Relativism
The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy
The Greater Good View
Appendix A: Dialectics Glossary
Appendix B: The Four Horsemen and the Hunger
Appendix C: The Logic of the Essentialism Dialectic
Appendix D: Quiz: Are You an Essentialist or a Voluntarist?
Appendix E: Glossary of Answered Criticisms of the Golden Rule
Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable)
Appendix G: Synthesizing Golden Rule Variations and Competing Ethical Theories
References and Notes
TO DO
Why Ethics?
The field of ethics is a grand narrative thousands of years old. It is filled with every narrative genre, but it is essentially a love story about the kind of love that endures all circumstances. Many different kinds of circumstances bring us to this field. A lot of us just get bored or over-burdened with the same old thing and begin to wonder if there is actually a greater point to this life. Some of us never have a care in the world for anyone other than ourselves until someone gives us a rude awakening that causes us to wonder why they affected us so much, why we began to empathize with others we affected in the same way, and what all this might imply about how things are supposed to go. A few of us oddballs analyze everything to smithereens, finally getting past psyching ourselves out about whether or not we really exist, or whether or not we are the only self in existence and all others are just our imagination (41), and are now ready to start digging deeper into the ultimate purpose to which every self should treat every self, asking, “What is the ultimate end, the Why behind how we should be or behave towards the Other and self?”
This question is a sort of rational hunger (57) that is common to all humans. “We remain conscious of a desire which no natural happiness will satisfy. But is there any reason to suppose that reality offers any satisfaction to it? ‘Nor does the being hungry prove that we have bread.’ But I think it may be urged that this misses the point. A man's physical hunger does not prove that that man will get any bread; he may die of starvation on a raft in the Atlantic. But surely a man's hunger does prove that he comes of a race which repairs its body by eating and inhabits a world where eatable substances exist,” (C.S. Lewis, 57).
Would we have evolved a hunger for true meaning, if there were nothing to satisfy that hunger (57; Appendix B)? This is the sort of hunger spoken about in Plato's Symposium (5a) (as Socrates tells it) when Diotima refers to a type of love we know intuitively, as being "the love of having the good for oneself always," a hunger that is "common to all." There is not a culture in existence or in history which has not demonstrated this hunger in an attempt to answer “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” It is no coincidence that some version of the Golden Rule is found in the creeds of every major culture in history (9 and 10) (see Objection 12 in Appendix E).
Whatever may bring us here, in the field of ethics there grow many alternatives, some old, some new. Different theories in the field of ethics place emphasis on the sort of character we should cultivate (virtue theories), the sort of conduct we should be doing (deontological theories), and/or the sort of consequences or end-goals for which we should be aiming (consequentialist theories). How can we tell the true morality from the artificial, if a true alternative is even possible (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you)? We need some way of examining and weighing each alternative, the way we examine our food sources to make sure they are tasty, nutritious, and fresh. After all, we may intuitively know we hunger (57) for something, but it takes more than just hunger to know whether or not the food we have chosen is actually good for us. The section titled Moral Truth Litmus (43) is a way of ensuring we select only that which edifies. Before the three-part litmus is presented and used to examine the major theories in ethics, we will discuss the controversial issue of faith and reason, as concerns the Moral Truth Litmus.
A Word on Faith and the Moral Truth Litmus
First, to differentiate between “morality” and “moral truth”. Morality means standards and ends (the ‘how’ and ‘why’), of social character or conduct. Morality may be created by the individual or cultural will, and/or perceived to be discovered (71) in evolving human nature (69), or in an eternal social essence. While it may be true that a given morality exists in reality (the way all thoughts exist in reality), its standards may or may not be “truth”.
Truth is that which corresponds to reality (that which is). Moral truth (or the real ought), if it exists (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), is those standards and ends (hows and whys), of social character or conduct which are true (corresponding to reality). If there are none which correspond, then the truth about morality (a descriptive statement about morality, rather than a “real ought”) is that what is moral is a matter of opinion (61). There ‘is’ a fact of the matter when it comes to morality (or unicorns)—that fact—that truth—that moral (unicorn) truth (descriptive statement)—may be that there ‘is’ no moral (unicorn) truth (real ought, real unicorn) (67). Normally, and particularly in this paper, the term ‘moral truth’ is used to mean ‘real ought’ (70).
In Sam Harris’ “Moral Landscape” (66), though he uses the word “well-being” in place of “perfection,” he does not (90) overcome 1) mapping an imperfect landscape, but claiming that it is the source of perfection (69), and that the very existence of the landscape justifies its map as mapping perfection (69), committing David Hume’s (1711-1776) is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E), or 2) denying the existence of the very perfection (69) which must exist in order for his map to correspond, committing the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E). To have this explained in numerical steps, skip to the section “The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy” at the end of this work-in-progress.
If there is justified moral truth (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), it is justified if it answers “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” and it is always true only if it corresponds to an Other/self who always is and does what we should be and do (an eternally perfect being—God) (69). If you put faith in the Golden Rule, then you must put faith in a God which it describes, a God to which the Golden Rule corresponds, or else in your inconsistency you will commit the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)—in other words, you will commit the error of saying the Golden Rule corresponds (is true), without there being anything to which it can correspond (be true) (God). The only other way to maintain consistent beliefs is to put faith in the impossibility of moral truth. Moral statements are only always true, if there is always a being to which they correspond. We know (only intuitively, at this point in the discussion) that humans are not always good, so they do not qualify as such a being. If we compare geographical maps, to the moral map we call the “Golden Rule,” we see that geographical truth does not need to correspond to an eternal, unchanging landscape, but the Golden Rule requires there be an eternal, morally perfect being to which it corresponds (69).
However—you could instead opt to reject the Golden Rule as objective moral truth (see Objection 4 in Appendix E). Just because it is the only theory to fully answer the question of Ethics (83), does not guarantee its truth (82) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E). And so, the Moral Truth Litmus cannot “prove” with certainty (89) the existence of God (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you).
Likewise, the Moral Truth Litmus cannot prove true any particular theory in ethics, it can only rule out theories as not passing as objective moral truth. If a theory does not pass all three parts of the Moral Truth Litmus soon to be discussed, then it is made up (70), even if claimed to be discovered (71). If no theory passes the litmus (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), the moral truth (descriptive statement) is that there is no moral truth (real ought)—just morality based on opinion. Granted, if it can be shown that a theory passes the litmus, then it must be true that the theory is objective moral truth, however—we cannot prove that any theory passes parts two and three. We can only rule out theories which clearly do not pass those parts. The Golden Rule is the only theory that is not ruled out (and see Appendix G), but this does not mean we can have certainty (89) that it is true [to suggest it is true merely because it is justified would commit the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)] (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you). That it passes the litmus (or at least is not ruled out by it), that we intuitively know (hunger for) it (57), that we find it in the creeds of every major culture throughout history (9 and 10)—that gives us good reason to put faith in it, to live according to it, to teach it to our children. Certainty, however, is reserved for the omniscient. It is impossible to prove a belief (as strong rationalism requires) (89) but beliefs can be evaluated to be more reasonable than others (the task of critical rationalism) (2), though still rationally avoidable.
The Moral Truth Litmus is a tool that will only be found in the toolbox of the critical realist, because it only permits truth that is discovered, and rules out all constructs. The litmus can migrate to other fields of inquiry. The only thing that would change is the question being asked (L1); the truth of the answer would still be discovered instead of created (L2), and it would still be universal instead of relative (L3)—in other words, it would still be mind-independent (see Objection 10 in Appendix E). The litmus is most helpful and illuminating in the field of ethics, where, more often than in any other field, constructs are passed off as truths. Skeptics and anti-realists will never use the Moral Truth Litmus—they will not want to follow its implications. Skepticism, anti-realism and critical realism (76) are all reactions to the realization that what we once thought we knew (naïve realism), turned out to be wrong. Skeptics have faith that we can therefore never know anything, whereas anti-realists have faith that there is therefore no “truth” independent of minds, and critical realists have faith that there are truths waiting to be discovered by minds, and so employ tools like the Moral Truth Litmus to narrow down the search. After all, we only realize that we are wrong because we trust the evidence that something else was right, before we knew it was right.
Nevertheless, skeptics discard all tools, and anti-realists consider all tools to be used for construction, rather than discovery. Critical realists understand that there may be evidence to which we do not have access, which would influence a different conclusion, but a true conclusion is true despite whatever evidence we have available to us—its truth and our knowing or discovering it are two separate issues. A fact is true before we have the evidence to know it, just as food is not produced by hunger, though hunger is a clue to the existence of food. If something is true, it is true even if we never find evidence supporting it—even if the idea of it never enters our mind. Granted, ideas and statements cannot be true unless a mind thinks or utters them, however—if they are true, they are true independent of any mind. The only mind-dependent facts are facts “about” minds, however—their truth is still not justified by the existence of the mind(s) of which they are about, for that would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 10 in Appendix E). A true fact, or a true conclusion, is true (has objective certainty) despite the evidence, and we must have faith (subjective certainty) in the strongest evidence (89).
Faith in the strongest evidence is mere intellectual assent, mere subjective certainty, and means confidence (75) or trust in the evidence, but lacking absolute subjective certainty (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you). Of how many of your beliefs are you really certain (89)? Of the rest—what is your evidence? All belief below absolute certainty involves varying degrees of subjective certainty (faith) (91). The stronger the evidence, the stronger the subjective certainty (faith) (80).
But, if a person is going to hold on to beliefs with blind faith “in the teeth of evidence” (meaning counter-evidence) as Richard Dawkins first said in "The Selfish Gene" (77)—then reason (including smack-you-in-the-face revelation) is not going to persuade. Blind faith, belief supposedly without any evidence, is a form of bad faith. To do something in bad faith is to betray confidence or break trust—it is to deceive, to put up a false front, false evidence. An example used by Sartre, discussed in the section on Existentialism, is that to refuse to choose, is a choice, and so it is a choice made in bad faith. To do something in good faith, with authenticity (a word used by existentialists), is to provide confidence or build trust—it is to tell the truth, it is to be genuine, to be honest. Applied to beliefs, it is bad faith to decide not to decide what one believes about this or that—it is good faith (authenticity) to believe the conclusion to which all the strongest evidence points, and not to rule out (or in) any (counter-)evidence without first critically examining it. One reason some people don’t take Christians seriously is because some Christians believe things which clash with science. For example, the evidence for evolution weighs too much, and the early stories of Genesis ring too poetic for young-earth creationism to be a reasonable position (26). Many scientists believe the evidence for evolution and are Christians (like Dr. Francis Collins, head of the Human Genome Project, director of the National Institutes of Health and founder of BioLogos.org), who believe the Bible’s account of creation is poetic, and that this does not affect the fundamentals of theistic faith. The stronger the evidence, the less tentative the belief (good faith). The weaker the evidence, the more tentative the belief (good faith). It is the sort of faith that is necessary before we can trust or put faith in another person. Faith “that” a person exists, or intellectual assent to the evidence that a person exists, is different from and precedes putting your faith, or trust, “in” that person.
Those who feel that we should just have faith may wonder why the Moral Truth Litmus, or a rational examination of the theories in ethics, is even necessary (see Objection 5 in Appendix E). They may feel that it shows how strong our faith is, when we do not question anything, and that it shows how weak our faith is, whenever we do question. They may feel we should just trust in the revelation of the Bible; that this paper goes through a lot of trouble to explain why the Golden Rule is the only viable theory of moral truth, when all we needed to do was search the Scriptures, and live out the great principle in our lives. Soren Kierkegaard, the great Christian philosopher and father of existentialism, is often misunderstood as being such a fideist (42). However, fideists like Kierkegaard would say that “Subjectivity is Truth”—that having objective evidence of the real ought (God, described by the Golden Rule) is a mere shadow of actually living it out (see Objection 6 in Appendix E)—faith “that” God exists is not enough—we must live faith “in” God. Golden Rule love is about subjective faith, not objective certainty (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you), as John Nash discovered in the marriage proposal scene of the movie “A Beautiful Mind”. There is truth in making truth personal, in going beyond mere intellectual assent and putting our faith in God, but before we can do that we are encouraged in the Bible to “reason together” (Isaiah 1:18) with God, to “examine everything” (1 Thess. 5:21) and to “give a reason” (1 Peter 3:15). If “faith” is the ultimate goal, then the object of our faith could very well be anything, as long as “faith” is accomplished. But we know this is not true. Kierkegaard was angered by clergy who focused on evidence (knowing/believing "that" God exists) and never demonstrated saving faith (knowing God "personally" and believing "in" God). That's why he focused so much on faith. But he wasn't "against" evidence—he just knew nothing can be proved/known with certainty (and that much of Christianity feels like counter-evidence, like the God-man, which seems paradoxical), and that the 'virtue' sort of faith (trust "in" God) is where it is at (but see Objection 24 in Appendix E). That is where we will find true satisfaction. However, when a person exalts blind faith, they think they are exalting the sort of faith that puts trust in a person, when actually they are insulting the person by saying there is no evidence that they are trustworthy.
You will not find blind faith in the Bible. What you will find when you research the several heroes of faith listed in Hebrews 11 is a lot of people who struggled with doubt, and a God who did what he could to provide evidence that he would be there for them. But, ultimately, they had to have faith that God would do what he promised, even though everything in them said run the other way. Believing—faith, for all us finite folk—is a virtue when new evidence is battling against an old worldview over territory in the mind—but only when we commit ourselves to believing only what is true (even if we don't at first get it right), despite the sometimes overwhelming "pull" of the familiar worldview or trending new evidence. All else is bad faith. The most common passage used by those who disagree that blind faith is not found in the Bible (fideists, 42, and atheists who think all religious faith is blind faith), is Jesus’ dialogue with Thomas on believing without seeing. Jesus is not speaking of blind faith when he tells Thomas about those who believe without seeing—he is speaking of those who trust God to fulfill his promises, before they see the fulfillment. Faith is trust, and no one trusts blindly. But, it comes without certainty (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you), as no one has faith and trust is not required if the thing is certain (89). Faith is important in every relationship—it is important for a wife to believe in, have faith in, her husband, and vice versa. You must say "I do" as a risk you consider worth taking. A relationship without any trust cannot be considered "blessed". The same is true of our relationship with God. If it is a genuine relationship, it is not blind, but it comes without certainty.
And so we must reason about which “object of faith” is worthy of our faith—we must be able to explain why the Golden Rule is more worthy than any other theory in ethics. If we do not know why our object of faith is worthy of our faith (or that it even exists), are we not committing idolatry? It was because they put blind faith in Jim Jones that the People’s Temple “drank the Kool-Aid” (36). In order to filter true revelation from false, reason is required. All else is idolatry.
Dialectic is used in this paper to pan out the fool’s gold, to sift and winnow out the chaff of artificial morality. It is not guaranteed that we will be left with the genuine nugget or the edifying kernel—it is not guaranteed we will be left with anything at all—but it does ensure we do not settle for anything less than the truth. Dialectic resolves what appeared to be a contradiction. Reality does not permit contradiction, so all contradictions are merely apparent, not real. If a theory contains any contradiction, it means the theory is wrong at some point, because contradictory language is meaningless and cannot correspond to reality. An antithesis appears to contradict a thesis, but then a synthesis resolves the apparent contradiction by keeping the parts of both thesis and antithesis which correspond to reality (and so are consistent), and discarding the parts inconsistent with reality. It’s a lot of drama with a happy ending—and the synthesis is our (tentative) hero, saving us from a life of paradox and contradiction (assuming it has arrived at truth and does not eventually become the thesis of a new dialectic, as seen in the many theory-revisions in science). The dialectic method (58, 66) being used in the Moral Truth Litmus and throughout this paper is synonymous with the scientific method. The thesis is synonymous with the hypothesis, the antithesis is synonymous with counter-evidence, and the synthesis is synonymous with the revised theory (58). We can flesh this out:
The Scientific Method Dialectic
Thesis: Hypothesis.
Antithesis: Counter-Evidence.
Synthesis: (Revised) Theory.
Here is an example of one such dialectic:
The Reasoned Faith Dialectic
Thesis: We should have blind faith (fideism).
Antithesis: Don’t drink the Kool-Aid (36).
Synthesis: We should have reasoned faith.
The dialectic method (58, 66) does not conflict with faith, only with ‘bad’ (or seemingly blind) faith, because not even the scientific method can provide certainty (89) and so requires varying degrees of faith (91). If the dialectic isn’t good enough to settle on something we can have reasonable faith in—then the scientific method, too, is a fail, and it isn’t. It is possible to arrive at a final synthesis, to which there can be no further antithesis, but, for the sake of intellectual humility, one must be open to the possibility of a future antithesis. This is the flexibility to which we can credit every advance in scientific progress—every leap of faith in the absence of the certainty even science cannot provide (89). In this spirit, any and all are challenged to attempt to find antitheses to the syntheses of the Moral Truth Litmus and of the rest of this paper. So far, the many who have attempted it have not succeeded (see Appendix E).
Moral Truth Litmus
This three-part Moral Truth Litmus tells us when a particular morality is artificial (70), when that morality fails any part of the litmus. If no theory passes all three parts of the litmus, there is no moral truth (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), defined at the beginning of the preceding section.
(L1) Part 1: Question Aspect: Moral truth must describe the answer to “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?”
(L2) Part 2: Objective Aspect: Moral truth, like all other truth, must be discovered (71), not created.
(L3) Part 3: Universal Aspect: Moral truth, like all other truth, must be true for all or none.
(L1) Part 1: Question Aspect: Moral truth must describe the answer to “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?”
This question is why the field of ethics exists, and a good theory must answer it. This first aspect of the litmus may seem redundant, a definition of an ethical theory, because it includes all the different elements emphasized by the theories in ethics (be, do, end; or character, conduct, consequences). However, none of the theories, save the Golden Rule, fulfill this part completely (67) (see Appendix G). There are three dialectics (resolutions to apparent contradictions) (58, 66) combined that will show this:
(L1.1) The How and Why (Means and End) Dialectic
(See Objection 9 in Appendix E.)
Thesis: ‘Why’ (the internal end) is more important than ‘how’ (the external means) (consequentialist theories).
Antithesis: ‘How’ (the external means) is more important than ‘why’ (the internal end) (conduct theories).
Synthesis: A ‘how’ (means) without a ‘why’ (end) is pointless; a ‘why’ (end) without a ‘how’ (means) is impossible to apply [Golden Rule is both ‘why’ (love) and how—see Objection 16 in Appendix E on the GR being love].
(L1.2) The Be or Behave Dialectic
Thesis: ‘Be’ is more important than ‘behave’ (virtue theories).
Antithesis: ‘Behave’ is more important than ‘be’ (conduct theories).
Synthesis: The nature of the “doing” affects the nature of the “being” and vice versa. We should be a loving person so that we will be more inclined to do love (Golden Rule), and we should do love so that we will become a more loving person. The word ‘more’ is meant to remind the reader that anyone who asks the question of ethics, anyone who has the question in them, is ‘already’ a loving person who does love (simply by being hospitable to the question) (67). This “doing” and “being” is the only sort of creating and choosing which creates toward the eternal; chooses the eternal (see Objection 13 in Appendix E). If you think of “doing” as a verb, like the “e” of e=mc^2, and if you think of “being” as a noun, like the “mc^2” of the same equation, then it would be right to say that we cannot be (noun/mc^2) without doing (verb/e), and we cannot do (verb/e) without being (noun/mc^2) (62). By the way, check out Chuang Tzu’s theory of mutual production (5j).
This “being” which “behaves” is called “self” (41)—leading to L1.3:
(L1.3) The Other and Self Dialectic
(If you are not sure if “self” is even real, please see notes 23 and 41.)
Thesis: The Other or out-group should always benefit, whereas self or in-group should never benefit (self-abusive theories). Be a doormat.
Antithesis: Self or in-group should always benefit, whereas the Other or out-group should never benefit (egoistic theories). Be selfish.
Synthesis: In every in-group and out-group, a self is an Other, an Other is a self (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E), so however we should treat Other/self is the same as how we should treat self/Other (56). Also, since we can reason without thinking of the Other (or, for that matter, the self), theories which exalt reason fail to answer this aspect of the question of ethics. Would we even ask how/why we should be or behave if there were no self/Other?
Indeed, if there is moral truth (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), it is discoverable (71) by all moral beings (objective), and true for all moral beings (universal), as shown further in the following two parts of the litmus:
(L2) Part 2: Objective Aspect: Moral truth, like all other truth, must be discovered (71), not created.
As discussed in the last section, truth is mind-independent. The only mind-dependent facts are facts “about” minds, however—their truth is still not justified by the existence of the mind(s) of which they are about, for that would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 10 in Appendix E).
The quickest way to narrow down a search for the answer to “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” is to discard those theories which do not claim to be moral truth. Though this rules out all forms of relativism, there is plenty of room for a theory celebrating diversity so long as it is in line with the true meaning for which every moral sense, every conscience, hungers (57). Moral truth is known intuitively, rather than created, and we are able to articulate it and discover (71) more about it using reason. This is a modern version of the Euthyphro Dilemma, discussed in the section on Greek virtue theory (see also Objection 1 in Appendix E).
By way of dialectic (58, 66), two apparently contradictory views (descriptive statements) on moral truth (real ought) are going to be resolved (67).
The Essentialism Dialectic
Thesis: Moral truth (real ought) is created, or voluntarism (70).
Antithesis: There is no (discoverable) (71) moral truth (real ought), because that which is created is not discovered, or nihilism (or skepticism).
Synthesis: Moral truth (real ought) is discovered (71), or essentialism (14, 37). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
Observe:
Thesis: Voluntarism.
We all hunger (57) for true meaning; moral truth is created. This is called voluntarism, or moral anti-realism (70). There are true voluntarists, and there are voluntarists by default.
True voluntarists think that moral truth is created by the individual or cultural will (subjectivism or relativism; individual/divine or cultural voluntarism) (14, 37, 70)—they think all nihilists cannot help contradicting themselves as their attitudes and behaviors acknowledge meaning, and they think essentialists arrogantly claim to have discovered (71) moral truth and should instead create their own meaning (atheist voluntarists) or submit to God’s created meaning (theist voluntarists).
A special category of voluntarists, like the atheist existentialists to be studied later, do not believe there is moral truth, but see more value in creating meaning that is made authentic by the individual.
Those who attempt to discover (71) moral truth where it cannot be found (for example, evolving human nature, 69) may think of themselves as essentialists, but they are voluntarists by default, since their ‘discovery’ is actually a creation of will (perfection cannot evolve, 69).
Since voluntarists by default claim their creation is moral truth (but it isn’t), they commit the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), and if they attempt to justify it with the reason that it is “natural” (from nature), or merely base it on the existence of (nature of) God, they commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E).
Since voluntarists (both true and by default) do not acknowledge essential meaning, they are nihilists by default, though that offends the voluntarist’s moral sense (and so defaults to essentialism).
Note: If this theory is right (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you), human rights are made up or evolved by individuals, cultures, or, somehow, nature.
Antithesis: Nihilism (or skepticism).
We may hunger for meaning, but we do not hunger (57) for perfect meaning, because perfection cannot be created or evolved (69), only discovered (71); therefore, there is no (discoverable) moral truth. The “no moral truth” position is called nihilism, and the “whether or not there is (moral) truth, we cannot discover (know) it” position is called skepticism. There is a difference between general skepticism/nihilism and moral skepticism/nihilism—not all moral skeptics/nihilists are skeptics/nihilists about truth in general. Obviously in this context, the moral variety are under consideration. See note 88 for one recent reply to moral skepticism, having to do with divine command theory. There are true nihilists/skeptics, and there are nihilists/skeptics by default.
True nihilists/skeptics think that truth cannot be created, and feel that even essentialists ‘create’ rather than discover (71). However, nihilists/skeptics will not allow a construct to pass as truth, and so agree with essentialists that voluntarists (70) are nihilists by default and that constructs do not obligate. We can discover created things, but we cannot create perfection (69, 71)—we can manufacture meaning, but we cannot create ‘perfect’ meaning [ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)], and if we try to justify it with the reason that it is “natural” (from nature), or to base it on the existence of (nature of) God, we commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). If the truth about all morality is that it evolves with individuals, cultures, or nature (if there is no morality among all moralities which does "not" evolve)—then there is no (discoverable) "moral truth" (real ‘fulfilled’ ought; actuality with no potential; perfection never changes, 69) (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you).
On the other hand, atheist voluntarists think essentialists are nihilists by default, because they will not ‘create’ truth (or ‘meaning’)!
The attitudes and behaviors of nihilists/skeptics, in reaction to the violation of their moral boundaries, betray an intuitive sense of moral truth—no one ever acts as if their moral boundaries are just ‘made up’—and so they default to essentialism.
Note: If this theory is right (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you), there are no real human rights, none made up, none evolved, none discovered (71).
Synthesis: Essentialism.
We all hunger (57) for true meaning, but perfect meaning cannot be created, therefore, if there is true meaning, it is discovered. This is called essentialism, or moral realism. There are true essentialists, and there are essentialists by default.
True essentialists think that moral truth is discovered in (not justified by) God’s unchanging essence (14) (universalism; divine essentialism). This does not commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). Rather than settle for the artificial (though atheist voluntarists call it ‘authentic’), essentialists freely, and in good faith (contrary to Sartre’s belief), choose the real, rather than commit the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (or die starved of true meaning) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E).
We may ‘say’ we do not hunger (57) for true meaning, we may ‘say’ true (perfect, 69) meaning can be created or evolve [ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)], but we live against it whenever we feel that a certain behavior (ours or someone else’s) is truly justified, or whenever we react to it with indignation (or guilt, or telling ourselves we don’t need to feel guilty). Anyone with the question in them will already be familiar with examples from their own life. We live as if we hunger (57) for true, uncreated, unevolved, discovered (71) meaning—a real, fulfilled ought (perfection, 69). We no more create the true meaning we all hunger for, than we create the nutrients we all hunger for (57). Whether ‘our’ meaning is true or not is irrelevant—our 'hunger' for it to be true is evidence that there 'is' true meaning.
Since moral truth is social truth (L1.3), it actually requires the eternal existence of a perfect social mind (subject, self, person) in order to always be true (however, it is not mind-dependent truth—see Objection 10 in Appendix E). Therefore, if there is a real, fulfilled ought, it must be a social being (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you). A real, fulfilled ought has no potential, is actuality, and so it is truth that cannot evolve into being, but must always be (not merely ‘pre-exist’). A true standard for moral perfection (69) needs no further perfection or evolution.
If we accept as given that we all live as if we have the ‘hunger’ (57) and essentialism corresponds to reality, whereas voluntarism and nihilism do not—voluntarists (both true and by default) and nihilists (both true and by default) are both essentialists by default, further evidenced when the voluntarist takes offense at defaulting to nihilism, and the nihilist takes offense at a violation of their moral boundaries.
However, for the sake of argument, if there is no essential moral truth to be discovered (71) (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you), essentialism is a creation of will and is voluntarism by default, which is nihilism by default, though we live against it.
Note: If this theory is right, human rights are discovered, not made up or evolved. See also Appendix C: The Logic of the Essentialism Dialectic.
(L3) Part 3: Universal Aspect: Moral truth, like all other truth, must be true for all or none.
Continuing from our mind-independent truth theme (see Objection 10 in Appendix E), the way this is commonly said, famously by Bertrand Russell (85), is that a belief, though dependent on a mind for its existence, is not dependent on a mind for its truth. Truth is mind-independent, and this does not at all mean, as some anti-realists claim, that mind-independency puts truth beyond the grasp of minds, or that there can be moral truth without a perfectly moral mind. It only means that, even if a mind (subject, self, person) has yet to discover (71) it to be true, if there is moral truth (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), then it is true for every mind (subject, self, person), whether s/he is a self or an Other. Something that is objectively true is true for every mind (subject, self, person). If not true for all, then true for none. This part (L3) is different from L1.3, because L1.3 discusses the nature of knowers (self=Other) (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E), whereas L3 discusses the nature of the known (true for all knowers). This universality must be essential, not forced, otherwise it commits the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E). The following dialectic (58, 66) shows this by reaching the same conclusion (synthesis) as the dialectic found in the second part of the litmus, because both the is-ought (12) and the ought-is (82) fallacies of reification (70) (see Objection 2 and 3 in Appendix E) are resolved by the same conclusion:
The Moral Realism Dialectic
Thesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are all valid moral truth (relativistic and subjectivist theories, or voluntarism, or anti-realism, 70).
Antithesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are evidence against the possibility of moral truth (nihilistic theories).
Synthesis: Moral truth transcends cultures and individuals and their apparent contradictions and is true (immanent) for all (realism)—providing a basis (along with L1.3) from which to defend the human rights of individuals of every culture (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
Again, none of the above is a fallacious ought-is guarantee (70, 82) that there is moral truth (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), but only a way to eliminate that which is certainly ‘not’ moral truth. L1.3 and L3 explain why a good ethical theory must be equally true for all minds, subjects, selves, persons, individuals, social beings or whatever synonym one prefers. L2, the objective aspect, necessitates that the real ought, if one exists (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you), must also be a fulfilled ought, and L1.3 necessitates that the real, fulfilled ought, if one exists, must be a social being described by the Golden Rule, both the why (love) and the how (L1.1) behind both right being and right doing (L1.2). A real ought is a fulfilled ought, a social being who does (conduct) and is (character) the ultimate end (consequences)—the answer to the question, for all or none—or there is no real ought (70; 12, 82).
If there is moral truth (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), the Golden Rule is it—none of the alternative theories growing in the field of ethics pass the Moral Truth Litmus, which will now be used to examine them each more closely, pausing intermittently to discuss legal justice, free will, and sin, ending with the Golden Rule. First we will use our litmus to rule out philosophical naturalism, and discuss how we rationally discover what we already intuitively know about moral truth.
A Natural Capacity for Discovering the Supernatural Standard
We can use our litmus to rule out ethical theories which do not pass as truth—one of those theories being ethical naturalism. If we stop where naturalists stop, acknowledging the moral sense without acknowledging the unchanging truth sensed by the moral sense, we make moral truth (and the being to which it corresponds) out to be a construct (50), which is, of course, a fiction [ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)].
In this section we are going to discuss how unchanging moral truth cannot be based in nature, then we are going to discuss how we have a natural (rationally intuitive) capacity for discovering (71) the supernatural standard. First, a dialectic (58, 66) to think about, which is very similar to the dialectic of L2:
The Super-Naturalist Dialectic
Thesis: If moral truth is beyond nature, then it has nothing to do with we who inhabit nature. However, there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature; moral truth is completely natural (philosophical naturalism) (see 50, 52, 53, 54, 66).
Antithesis: It is true that there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature, but making changing nature the basis for unchanging truth commits the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E) (nihilism).
Synthesis: That we hunger (57) for a ‘more’ that nature cannot satisfy, points to the existence of supernatural meaning—we hunger for transcendent meaning that exists immanently, or we would not hunger for it (essentialism). [ If it doesn’t exist (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), this ‘more’ commits the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), but that it ‘does’ exist is not its justification, which would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification(70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). ] See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
Philosophical naturalists justify a particular morality (or ethical theory, see below) by suggesting that it merely serves evolutionary purpose. Note that beliefs, including beliefs about morality, are true or false independent of whether or not we have evolved a natural tendency to accept them. For example, we have a natural tendency to survive, but this tendency does not validate a belief that we should survive at all cost. Survival is an accident, according to evolution—not an essential purpose. This is to move from “is” (evolution) to “ought” (evolutionary purpose). That nature, even human nature, is a certain way does not require that it should be that way—nature cannot prescribe. If a natural tendency toward moral behavior is its justification, then the social behavior allowed by all other social animals, not just humans, is moral truth, as are the standards of those who claim (with scientific backing) that their antisocial behavior is natural and therefore justified [is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E)—not to mention that it is a contradiction to make antisocial behavior a standard for social behavior; see section on egoism]. Besides, those who say we ought to let natural selection take its course (a minority of naturalists) are implying our interference is supernatural selection, and since we are responsible for whatever action or non-action is taken (Sartre was right), natural selection becomes impossible when humans are present.
Nature cannot satisfy our hunger (57) for more. It only provides the capacity for creating man-made purpose or discovering (71) supernatural, essential purpose. Blind nature only provides the capacity for evaluating, it cannot assign value. Does it make sense to you that all of nature operates under “survival of the fittest” (2; 151)–but it is grounded in nature that humans should treat the Other as an end and not merely as means (which we will soon discuss) (54)? Rational empathy (51) and selflessness, or brutality and selfishness (“might makes right”) both aid in survival, and nature cannot tell us which one is morally superior, and so cannot tell us how we ought to be or behave, or to count the self and the Other interchangeably. So, answering that how and why we should be or behave with the Other and self is to fulfill evolutionary purpose (54)—isn’t saying anything meaningful (is a fuel tank full of air). In atheist Richard Dawkins’ words, “In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at the bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no other god. Nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is,” (24; 133)—as opposed to “ought” (however, see note 66). Again, according to evolution, survival is accidental, not our ‘purpose’. And if survival were the point, the last man standing would be the most moral man, making the existence of the Other unnecessary for a moral existence (failing L1.3, 70).
One might argue that if we cannot derive an ought from nature (is) (12), then why can we derive all valid oughts from God's nature (12)? The short answer is: we cannot. The long answer is that, while the Golden Rule describes God, corresponds to God, rather than committing the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), it is not justified by God’s existence, or else it would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). The Golden Rule is the “intuited value not definable in terms of something else…that ‘ought’ to be followed in one’s intentions and actions,” (1; 409) and which is the only theory which passes the fiery reason of the first part of our litmus. Naturalists (voluntarists by default, 70) decide some moral rules are more justified than others by measuring them against pre-existing (unjustified) norms, which are the end result of the “evaluative process” [value is (assumed to be) assigned, moral rules are (assumed to be) culturally constructed, rather than (acknowledged as) discovered (71)] (50). The Golden Rule is like the pre-existing norm of the naturalist, only, rather than committing the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), it corresponds to an eternal God (“if” true, 82). Rather than being created (69)—it is discovered (71) value, rather than (apparently) added value. Let’s put all these thoughts into a dialectic:
The Anti-Reification Theism Dialectic
Thesis: Voluntaristic theism. God exists because, if he doesn’t, the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics corresponds to nothing and commits the fallacy of ought-is (82) reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E).
Antithesis: Atheistic voluntarism/“essentialism”. To conclude God exists in order to give substance to a potential answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics commits the time travel paradox of the closed causal loop—just as an archaeological find making the past true commits that paradox (read Dummett). Though the thesis attempts to avoid committing the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), it commits just that. Therefore, there is no good God, and the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics is a construct or corresponds to something else.
Synthesis: Essentialist theism. Unless there is always a real being who always is and does what we should be and do, to which the answer to the question of Ethics (83) may always correspond (be true), then the answer, even if justified, commits the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (69, 70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E). However, this conflicts with our hunger (57) being a rational hunger for true meaning, not a construct. See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
Some philosophical naturalists (46, 66) maintain that moral truth does not have to be absolute to be true, content to adhere to evolved moral principles they feel will no longer be applicable if humans go extinct. They maintain there are objective, discovered (71), yet evolving, absolutes (53) not anchored in the unchanging (the constant, the Logos), that came into being with humans and will evolve as humans evolve and cease existing when humans cease existing; that absolute, objective moral truth does not have to be essential. Such adaptable, anchorless standards cannot reasonably be considered absolute, or ‘perfect’ (69). If it is not “always” true that x (as long as humans exist)—then in what sense is x true? And if it is “always” true that x—then why is “x is always true” dependent on the existence of humans? A true standard for moral perfection (69) needs no further perfection or evolution. See points 1 through 17 at the beginning of the section “The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy” in this paper.
So, nature cannot be the basis for unchanging moral truth (ought), not only because it is an ‘is’ instead of an ‘ought’, but because it has potentiality and changes, whereas the fulfilled ought is pure actuality and never changes—it must always be. Heraclitus (late 6th century B.C.) and Cratylus (late 5th century B.C.), before evolution was a theory, said that everything is in a state of flux, which would imply “there are no unchanging absolutes, ethical or otherwise,” (1; 400) except that Heraclitus believed in “an unchanging logos [(28)] beneath all change and by which the change itself is measured. …that all men should live by this absolute law in the midst of the flux of life” and “Cratylus carried change so far that he destroyed the idea of change itself. When everything is changing and nothing is constant, then there is no way to measure the change,” (1; 400).
Consideration of Heraclitus’ unchanging logos sets us up for a dialectic (58, 66), the synthesis of which resembles the synthesis reached in the Super-Naturalist Dialectic:
Aquinas’ Immanent-Transcendent Dialectic
Thesis: All is immanent, all is one, nothing transcends; everything is just the same “thing”…“many” is an illusion (monism—Parmenides and Zeno, pantheists).
Antithesis: There are definitely different “things” (pluralism; Heraclitus and Cratylus, Plato, atomists like Democritus, Leucippus and Lucretius), but they have their being “in” the One—which transcends them (Plotinus; deism).
Aquinas’ synthesis: All that changes “has” its being (“has” its “thingness”) from the Unchanging (which “is” being, “is” “Thingness”), so that the Unchanging One (actuality with no potential, eternal, simple) does not only “transcend” the changing many (actuality with differing potential, temporal, composed), as deists believe, but is “immanent” (60) in it. The One is both transcendent over and immanent in the many.
This concludes our dialectic interlude. Keep “actual” and “potential” in mind—it will come up again when we discuss essence as it relates to virtue theory and existentialism—resulting in another dialectic diversion from Aquinas. At any rate, nature, and anything else that is always changing, cannot be the source of unchanging purpose and goodness.
That includes us. Being neither unchanging, nor self-sufficient, we cannot be the absolute source of discovered (71) moral truth. If humans are the source of true purpose and goodness, not merely its discoverers—why do we not will always in accordance with our good nature? There is not a single human who is an example of any standard or end perfectly (69) fulfilled—so such an end appears not to correspond to anything, to commit the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)… unless… there is a being whose nature is that end fulfilled [but not the end’s is-ought fallacious justification (12), of course, which would also be reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E)]. We intuit mathematical law, but are not the source of it. We hunger for food, but nutrients preexisted us. The same is true of moral truth or “the good”—rather than being its source, we intuitively hunger (57) for it.
The Hunger
Recall the synthesis from the beginning of this section: That we hunger (57) for a ‘more’ that nature cannot satisfy, points to the existence of supernatural meaning—we hunger for transcendent meaning that exists immanently, or we would not hunger for it. Though we may try, we cannot satisfy our hunger for more. On our own, apart from God, we adapt love (see Objection 16 in Appendix E) into what it is not, still perhaps calling it love, though it isn’t, or feigning to abandon it altogether, though we cannot…not without that part of ourselves dying. Often, we love from a lack [Diotima’s reasoning behind why Eros was not a god—he loved from a lack (5a)] because we are lonely and feel empty, but God loves and helps us to love from abundance because he is completely fulfilled and it is in his nature to pour out unmerited love (see Objection 1 in Appendix E).
Some argue that God, eternal Golden Rule love, is just an imaginary friend for those whose need for affiliation is unmet by those around them, but C.S. Lewis writes, “One thing, however, that marriage has done for me. I can never again believe that religion is manufactured out of our unconscious, starved desires and is a substitute for sex. For those few years H. and I feasted on love, every mode of it—solemn and merry, romantic and realistic, sometimes as dramatic as a thunderstorm, sometimes as comfortable and unemphatic as putting on your soft slippers. No cranny of heart or body remained unsatisfied. If God were a substitute for love we ought to have lost all interest in him. Who’d bother about substitutes when he has the thing itself? But that isn’t what happens. We both knew we wanted something besides one another—quite a different kind of something, a quite different kind of want. You might as well say that when lovers have one another they will never want to read, or eat—or breathe,” (39; 659). If we were the source of true meaning, or if there were ‘no’ true meaning, we would not hunger (57) for it.
The intuited expectations, or values, of God’s general revelation in nature, pointing to the eternal, are seen in “the striking resemblance of [the] basic ethical principles [of] … the great moral creeds of mankind's civilizations,” (9; 1; 362). This striking resemblance is due to our common humanity, our sharing the moral sense of Golden Rule love.
All humans hold expectations of how we ought to be treated by the Other, as evidenced in our feeling wronged when the Other, whom we assume (being a self, too) is aware of those expectations, defies them. We don’t react as if those expectations, those moral boundaries, were just “made up”. There are inappropriate ways to react to crossed boundaries (such reactions 'also' cross boundaries), and some boundaries are unreasonable expectations—only if there is a 'true' boundary. If you think there are things that are really, truly wrong (and we all behave as if we do)—like abuses of the church, for example—then you agree there is moral truth that anyone with a conscience (moral sense) can discover (71), and intuitively already knows. We intuitively live against nihilism, skepticism and subjectivism whenever we find ourselves criticizing or praising someone’s social behavior, and if they are from an Other culture (note that cultural revolutionaries are considered immoral by the implications of relativism because they are being intolerant of cultural norms), we are living against relativism (cultural voluntarism, 70).
If a voluntarist (a nihilist by default, because s/he does not acknowledge essential meaning) praises or criticizes an Other's social behavior, they are acknowledging shared created meaning while ignoring what our shared moral sense implies about moral truth (71)—like when Sartre (whom we will discuss later) prescribed moral responsibility [“In choosing myself, I choose man,” (5d)], without acknowledging the moral sense, the innate ability to detect essential good and its privation (absence), as an aspect of our common nature or essence, which he skips over with the shortcut use of “man”. Which came first, the rationally-intuitive conscience (moral sense), or that which it rationally intuits? In other words, we all live as if we know there is unchanging meaning and essentially objective morality. Something in each of us intuitively knows that we all share the same moral sense beneath and beyond our cultural applications and adaptations, that our senses are not deceiving us, and that we’re not just playing pretend and making it all up. To silence such a voice inevitably leads to a departure from reality (and social disintegration).
All of our senses evolved (26) because there was something very real to be sensed. The senses of sight, sound, smell, taste, and touch in all of us imply that there is something very real to be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, and felt.
A human with a normal childhood will develop a natural moral sense just as a seedling correctly nurtured will develop into a healthy plant. God knows if an individual’s moral sense is underdeveloped or lacking (51) due to childhood trauma or neglect—he knows who he has forgiven for that sin—and it isn’t the innocent child. That it is possible to influence an impressionable child’s development of conscience (moral sense) is why it is so important to cultivate their growing moral sense. We must be taught how to love, even though we already have the capability for Golden Rule love, for the same reason we must be taught math, even though we all reason mathematically to varying degrees. Mathematical truths do not change and grow as our awareness of them changes and grows, and neither does the standard for moral perfection (69). Whereas it is the work of physics to discover facts about nature that remain facts whether or not we have the ability to discover them, it is the work of the theories in ethics to define “good,” to study what it means for people to relate as we should, even if our moral sense is lacking or underdeveloped for whatever reason (51).
“If there is no God,” Pastor Tim Keller writes, and A.J. Ayer (1; 1910-1989) argued, “then there is no way to say any one action is ‘moral’ and another ‘immoral’ but only ‘I like this,’” (2; 153) (‘emotivism’). At first this criticism may make it seem like we should favor our intellect over our intuition when attempting to discover (71) the moral standard. It is, however, reasonable to ask: "If we have no feeling of moral approval or outrage, then do we really care about whether something is morally right or wrong? If we don't feel that it's wrong to harm a child, then how is logic going to persuade us? … Feelings such as disappointment, elation, grief, and even love are all responses to certain situations. They develop according to some inner logic; they don't strike at random. … A new breed of thinkers, including the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum (1947- ) (read more), hold the theory that our moral values do indeed have a strong connection to our emotions, but that doesn't mean the values or our moral decisions reflecting them can't be rational. According to this theory, there is a rational element within our emotional life that makes some emotional reactions reasonable and morally relevant, while others may not be,” (4; 10, 13, 15).
That “rational element” is our conscience, our moral sense, which is not removed from emotions (51), but governs them according to a moral standard. Guilt, or remorse, is a distinctly moral emotion which follows behavior that offends our moral sense, an emotion the anticipation of which motivates us not to commit morally offensive behavior in the future (55). Pastor Keller is not saying we should abandon our intuition and just do what God says is right—he is saying that moral truth cannot be “unchanging truth” if there is no unchanging God who “is” that truth. Emotivism (whim-morality) is what is left if there is no moral truth. So it seems reason is important in discovering (71) moral truth—but does that mean it is more important than intuition?
When discussing whether reason (thesis: logic or ethical rationalism if all by itself) or intuition (antithesis: love or emotivism if all by itself) plays a higher role in discovering (71) the moral standard (of how and why we should be or behave with the Other and self), think of intuition as an accelerating vehicle, and reason as the steering wheel and breaks—and the moral standard as the energy fueling the vehicle. Without the moving vehicle (intuition), there is nothing to govern. Without the governing (reason), the vehicle will be aimless and likely crash. Without the fuel, there is no motivation. Soil is less ‘designed’ to grow gardens than a vehicle to run on fuel, but we can also think of our intuition as the field in which the moral standard can either grow or die, and our reason helps to cultivate it or weed it out (see litmus). So our conscience, our moral sense, is rationally intuitive (synthesis of logic and love); reason and intuition are equally important in discovering (71) moral truth. Without intuition, we wouldn’t need or sense the highest motivation; without reason, we would not be able to choose or reject (litmus) what motivates us, and so would have no access to the highest motivation, which necessarily must be chosen (Golden Rule love). Voluntarists (70) suggest we create the fuel and flower, or that nature constructs it (though, again, perfection cannot be created, 50, 69)—essentialists suggest the fuel and flower have been around and will be around forever—Golden Rule love (God)—love that is not only the fuel, but the destination—for what the steering wheel (reason) is aiming, where the vehicle (intuition) was created to go (71). There is a logic to this Golden Rule love (logos), but logic alone (without love) is “a resounding gong, a clanging cymbal” (Paul)—keep this in mind, as it will come up again when we talk about Greek and Kantian rationalism. For now, let’s make this dialectic (58, 66) stand out:
The Love and Logic, “Law was Made for Man” Dialectic
Thesis: Logic or ethical rationalism if all by itself. Kant’s “man was made for law” thinking.
Antithesis: Love or emotivism if all by itself. Egoism’s “whatever results in my/our definition of happiness” thinking.
Synthesis: Logic and love (“law was made for man” thinking), reason and intuition (L1.1, L1.3). All legislation should conform to the Golden Rule.
One may agree with Bertrand Russell (31; 463) (1872-1970) and others that it is not philosophy when one approaches a question already knowing (especially knowing “intuitively”) the answer, but, perhaps, in ethics, anything this side of “Because I said so” is worth a shot? We can come to this inquiry with all of our presuppositions and put them through the fire of reason using our litmus, abandoning those ideas which are burnt up and replacing them with what will stand against the flame. “Some think that this material world is all there is, that we are here by accident and when we die we just rot, and therefore the important thing is to choose to do what makes you happy and not let others impose their beliefs on you. Notice that, though this is not an explicit ‘organized’ religion, it contains a master narrative, an account about the meaning of life along with a recommendation for how to live based on that account of things. … All who say ‘You ought to do this’ or ‘You shouldn’t do that’ reason out of such an implicit moral and religious position,” (2; 15). This is true of all the theories studied in ethics, and so we shall put every theory through the fire of reason.
There certainly are socially-constructed and -reproduced values, some considered by voluntarism to be created "truth"—failing L2 (70). However, preceding and outlasting them all is an eternal standard we discover (71) rationally and intuitively: The uncreated, eternal, ultimate end (consequences) of both being (character) and doing (conduct), is Golden Rule love that endures all circumstances: love the Other as self—affectionately titled “The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy” (20). This standard did not have to compete in the marketplace of ideas to achieve its superior status, but always passes the test of intellectual, intuitional fire, whereas all other standards fail and are sandcastles for the tides (72). This paper uses the Moral Truth Litmus to survey how the major ethical theories answer the question, “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?”—in other words, how they approach character, conduct and consequences, next to the Golden Rule. We will examine Greek virtue theory, Kant’s categorical imperative, Bentham and Mill’s utilitarianism, Sartre’s atheist existentialism, Rand’s egoism, and relativism, pausing intermittently to discuss legal justice, free will, and sin, concluding with the Golden Rule.
Gleaning through the Market Place of Competing Ethical Theories
How Should We Be? “Essentialist” Virtue
Classical (Greek) Virtue Theory
Greek virtue theory answers “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” by emphasizing a virtuous (rational) character according to purpose that is built in to reality, considering conduct important in behaving according to the Golden Mean, and valuing the consequence of happiness. Virtue ethics consider character to be more basic than conduct, because, in Aristotle’s (384-322 B.C.) words, “We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit,” (Nichomachean Ethics, i, 7). See L1.2.
Plato (c.427-347 B.C.) believed in a world of eternal, unchanging Forms, which is more real than the shadowy, ever-changing world of senses which is just an imperfect projection of the world of Forms. The world of Forms, or Ideas, can be accessed through the mind only, including the Form of the Good, which was the most important Form, from which everything else derives. The apostle Paul did not believe in Plato’s world of Forms, but did say, “For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face; now I know in part, but then I will know fully just as I also have been fully known. But now faith, hope, love, abide these three; but the greatest of these is love,” (1 Cor. 12:13). The Gnostic “gospels” appealed to the Greeks when they spoke of being rescued from the dark, evil material world by secret gnosis, whereas the canonical gospels offended the dominant views with a “positive view of material creation,” (2; 106). Christians acknowledge our bodies as God’s sacred temple, his holy dwelling place—not something to escape [see also (22)], but something to be glorified in resurrection (3).
Plato and Socrates (469-399 B.C.) believed the virtuous, happy life (the “good life”) results from examining all of your beliefs (“The unexamined life is not worth living”) to make sure they are knowledge and not mere opinion (“Only ignorance leads to wrongdoing”). Knowledge of absolute truth leads to a good life worth living. [Aside: If ignorance leads to wrongdoing, that means one can unintentionally seek satisfaction from something other than Golden Rule love (see Objection 16 in Appendix E), but it does not imply that a finite being would never intentionally behave immorally if s/he knew (and s/he does know, intuitively) why her behavior was immoral—only God is perfectly good (as would we be, if we had eternal omniscience) (68).] The virtuous person’s appetites are ruled by reason, making them wise, and controlled by willpower (also called spirit), making them brave. A person who controls their appetites in this way is temperate. A temperate person, in their relations with the Other, is the picture of justice. This can be compared to the earlier discussion of fuel and flower. Reason is the steering wheel and breaks, intuition (will) is the accelerating vehicle, and the fuel can be the eternal moral standard, or it can be whatever the appetites settle for (actually part of will). Plato was a rationalist, but the eternal standard (Golden Rule love) appeals to both reason and intuition.
In ancient Greece, to be virtuous meant to act with excellence, with virtuosity — to be a virtuoso — to be a master at every attempted skill because one developed the sort of disciplined character that produces good choices and habits. The temperaments David Keirsey’s (1921- ) sorter (29) tests for, modeled after Plato’s artisans, guardians, idealists and rationals (from his Republic), describe aspects of character we are born with. Virtue ethicists assume that, though character or temperament may be something we are born with, it is also malleable. In order to develop virtue, you must practice moral habits until it takes little effort and you enjoy it. Although Emmanuel Kant (whom we will discuss later) argues that a good will, which he also refers to as a virtuous disposition, is essential in making a moral decision, he saw more to be admired in struggling against disposition, against character or temperament, with respect for the moral law, but see what C.S. Lewis has to say about that in the next section, which covers deontology (conduct). Plato in his Republic presented the virtues of temperance, fortitude, and prudence for the producers, warriors, and rulers, respectively, and justice for the relations between them, failing both L1.3 and L3 (70), because virtue should be the standard for all or none.
So, since the Greeks saw virtuosity as something to be developed, one might expect they had not applied virtue to God (or, in their minds, “gods”), who cannot develop and is pure actuality. This is exactly what we find in the dialogue with Euthyphro, wherein Socrates (470-399 B.C.) asks whether something is right because God wills it (thesis: divine voluntarism, 70), or if God wills it because it is right (antithesis: Greek “essentialism”). He sees problems with both options. If it is right because he wills it, right is dependent on God’s arbitrary will—he could will that murder is right. If he wills it because it is right, he is under the moral law, rather than being its absolute source. But, the solution Socrates left up to us to find (and Aquinas did) is that God is what is right (Golden Rule love) (synthesis: divine essentialism) (see Objection 1 in Appendix E, and L2). Let’s make this dialectic (58, 66) stand out:
Aquinas’ Euthyphro Dialectic
Thesis: Something is right because God wills it (divine voluntarism, 70).
Antithesis: God wills it because it is right (Greek “essentialism”).
Synthesis: God wills in accordance with his good nature (divine essentialism). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
Socrates argued in Plato’s Symposium that the Greek god of love, Eros, was not a god, but merely a messenger (like our hunger for true meaning, 57), because his sort of love was in want of the Good, that he loved from a lack (this is where Socrates stops), rather than loving from abundance and ‘being’ the Good, like the Christian God (63) (see Objection 1 in Appendix E). Therefore, Greek virtue theory is voluntaristic (70) by default [in that it is not a discovered (71) truth, even if it is assumed to be—it is actually a mere construct, not of indifferent nature, but of human will], failing L2 (which is why “essentialist” is in quotes in the section heading, 70). Plato’s concept of “The Good” (the Form from which everything else derives), though eternal, had no anchor, an eternally good (loving) God who wills in accordance with his good (loving) nature (note that love is impossible if one is not a personal being). Unlike us, he did not have to develop virtue like we do, made in his essence, but having potential—he has always been a Virtuoso—pure actuality (he exists his essence). Perfect virtue cannot be arrived at. He has always been (69). [ Was Plato’s God “the good”? Was this what Socrates was helping to birth? (Schuyler) ]
Plato’s pupil, Aristotle, believed that the world of the senses reveals the world of Forms and is not a mere projection of it, and so should be empirically studied. To Aristotle, everything has its own virtue, or purpose, and if it performs its virtue, it is virtuous; if not, it is lacking in virtue. So his thoughts are teleological, telos meaning goal or purpose (different from the consequentialism discussed later, because teleology is dealing with the ultimate purpose of humans, rather than the consequences of their actions or the ‘any old goal’ approach of pragmatism). Virtue was built into reality from the beginning (“essentialist”) (this is the thesis that Sartre, whose antithesis we will later answer with a synthesis, objected to: essence precedes existence). A thing’s virtue is its final cause in Aristotle’s theory of the four causes. A material cause is what a thing is made of. An efficient cause is the creative force acting upon the material. A formal cause (remnant of Plato's theory of forms) is the shape or idea of the affected material. A final cause is the purpose of the affected material. In the theory of evolution (26), which Aristotle did not anticipate, the first material cause would have been the singularity, and it is hard to say what would have been its efficient, formal, and final cause, from Aristotle’s perspective. Starting from now, the human body and all its systems is the material cause. The efficient cause is the environment which shapes (like sandpaper to wood) the body and what it is used for. The formal cause is what the body is shaped into; how it changes to better suit its environment. The final cause is how the newly shaped body is actually used in its environment; the reason it was shaped. So the formal cause becomes the material cause, and the final cause becomes part of the efficient cause. As the universe was complete before it started, the final cause is Golden Rule love. However, there is a problem with rooting the final cause to the formal cause—is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). Just because there is a natural basis for morality does not mean nature endorses it as anything beyond “is”—nature cannot prescribe (we agree with Sartre this far). Our essence, our final cause, our virtue, how we should be and behave is to choose Golden Rule love, justified because it answers the question of Ethics (83), true because it corresponds to a perfect being who exists (chooses) this essence at every moment (69) (see Appendix G). Let’s make this dialectic (58, 66) stand out—it will come up again in the section on Existentialism:
The Existential Essentialism Dialectic
Thesis: Essence (virtue, final cause, ought, how we should be) is a natural part of reality and precedes our existence (character, formal cause, is, how we are) (Greek essentialism) [is-ought (12) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E)].
Antithesis: Existence precedes essence—we define what it means to be human (Sartre—atheist existentialism) [ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)].
Synthesis: Our essence, our final cause, our virtue, how we should be, is to choose Golden Rule love, justified because it answers the question of Ethics (83), true because it corresponds to a perfect being who exists (chooses) this essence at every moment (69). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
Again, according to Aristotle, virtue is what something does best. The virtue of humans (human essentialism), what humans do best (Aristotle: man, in particular), is reason, or contemplation. Contemplation is good for us and makes us happy, virtuous people. To perform virtuously is to make a habit of reasoning well and developing a rational character, which Aristotle equated with moral goodness. Intellectual virtue involves both practical wisdom (phronesis) and theoretical wisdom (philosophy)—the highest virtue. Moral virtue involves reasoning out the Golden Mean (synthesis) between an extreme vice (thesis) and a vice of deficiency (antithesis) in every situation, on a consistent, character-building basis (vice: later in this paper referred to as a sinful trait, a breaking away from the Synthesis). Let’s make this dialectic (58, 66) stand out:
Aristotle’s Golden Mean Dialectic
Thesis: Extreme vice.
Antithesis: Vice of deficiency.
Synthesis: Balance (virtue) between vices of extremism and deficiency.
The Golden Mean is the concept of moderation, of “an action or feeling responding to a particular situation at the right time, in the right way, in the right amount, for the right reason—not too much and not too little,” (4; 374). For example, the Golden Mean (virtue) between being destructively critical and deficiently critical is being constructively critical (author’s example). Let’s make this dialectic (58, 66) stand out:
The Constructive Criticism Dialectic
Thesis: Being destructively critical is an extreme vice.
Antithesis: Being deficiently critical is a vice of deficiency.
Synthesis: The Golden Mean between those vices is to be constructively critical.
You can never perform moderate virtues “in excess” and you can never perform extreme or deficient vices “too little”—they are right or wrong in themselves. Aristotle thought that since there is a rock-solid Golden Mean for every situation (he was not a relativist), there would be no conflict between virtuous people on what the mean is. However, Aristotle’s virtues differ from Christian virtues, because he was tutoring aristocratic youths, one of which became Alexander the Great, so there are certain traits (dealing with anger and pride) Christians would consider vices but Aristotle would consider virtues. The conflict between Aristotle’s virtues and Christian virtues is solved by discovering (71) the standard of Golden Rule love in God’s essence, the essence in which we are created (45), as demonstrated in Christ’s sacrifice (see Objection 1 in Appendix E). The Golden Rule is like the Golden Mean, but love is built into it. Reason, then, is not our ultimate purpose, and neither is power; reason and power are what enable us to choose our ultimate purpose: Golden Rule love.
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s teleology fascinated Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). Purpose, built-in virtue, implies a Designer (in accordance with his good nature). Humans who freely fulfill God’s purpose are doing his will. However, some have argued that if we conform to ‘supposedly’ built-in purpose, we are no better than self-conscious tools and should make our own purpose instead. Sartre, discussed later, does not acknowledge essential purpose and views a choice in favor of it to be a cop-out made in bad faith (but see Objection 13 in Appendix E). Sartre says we are “condemned to be free,” unknowingly implying that it is our built-in purpose to create and claim our own purpose, that we are condemned to be self-conscious tools. Some would see choice as a gift, not condemnation…the reason we are ends having objective, intrinsic value, and not means having merely extrinsic value. Free will, choice, is what makes Golden Rule love (a choice) possible—“love” is the point of having a choice. Condemned to love? Romans 6:18 comes to mind, and what Tim Keller says about love being the most liberating freedom-loss (see Objection 1 in Appendix E). We’ll get to that later.
Making reason, or a rational character, the highest virtue misses the point (the why, the fuel and destination) of being and behaving well with the Other (failing L1.3, 70), as does making power the highest virtue, as some do. Although we should behave rationally in our dealings with the Other, "reasoning well," like being powerful, does not even require an Other to be in existence (failing L1.3, 70). As a consequence of putting reason and power over Golden Rule love, it seems the goal of Greek virtue theory is to cultivate the sort of character (L1.2) one can be proud of, whereas Christian virtue is not something one can boast about, because God’s love cannot be earned or lost, and he shapes our virtue. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the problem with Greek essentialism, besides being classist and sexist, in Socrates’/Plato’s case, is that it had no anchor (eternal love implies eternal personhood, and they didn’t even get the “love” part yet, even though they had a bunch of different words for it), and in Aristotle’s case, is that, according to the is-ought (12) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E), no (eternal) ought can logically be derived from anything in the (ever-changing) natural universe (is), including from evolving humans. God's Golden Rule love, the source of genuine happiness, cannot be taken away, even in the midst of turmoil, whereas our ability to contemplate can be taken away by various causes. Again, that is why Greek and human essentialism is 'created,' not discovered (71), as in divine essentialism—human essence is patterned after divine essence (Golden Rule) (see Appendix G). The natural universe can, however, have its being within the divine source of that standard. The uncreated (71), eternal, ultimate end (consequences) of both being (character) and doing (conduct), is Golden Rule love that endures all circumstances: love the Other as self. Still, it is intriguing that the true and the good are united in Greek virtue theory, as Christians acknowledge God is truth and love.
What Should We Do? Deontology
Intentionalism
“Peter Abelard (1079-1142) argued that an act is right if done with good intentions and wrong if done with evil intentions. … [However], clearly, bad intentions will make an act wrong, but good intentions will not necessarily make an act right. Intention is only one aspect of an ethical action. Another essential aspect is whether the intentions are in accord with what is intrinsically right (namely, a law or divine command),” (1; 402). While it is true that, unlike with hypocrisy, the external behavior must be in line with the internal intention (the how must be in line with the why, L1.1) (63, post 363), the only way anything can be essentially moral is if it is in line with essential Golden Rule love (see Objection 16 in Appendix E), which is necessarily willful, which is God. Some people think they are acting with good intentions, but they are basing their definition of ‘good’ off of a human invention of what good means, or off of a corrupted version of what God says is good. All behaviors outside God's will are also intentional behaviors, though the intention may not have been to act outside his will. ‘Ought not’ implies ‘can avoid’—and one cannot avoid doing what one does not know one is doing, so even if someone is intentionally doing something, if they don’t know it is a sin, they are not intentionally sinning—but it is still sin, because it is not in line with God’s essential Golden Rule love (which forgives all that). Because intentionalism is incorrect, even if a person feels no remorse for what they have done, a wrong act is still wrong. And sometimes remorse is felt when we never intended to do wrong: Some memories come from the brain without intentionally recalling them and sensation comes from the body without intention (in cases where one hasn’t sought the cause of the sensation). We are responsible and should feel remorseful only for the wrong thoughts we intend (and should hold every thought captive), but just because we value our intentions as good doesn’t mean they are God’s essential Golden Rule love. Abelard’s intentionalism, beyond requiring that our intentions are ‘good’, does not tell us how or why (the fuel and destination) we should be or behave with the Other and self (failing L1.3, 70), because it does not define ‘good’ (double-check).
Deontology: “Don’t hate me ‘cause I’m dutiful.”
Whereas the Greeks thought they discovered (71) moral value in developing one’s character (review L1.2) according to a built-in purpose, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), though valuing a virtuous disposition, a good will, thought he discovered the answer to “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” in the categorical imperative: "Always act so that you can will that your maxim can become a universal law,” (5e) with the consequence of everyone’s moral sense being respected. In deontology (“deon” meaning “duty”), the categorical imperative is “a moral obligation or command that is unconditionally and universally binding” (m-w.com), as opposed to any number of hypothetical (conditional) imperatives, like “I won’t jump off cliffs with my friends, because I don’t want to die,” which depend on the situation and desires of the actor. Kant reasoned that it is not the actual consequences, nor the anticipated consequences, but the good will behind the intention, which makes an action morally good. Having good will means having respect, despite any opposing inclination, for our duty to the universal maxim (categorical imperative), the rule that applies to everyone (passing L3). When considering the morality of an act, you must ask, 1) what is the maxim (rule) of the act you are contemplating, and 2) would that act (regardless who commits it) still be possible, or would it undermine your original intention, if everyone (universal) followed that maxim? On the surface, the words “will” and “become” (and Kant’s autonomous “lawmaker”—though we haven’t used it here) sound like voluntarism (70), like we will moral truth into becoming, but underneath, Kant’s categorical imperative is a method of discovery (71) (passing L2), of making our behavior conform to what we already intuitively know. Same deal when God is referred to as a lawmaker—he wills in accordance with his good nature, rather than ‘creating’ some new goodness (see Appendix G). Perhaps it would have been better to word it this way: “Always and only act if your maxim qualifies as a universal law.”
If you base your actions dutifully on respect for the universal maxims they uphold, regardless what your inclinations might be, even if the consequences turn out bad (and you may be held responsible to repair the damages), then your actions are moral. If you base your actions on how it might make you feel, or whether the consequences/outcome will be favorable for you or the Other, then your actions have no moral worth (though they might be immoral), because you were not trying to do "the right thing" (4) (you had other motives on your mind) according to Kant. But C.S. Lewis (1898-1963) wrote, “If there lurks in most modern minds the notion that to desire our own good and to earnestly hope for the enjoyment of it is a bad thing, I suggest that this notion has crept in from Kant and the Stoics and is no part of the Christian faith. Indeed, if we consider the unblushing promises of reward and the staggering nature of the rewards promised in the Gospels, it would seem that our Lord finds our desires, not too strong, but too weak. We are half-hearted creatures, fooling around with drink and sex and ambition when infinite joy is offered us, like an ignorant child who wants to go on making mud pies in a slum because he cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday at the sea. We are far too easily pleased,” (16). In other words, though Golden Rule love is often difficult, we should feel free to love loving, rather than shouldering the burden of considering it more noble to, and feeling guilty when we don’t, suffer through it. “My yoke is easy, my burden is light,” (Matthew 11:30); “I came that they may have life, and have it abundantly,” (John 10:10). What Lewis and Jesus are saying here is not to be confused with egoism (discussed later), which gives moral priority to that which results in the best outcome in favor of the group (Bentham and Mill’s utilitarianism) or the individual (Rand’s Objectivism) [see below, and (52)]. God’s Golden Rule love transcends both good and bad circumstances and is what truly satisfies. This can be summarized in this dialectic (58, 66)…
The Love and Logic, “Law was Made for Man” Dialectic
Thesis: Logic or ethical rationalism if all by itself. Kant’s “man was made for law” thinking.
Antithesis: Love or emotivism if all by itself. Egoism’s “whatever results in my/our definition of happiness” thinking.
Synthesis: Logic and love (“law was made for man” thinking), reason and intuition (L1.1, L1.3). All legislation should conform to the Golden Rule.
The law was made to guide humans back to essential Golden Rule love, rather than man being made for the purpose of being under that guide. Kant lost sight of this, falling into the same trap of the Pharisees, and Sartre, whom we will discuss in the section on Existentialism, rightly objected to it.
Notice that to determine whether or not our intentions are to do the right thing, we do not have to wait and see how the consequences pan out, we simply "determine whether we could imagine others doing to us what we intend to do to them. In other words, Kant proposes a variant of the Golden Rule. … (It) draws on the same fundamental realization that I called a spark of moral genius in the Golden Rule: It sees self and others as fundamentally similar,” (4; 222, 225)—we share the same rationality and the same moral sense by virtue of being human beings, and so the rules are the same for all of us. A common, though not universal, interpretation of Kant is that he “had harsh words for the old Golden Rule. He thought it was just a simplistic version of his own categorical imperative and that it could even be turned into a travesty. If you don’t want to help others, just claim you don’t want or need help from them!” (4; 225) At any rate—instead of viewing the GR as “more simplistic” one could view it as “more basic” or “more essential” (see Appendix G and Objection 12 in Appendix E). Kant’s criticism (if it is a correct interpretation) is answered this way: The Golden Rule (treat the Other how you would want to be treated; love Other as self) includes the Platinum Rule (treat the Other how they would want to be treated), considering we would want the Other to put themselves in our shoes in their interactions with us (see The Platinum-Golden Dialectic in appendices A and G). So you should put yourself in the shoes of a person who genuinely needs help and help them even if, in the same situation, you would not ask for it (see Objection 7 in Appendix E)—and seriously reconsider asking for help.
Mill, whom we will soon discuss, would say the categorical imperative does actually imply concern for consequences, since in effect it is asking, "What are the consequences of everyone doing what you want to do?" In addition, “…the act of killing is inseparable from the result of someone being killed. Likewise, the act of stealing is inseparable from the result that something is stolen. Hence, even deontological ethics is concerned about results of actions—immediate ones,” (1; 392). However, the focus is on the logical implications, on not undermining your original intention, on consistently respecting everyone’s shared moral sense, rather than on the “actual” consequences. Another criticism of the categorical imperative is that it has a loophole: Making the maxim so specific that, after universalizing it, it can only apply to you. Observe that consequences are exceptions that are foundations for a maxim; even a universal has a situational context: The consequence of killing is ending a person’s life, resulting in the maxim "Do not (intend to) kill IF it will end the person's life.” You can prevent the loophole by restricting everything that comes after the IF to only the direct, natural, common consequences of the action. This would prevent maxims like “Do not kill if your name is not George.”
If we make the rules different for ourselves than for the Other, we are not respecting what is similar in all of us and are offending our shared moral sense, turning our fellow human beings into means to our own ends, similar to the way harming an animal offends our moral sense: "It dulls (our) shared feeling of their pain and so weakens and gradually uproots a natural predisposition that is very serviceable to morality in one's relations with other men," (Kant, 4; 237). Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative personalizes this respect for our common humanity: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means,” (Kant, 4; 234). Notice that this rule applies not only to how we treat the Other, but to how we treat ourselves. It is also the basis for an argument in favor of natural rights. Indeed, Kant envisioned a Kingdom of Ends wherein everyone would treat each Other as an end and not merely as means.
However, Kant did not go far enough. The problem with his categorical imperative is that he started from recognizing (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E) our sameness, but, as with Greek virtue theory, logic became divorced from love. Recall the earlier discussion on the rolls reason and emotion play in discovering (71) the moral standard. Kant emphasized pure logic (not committing a double-standard, but not undermining one’s original intention) so that our moral predisposition had to be warped in order for our will to be considered ‘good,’ because our shared moral sense apprehends more than just undermined intentions and double-standards, it senses “the” standard (Golden Rule love, the fuel and destination). For example, even if lying will prevent someone’s murder, Kant would have said to tell the truth out of respect for the fact that no one should lie as a rule. One could argue this is a form of legalism, of Phariseism. This grates against our moral sense—the law is for man, not man for the law. As mentioned earlier, the apostle Paul would say the principle is lacking in love and comes off sounding like a resounding gong or a clanging cymbal—it does not resonate. Some criticize the categorical imperative because it does not allow for exceptions, but, as Kant correctly pointed out, “once an exception to a rule is made, there ceases to be a rule,” (17). Instead, he needed to allow for some universal maxims (like “never murder”) to be greater goods than others (like “never lie”), which would’ve helped solve conflicts between them. The murder victim is a means to the honest person’s immoral end (if Kant had seen this, he would not have agreed with it), considering preventing murder is a greater good than being honest with a murderer. This Greater Good View will be discussed later.
Kant’s over-emphasis of reason has led some critics to point out that "The real world provides examples of people who most of us believe acted irrationally while in their own minds following a sure rational path toward a goal. [. . .] So, if the rationality of one's decisions depends on one's personal interpretation of the situation, how can the categorical imperative be a guarantee that we will all reach the same conclusion if only we use logic? [. . .] Kant seems to assume that we all have the same general goals, which serve as a guarantee of the rationality of our actions. Change the goals, though, and the ideal of a reasonable course of action takes on a new meaning," (4; 228). For example, if your goal is to cause mayhem, then categorical mayhem will not undermine your original intention. This further illustrates that rationality alone is not the basis of moral behavior. The problem of conflicting goals and legalism is solved if you see that there is only one goal, one purpose, one source of the meaning of life, one way to answer how and why we should be or behave with the Other and self, and we either use our reason to move towards him, towards Golden Rule love, or away from him, away from love. We will talk more about goals when we get to pragmatism.
Kant passes all three parts of the litmus test, except that he should have allowed for the uncreated (71), eternal, ultimate end (consequences) of both being (character) and doing (conduct), to be, not following rules for the sake of following rules, but Golden Rule love that endures all circumstances: love the Other as self (L1.1, L1.3). This goes back to the synthesis between the importance of logic and love, reason and intuition. Maybe then Kant would have allowed for a universal maxim to be a Greater Good (as opposed to a “lesser evil” or “third alternative,” discussed below), allowing us to save a potential victim’s life, rather than requiring we be truthful to a would-be murderer about the possible victim’s whereabouts, taking all the love and joy out of the Golden Rule he considered too simplistic, but which he should have left in its essential form (see Appendix G).
Since natural rights are mentioned in this section, we are going to take a break and discuss them in more detail before we consider utilitarianism.
Morality and Legal Justice
The two opposing viewpoints of how morality and legal justice relate are naturalism (essentialism), and legal positivism (voluntarism, 70) (see L2). It seems naturalism and essentialism should be two separate categories (resulting in three categories, two of which are both voluntarism: naturalism and legal positivism), but Nina Rosenstand, author of my ethics text (4), lumps them together. Naturalism in the context of this particular discussion is the viewpoint that the laws of society should reflect universal moral standards originating from God (voluntarism or essentialism, depending on which brand of naturalism), and/or are part of human nature (voluntarism by default, in that it commits the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E) and so is not a discovered (71) truth, even if it is assumed to be—it is actually a mere construct, not of indifferent nature, but of human will. Legal positivism is the viewpoint that the laws of society should be based on a consensus of legislators, because there are no (easily agreed-upon) universal moral standards. [Aside: Some might argue that even if there are (easily agreed-upon) universal moral standards, it would be intolerant to force them upon people, and so favor legal positivism, because it is much more tolerant to (tongue in cheek) force upon people laws made by fallible legislators (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). Others feign loyalty to anarchism, thinking that humans should stop making baseless laws (at best, the base is impossible to know) and let nature take its course.] This paper is written from a naturalist (divine essentialism) viewpoint, that the laws of society, and how their violation is dealt with, should reflect universal moral standards both anchored in God (Golden Rule love, the fuel and destination—see Objection 16 in Appendix E) and resonating with human nature (intuition and reason), essentially the Golden Rule, which does not give more importance to the Other than to self (or vice versa), but acknowledges the value of both (loving yourself is assumed as good and to be applied to the self of the Other) (L1.3, L3).
A key issue in Ethics is who counts as self, and who counts as the Other. In the parable of the Good Samaritan, a person (neighbor) is one who helps the Other in need (to include the need of our healthy conscience, our moral sense, to be held responsible for our actions). The point of Jesus’ parable is that we should behave as such a neighbor, rather than distracting ourselves with the question of who is our neighbor. That is what it means to be fully human, and before holding the Other to that standard, we should focus on living it out. However, we can still try to answer the question of who to include in “Other” (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E). Any being with characteristics with which we can identify, even if we can't identify with all of their characteristics, is a being we should treat as self. The more characteristics they have with which we can identify, the more like "self" they will feel, whereas the more characteristics they have with which we cannot identify, the more like "Other" they will feel—but, if they have "any" characteristics with which we identify—they are to be treated with the Golden Rule. That isn't to say that our feeling determines self/Other—it is only to say that we are not obligated to the impossible [ought implies can (see note 84 and Objection 24 in Appendix E)]—we can only do the best with what we are able to do, as far as figuring out self/Other. If we recognize self-characteristics, but do not acknowledge them in Golden Rule behavior—that is bad faith (a term discussed in the “Why Ethics?” section and which we will discuss more in the section on Existentialism). That is what made it possible for Jesus to say, “Love your enemy,” and put the onus of “neighborliness” on the one acting. We are not motivated to be a good neighbor so that our own needs will be met [the Golden Rule does not follow the rules of game theory (78, and see Objection 14 in Appendix E)]—if that were our motivation, we would be practicing egoism, a type of spiritual isolationism, discussed later. The only motivation for love, is love—it is not a game of “tit for tat”. This should be kept in mind when making laws. If they run counter to our hunger (57) for Golden Rule love, rebellion is inevitable.
Not all laws are moral laws directly, like the traffic law that we stop at stop signs. But if we benefit from living among other humans, we ought to live according to the rules of that society, provided they do not conflict with universal moral standards. In such cases, we are duty-bound to violate them. As Martin Luther King, Jr., wrote, “One has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that ‘an unjust law is no law at all,’” (19; written from a Birmingham jail after participating in a nonviolent protest). Note that legal positivism has no basis by which the true justness of a law may be determined. It is a great responsibility to make sure our laws (written or not) conform to discovered (71), unchanging Golden Rule love (God), and to rebel against them and (if possible) change them when they do not, whether they are made by those in power or the oppressed, majority or minority, friend or foe, acquaintance or stranger (L1.1). But, what if a just law is violated?...
A person should never be held responsible, for the sake of social utility (effectually treating the person as means to an end) (L1.1), for a crime they did not commit. However, holding someone responsible (or a group of people, family-size up to global-community) for their violation of or adherence to (just) laws respects their moral sense, as well as the moral sense of all affected by their violation or adherence, ultimately God (see Objection 12 and 20 in Appendix E). Moral indignation is a logical emotional reaction to an offense against moral sense; doing nothing to correct such an offense is morally wrong and leads to social deterioration of varying degrees. On holding violators accountable, Tim Keller writes, “There are many good reasons that we should want to confront wrongdoers. Wrongdoers have inflicted damage and … it costs something to fix the damage. We should confront wrongdoers—to wake them up to their real character, to move them to repair their relationships, or to at least constrain them and protect others from being harmed by them in the future. Notice, however, that all those reasons for confrontation are reasons of Golden Rule love. The best way to love them and the other potential victims around them is to confront them in the hope that they will repent, change, and make things right,” (2; 189-190). One could consider being held accountable for one’s actions a sort of right, but not a very fun one. If those in your life who were supposed to care about you, never cared how you acted—would you feel loved? That is why the strength of a society is the Godly family unit, and why its disintegration predicts the downfall of society. However, there are other less punitive universal rights…
The negative rights, for example, of life, liberty and property (which is the means of sustaining life and liberty) (“negative” rights because nothing is given that we do not already have—what we already have is simply protected), are discovered (71) when we acknowledge an intuitive awareness that every Other is a self, an end that values itself, not merely a means to an end (and that to treat them merely as means is criminal), and that “the limit of an individual’s liberty is the liberty of another person” (4; 277) [the view of Ayn Rand, which is a variation of the Golden Rule (see Objection 12 in Appendix E), though she would ironically disagree (see 59)—her contribution to egoism is discussed later]. Rand did not consider rights absolute: If you infringe on another’s rights, you forfeit your own. However, it could be argued that you do not forfeit your own absolute rights (to be treated according to the Golden Rule)—it is just that the rights of the Other cannot, in this case, be respected at the same time, and so the rights of the person or people upon whose rights you have infringed, take precedent, and the consequences you face would follow the Golden Rule. This is an application of the Greater Good, as opposed to the “lesser evil” or “third alternative” theories of moral conflict resolution, all three discussed at the end of the section, “The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy.”
The positive right of having our basic needs met by the Other when we are incapable of meeting them is discovered (71) when we acknowledge that, if we are incapable of meeting our own needs, we cannot enjoy our negative rights. This dialectic (58, 66) shows how granting negative and positive rights does not mean helping people who should be helping themselves, but only those who genuinely need help:
The Platinum-Golden Dialectic
Thesis: Give the Other what they want (over-simple Platinum Rule).
Antithesis: Give the Other what you want (over-simple Golden Rule).
Synthesis: Give the Other what a self in its right mind would want (essence of the Golden Rule, which includes the Platinum Rule). [ See Appendix G: Synthesizing Golden Rule Variations and Competing Ethical Theories. ]
A self in its right mind would not want to be helped (to take resources from the Other) when it should be helping itself (see Objection 8 in Appendix E). Also see L1.3, as this is a variation of it.
Tim Keller advocates a “band of brothers” (and sisters)—“a group of Christians who [have] a concern for justice in the world but who [ground] it in the nature of God rather than in their own subjective feelings,” (2; xiii). In another section he mentions a spiritual third way (the first two ways being traditional conservative and secular liberal) that is “much more concerned about the poor and social justice than Republicans have been, and at the same time much more concerned about upholding classic Christian moral and sexual ethics than Democrats have been,” (2; xx). With all this in mind, we move on to utilitarianism…
What Should Result? Consequentialism
The End Justifies the Means
One consequentialist theory that we can quickly rule out, because, like Greek virtue theory, it does not capture the “why” behind how we should be or behave with the Other and self (fails L1.3, 70), is Niccolo Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) thought that any means, including force and deceit, are justified by the end of maintaining political power (also fails L1.1, 70). We can achieve political power without an Other ever existing (the last man standing is the supreme ruler of the Earth and all its resources), and so achieving political power is not the why (L1.3, 70) behind the original question. As Martin Luther King, Jr. (1929-1968) practiced in peaceful protests during the Civil Rights Movement, the means are the seed sewn and the end is the fruit (L1.1, 70). This is why he spoke against violent means to a peaceful end (as promoted by Malcolm X during the same period), and encouraged sewing peaceful seeds to yield the fruit of peace (19). Consistent conduct shapes character, which shapes conduct, and the ultimate end of both character and conduct is Golden Rule love (see Objection 16 in Appendix E). If the end really justifies the means, it can justify failing to treat all selves interchangeably (failing L1.3, 70). This can all be summarized in a dialectic (58, 66)…
(L1.1) The How and Why (Means and End) Dialectic
(See Objection 9 in Appendix E.)
Thesis: ‘Why’ (the internal end) is more important than ‘how’ (the external means) (consequentialist theories).
Antithesis: ‘How’ (the external means) is more important than ‘why’ (the internal end) (conduct theories).
Synthesis: A ‘how’ (means) without a ‘why’ (end) is pointless; a ‘why’ (end) without a ‘how’ (means) is impossible to apply [Golden Rule is both ‘why’ (love) and how—see Objection 16 in Appendix E on the GR being love].
Machiavellianism certainly isn’t divine essentialism, and so is voluntaristic (70) by default [in that it is not a discovered truth (71), even if it is assumed to be—it is actually a mere construct, not of indifferent nature, but of human will] (failing L2), and fails all three parts of the litmus.
Utilitarianism
In utilitarianism (group, or collective, egoism), “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” is answered by exalting the consequence (L1.1) of bringing about the greatest happiness in the greatest number of people, and emphasizing conducting the greatest happiness principle to achieve happy consequences for as many people as possible [a happy character is important in ideas like ataraxia and eudemonia (87)]. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory because it stipulates the happiest possible consequences (as opposed to character or conduct) for everyone affected by the action. The Epicureans (hedonists, 4th century B.C.) were the first to proclaim that “What brings the maximal pleasure and the minimal pain is the right thing to do,” (4; 356), however, they left a lot of questions unanswered (not so sure this is 100% true), like Isn’t some pleasure bad, like sadistic pleasure, and some pain good, like pangs of conscience (moral sense)? “Pleasure for whom and for how long? Pleasure for the individual and for the moment? What about for all men and for all time?” (4; 356). Emotivism falls under the same questioning. While Hume is credited with inventing the term utilitarianism (he believed an act should have utility, should make the actor and the Other happy), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) is credited with developing this idea into a complete moral theory.
Bentham’s principle of utility, or the greatest-happiness principle, is as follows: “When choosing a course of action, always pick the one that will maximize happiness and minimize unhappiness for the greatest number of people,” (4; 175). In hedonistic utilitarianism (hedonism being pleasure-seeking), happiness or pleasure have intrinsic value (they are valuable in and of themselves, ‘almost’ making this an essentialist theory, but failing L2 with its anchorless happiness, 70), and anything that helps achieve them has instrumental value (they are tools utilized to achieve happiness or pleasure). One criticism of act utilitarianism (Bentham) is that it makes pain immoral, whereas one could argue that pangs of conscience (moral sense) are not bad; are good pain, alerting us so that we can stop immoral behavior, the way our body alerts us with pain so that we can fix what is causing the physical pain. Utilitarianism utilizes the hedonistic (hedonic) calculus, which is basically a souped up pros-and-cons list. However, it’s rigged, because biased humans assign the numerical values to the pros and cons, and while this is very egalitarian, it commits the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E) (cultural voluntarism, 70; failing L2), because how people actually assign value to the pros and cons is not necessarily how they ought to assign value (L1). Allowing people to determine the value of the pros and cons is a problem referred to as “tyranny of the majority” (this will also come up when we discuss relativism) but better recognized as the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). That a majority says something is good or bad, doesn’t make it “really” so. Also, humans are not omniscient and cannot see the future in order to know what consequences will actually happen in order to rate them. Any cutting-off point, like “think five steps ahead,” is arbitrary.
Furthermore, though the calculus leaves it up to the individual to decide what constitutes pain and pleasure and includes the person’s own pain and pleasure along with everyone else’s (passes L1.3, fails L2, 70), if only a few suffer from the consequences of the act, then the overall pleasure (the end) justifies their suffering (the means) (this is the problem of ‘sheer numbers’)—and we already saw how this “end justifies the means” thinking (made worse by criminally using the suffering few as mere means, legitimizing human rights violations, which Bentham had not intended) fails all three parts of the litmus (70), and so, too, act utilitarianism fails.
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) (Bentham’s godson) attempted to solve this with rule utilitarianism, which would be phrased "Don't do something (like cause the minority to suffer so that the majority will somehow benefit) if you can't imagine it as a rule for everybody (everyone should suffer), because a rule not suited for everyone can have no good overall consequences," (4; 201, excluding content inside parentheses) (this is said by Nina Rosenstand, the author of the referenced textbook, to be the Golden Rule, fortified, again suggesting the GR is more basic, more essential—see Appendix G) (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). This differs from Kant’s categorical imperative because it is focused on overall consequences, whereas the cat imp is supposed to be followed even if we calculate that it will not result in the common good (L1.1). [Maybe this is a good place to discuss ‘just war’?]
Mill acknowledged that there are higher pleasures that may come after many long hours of sacrifice, like the pleasure of building your own home, and revised Bentham’s utilitarianism by taking out the egalitarian element that left it up to the individual to determine what constitutes pain and pleasure, and instead determined the higher pleasures to be what the educated actually desire. Although allowing educated people to determine the higher pleasures is often referred to as “tyranny of the majority”—it is really just the is-ought (12) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E) (cultural voluntarism; fails L2 and L3), because it claims that people determine the truth, rather than discovering it. What people actually desire is not necessarily what they ought to desire (fails L1, 70). That a majority (even a majority of educated people, who may actually constitute a minority) says something is good, doesn’t make it so. And who determines whether or not one is educated enough to determine higher pleasures? It’s rigged, just like the hedonic calculus.
Bentham’s main goal in developing the theory of utilitarianism was to remodel the British legal system which allowed for unfair advantages. Mill took it even further with the harm principle, that the only reason to interfere with a person’s liberty is self-/Other-protection. This view of personal liberties is referred to as classical liberalism, and when ensured by the government, is referred to as modern liberalism, and when teamed up with a laissez-faire (hands-off, non-interference) government, is referred to as a conservative economic philosophy (greatly emphasized by the Libertarian Party). It is safe to assume Mill didn’t see the harm principle (of non-interference) as conflicting with letting the educated determine the higher pleasures for everyone else, because he believed in exposing everyone to the higher pleasures through education so they would become competent judges with the freedom to enjoy or reject them (passes L1.3, but still fails L2 and L3, 70). But, if the end of pleasure is achieved, according to whoever is deemed "educated," the means are justified, regardless what causes the pleasure, or what takes greater effort and skill. This opens the door to justifying many evil means (L1.1), which shows us that the principle of utility does not capture the principle of morality. Wolfgang Carstens (1971- ) made an excellent observation in his “The Knife and the Wound Philosophy” that “only competent judges know what this happiness is and how to achieve it,” (20; 13) and one could argue God and those who accept and reflect his unmerited Golden Rule love are the only competent judges. Caveat: “Unmerited love” and “judge” must never be separated. Those who don’t know about God’s unmerited love are not judged in their ignorance (remember, God knows whom He has forgiven for neglecting to nurture their moral sense), but they are missing out on the point.
“There is … some truth in relating good to long-range results. If there is an absolutely good God, then surely He is interested in bringing about the greatest good for the greatest number in the long run. …since only an omniscient God can determine what will bring the greatest good to the greatest number in the long run, then only God is in a position to determine the right way to bring about these best results. …there must be some concept of what is intrinsically right apart from the results. …This intrinsic value must be inside his own nature rather than outside; otherwise there would be some ultimate beyond God. In brief, even the theistic version of utilitarianism reduces to a deontological duty to be God-like. It is, in the final analysis, a rule-centered duty geared toward emulating the ultimate good (God),” (1; 360, 393-394). Emphasizing the “end” allows for evil means and character (see Objection 9 in Appendix E)—there must be a standard which judges the means, the character, and the end to be right. What is lacking in utilitarianism, what would prevent it from reducing to group egoism, is to define happiness (the fuel and destination) as the uncreated (71), eternal, ultimate end (consequences) of both being (character) and doing (conduct)—Golden Rule love that endures all circumstances: love the Other as self.
Pragmatism
Pragmatism, or instrumentalism, is a consequentialist theory that equates true and good, but, unlike Greek virtue theory, reduces them both to what works best to obtain desired results, not necessarily the common good (like utilitarianism). Something can be true without evidence, as long as it makes you happy or has some other use. Another problem with this view is it does not matter what the desired results are, as long as they are attained (see L1.1). There is no question of whether it is good or bad to desire such results, or whether the means which worked to produce those results were ethical or unethical—pragmatism would say “it worked—it is both true and good.” Like Greek virtue theory and Machiavellianism, pragmatism does not capture the why behind how we should be or behave with the Other and self (failing L1.3, 70), as we can accomplish ends and goals without an Other ever existing—people don’t necessarily enter into the discussion (besides the fact that desires and discussions are impossible without people). If the end really justifies the means, it can justify failing to treat all selves interchangeably (failing L1.3, 70). It certainly isn’t divine essentialism, and so is voluntaristic by default [in that it is not a discovered (71) truth, even if it is assumed to be—it is actually a mere construct, not of indifferent nature, but of human will, 70] (failing L2). Pragmatism should not be confused with teleology (concerned with the ultimate purpose, goal, end...the final cause)—Golden Rule love is right whether or not it is expedient. Now for a little warm-up before jumping in to existentialism…
Free to Be or Not to Be…
Most of us do not ask if we have free will. We feel responsible for our choices, hold people responsible for their choices, and never give it much thought whether we or they are really free to choose. If we had to respond to the question of free will, we might respond with more questions: Why do we even use the word “intend” if we never freely intend anything? Why do we distinguish between unintentional behavior and intentional behavior, if the intentional behavior is no more free than unintentional behavior? Why do we deliberate between our options, if we are not free to choose? Why do we punish criminals and reward children, if they are not free to choose?
Granted, we have limited options, but it seems that we are free to choose from among those options. “I did not have the option” does not equate to “I did not have free will.” Also, we can shape which options will occur to us as conceivable by refusing to entertain thoughts about options we do not want to occur to us, and by choosing to entertain thoughts about options we do want to occur to us. Those thoughts we entertain most will occur to us most, which is part of why it is so hard to break a habit, and which is why part of breaking a habit is distracting yourself and keeping your mind busy with other things (like healthy habits). Habitual behavior is free behavior, because actions, including thoughts, performed as a matter of habit, confirm a pattern of past intention, and habits can be broken with new intentions. Certainly not all of the behavior of our body is voluntary, like cell reproduction and habitual thoughts that occur when we are trying to break a habit, but one could argue that the involuntary behavior of our body is not “our” behavior, and hopefully, if necessary, we learn how to bring that behavior under our control.
Golden Rule love is a choice, and sin is its alternative choice (see Objection 16 in Appendix E). When we make a habit of either, we are still choosing, but some of the choice has become “second nature” to us and can be made without thinking it through. It is just like driving to or from work without even thinking about it. We are not driving against our will—we are willfully driving—our will is just on autopilot. If we notice anything out of the ordinary that needs quick, immediate action, we will come out of our autopilot state and make conscious decisions. The same is true of our moral decisions—we will choose how we have always chosen, without really thinking it through, unless we are given reason to give it more thought and choose differently. So we can never blame our mistakes or victories on blind will—if we didn’t really want to do what we did, we would have stopped ourselves from doing it, just as we would come out of autopilot and slam on the breaks the second we notice the car running the red light.
How we think about this is important, because if we truly feel that we do not have free will and cannot control our thoughts and behavior, this will be reflected in our choices, especially if we think that in the end, none of it matters.
Look at Joseph Duncan’s blog at http://fifthnail.blogspot.com as an example, albeit an extreme one (47). To ask if Duncan’s choice of evil was compelled begs the question of whether or not evil is even a real option. Did Duncan commit evil? Was it sin? Was he free to have chosen better, and would it have been essentially better than what he chose, or is “better” an illusion, is there no alternative to evil, because there is no essential good, and therefore no evil (no privation, absence, of essential good), and so he did not choose evil in the first place? We will discuss whether or not he had free will a little later in this section, but for now we will consider whether “good” is a real option, and “evil” its real alternative.
There are five opposing positions to choose from on sin or evil and what it implies about God, the first four being insufficient and answered by the fifth, which is correct (some or all of these alternatives are discussed in Ravi Zacharias’ “Jesus among Other Gods” and Geisler and Feinberg’s “Introduction to Philosophy / A Christian Perspective”)—you will see we cannot discuss sin or evil without discussing free will.
1. Evil and suffering exists, therefore a good/omnipotent Creator does not exist. This comes from Epicurus (341-270 BCE) and is called the Epicurean paradox, or Riddle of Epicurus:
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?
This explanation contradicts itself because it implies an objective, transcendent good (God) (because without good, there can be no evil, because evil is the privation of good, explained in option five), and then denies the existence of that good (God). In order to condemn God for not preventing all evil, you must first admit the “real” good which describes him, and so in condemning God, you would be negating the real good, so that there is no real basis from which to condemn him (and no him, if he doesn’t exist, since he isn’t good). All forms of suffering (whether or not it is punishment for sin) can draw us closer and into a deeper relationship with God, who is there regardless of circumstances, a never-changing anchor in the stormy vicissitudes of life (a Melville-ism). This can be seen in a dialectic (58, 66)…
The Theodicy Dialectic
Thesis: God is good and all-powerful.
Antithesis: Evil and suffering are real, so either God is not good, or is not all-powerful to prevent evil and suffering.
Synthesis: God is good and all-powerful when He allows us to choose or reject Golden Rule love-despite-circumstances.
Couldn’t it instead be that there are reasons God does not prevent all suffering? What would happen if He did prevent all suffering? We could never be able to make a choice which would lead to suffering (even self-sacrifice; there goes free will)—and so Golden Rule love would be impossible (love being a choice), and we’d never know the sort of love for which we hunger (57)—and God (a study in self-sacrifice, showing that love is more important than being free from suffering) would blink out of existence (impossible if He ‘is’).
Would it be a fair trade to end all suffering, but in so doing, to also end all truly living? Most folks who’ve suffered greatly would answer a resounding “No.” Nietzsche said some things on this which ring true, about suffering making you stronger (but, stronger to love!), about great heights being made possible by great depths. One is reminded of Ivan’s speech to Alyosha in Dostoevsky’s “Brothers Karamazov”—"Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end... but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature ... And to found that edifice on its unavenged tears: would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell me the truth!" If you were the child, would you want the world, all its past, all its present, all its future (lives) never to exist, on account of ending your suffering? No child would want that who wasn’t taught to be selfish and hateful. Of course that does not justify ‘our’ allowing a child to suffer. We are obligated to help—if we cause the child’s suffering, or allow it to continue—it is we who are responsible, not God. If you only want God to end the suffering that no one else can end, and that no one brought on themselves—what about everyone else?—what real standard makes that okay? What about forgiveness? What about learning about the sort of Golden Rule love that is greater than our suffering (74) (see Objection 1 in Appendix E)?
2. All is god (pantheism) and there is no evil (see Dawkins quote in #4). Hinduism explains the perception of evil as induced by ignorance (3; 120). However, Hinduism’s doctrine of reincarnation, of paying your debt of karma (known to Jews and Christians as the debt of sin — the consequence of which is death, complete separation from God, rather than...), having to ‘suffer’ through another life (although an infant has done nothing to earn your debt... and what debt did the first human incur?) inadvertently acknowledges the reality of evil (the corruption of good) while denying it and utterly missing the point.
3. Dualism: Good and evil in eternal opposition. This assumption: “If the past, present, and future are complete before it all started, then from God’s perspective there is no change, and even evil is unchanging, essential to reality…” fails to distinguish between temporal and eternal. Absolutes are anchored in the eternal, reflected in the temporal. Evil is limited to the temporal (changing), is not an opposite of Golden Rule love (unchanging), and is certainly not a reflection of it, but a privation of it. (To clarify: The temporal is not itself evil.)
There is an argument that centers around the narrative of the Fall found in the book of Genesis. This argument claims God failed to provide a consequence Adam and Eve would understand (because they had no idea what death was), and so they were acting in ignorance and didn’t mean to sin; they didn’t possess free choice, they didn’t ‘know’ what they were doing, until after eating the fruit from the Tree of the ‘Know’ledge of Good and Evil. Entangled in this argument is the belief that in order to know “good” they had to know “evil” (and vice versa)—and so God’s command to not eat of that tree was a command against knowledge. However (if this narrative actually happened, and if we grant they had no idea what death was), in Eden, Adam and Eve knew the difference between eating and not eating the fruit. It is not that their freedom began when they ate of the fruit and God killed an animal to demonstrate death and make them clothing. Before they ate the fruit, they were freely following God. Understanding the consequences was not necessary for them to ‘know’ that they were doing something God warned them not to do, and we should not only do right when there is a reward for it or a punishment for doing wrong (our only motivation should be God’s unmerited Golden Rule love, by which they were surrounded). Additionally, how would God have given a proper demonstration of the kind of death he meant—breaking unity with him (essential life and goodness)? Adam and Eve could have had as much knowledge as God could give them if they had asked him for it. He knew the difference between good and evil, and could have explained it to them in a way that would not corrupt them, if they had sought the answer in him. That they broke unity to try to be like God apart from him (essential Golden Rule love) is how they came to be able to distinguish good from evil in a corrupt way, rather than in God’s pure, immune way of knowing, and rather than only knowing good (though, before disobeying God, they didn’t know they knew good, like spiders don’t know they know webs and birds don’t know they know nests—see note 71). Their knowledge of good was the kind of intuitive, innate sense we discussed earlier.
As just mentioned, some have said that we don’t know what good decisions are (and so are not free to make them) until we make ourselves capable of committing and empathizing with the opposite evil. Actually, we don’t know evil without knowing first the good which becomes corrupted (becomes evil). We shouldn’t seek to learn how to better help people by learning how to hurt them worse—it would be better to, say, take a CPR class. The only good purpose of knowing evil is to develop antibodies against it (in ourselves and the Other), but our focus should primarily be to educate ourselves in God’s Golden Rule love. “Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good,” Romans 12:21. Dualism neglects that without the eternal default of good, there is nothing to become corrupted (become evil). Consider this dialectic (58, 66)…
The Privation Dialectic
Thesis: Good and evil are opposites (dualism).
Antithesis: There is no good or evil (because without preexistent good, there can be no evil).
Synthesis: Evil is the privation of a preexistent good.
This synthesis will be discussed further below—but now we come to our antithesis:
4. There is no such thing as evil, because evil implies an essentially objective, transcendent moral law, which only exists if God exists, and God does not exist. This explanation cannot logically demand an explanation for why God allows evil or what He is going to do or has done about it, since it does not allow for the existence of God or evil. To repeat atheist Richard Dawkins’ words (but see note 66), “In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at the bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no other god. Nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is. And we dance to its music,” (24; 133). Though it sounds like Dawkins is saying we have no free will, he actually means that, unless we choose otherwise, we ‘dance’ according to our amoral genes (Sartre, discussed below in the section on Existentialism, would consider this to be dancing in bad faith, if we blame our dancing on our genes). Dawkins is not saying that we absolutely must dance deterministically according to our genes, he only means that “If you would extract a moral from this book, read it as a warning. Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals co-operate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. Let us understand what our selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least have a chance to upset their designs (SG, 3). We have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth…We can even discuss ways of deliberately cultivating and nurturing pure, disinterested altruism, something that has no place in nature, something that has never existed before in the whole history of the world (215),” (64). Far from being born capable of only selfishness, we are also born capable of rational empathy (51). Conscious selfishness has moral meaning, whereas selfish genes do not. That said, Dawkins shows honesty when he admits that there is no “ought” in nature. Unfortunately, he does not recognize that his desire to cultivate “pure, disinterested altruism” is evidence that there is something which satisfies that desire. He encourages us instead to make it up (create it from scratch, when we could instead create toward the eternal) [creating meaning to satisfy our hunger (57) brings to mind the cliché “necessity is the mother of invention”]. Sartre would have sat more easily with Dawkins (until Dawkins’ recent change of mind, note 66), and less easily with Nietzsche.
Some, like Nietzsche (see ‘existentialism’ below), have argued that we are not responsible for our actions and evil is an illusion because we do not have free will, as the universe, including all of our actions within it, is physically determined (upwards causality) (theists would add to or correct determinism with ‘predestined by God’). Schopenhauer said: "A man can do as he will, but not will as he will" (32) because, "Everybody acts not only under external compulsion but also in accordance with inner necessity," (32; Einstein). However, the universe is not physically determined (it is probabilistic), we can influence the universe (30; downwards causality), and God’s predestination of the universe from beyond time (He knows all the probabilistic outcomes) includes our freely willed, self-determined, downward-causing, co-creative actions (with his interaction). A causal relationship is maintained between God and his creation [prayer requests, though directed upward (from within temporality), are granted downward from beyond the beginning], as the temporal came from the eternal but did not become divorced from it—God is both immanent (60) and transcendent. Note that Karl Popper (30) spoke of downward and upward causality but had a much different view of the universe and God.] Many factors, including what we know, determine our conceivable and viable options, but only influence our actions. Free will (thesis) and predestination (antithesis) appear to contradict eachother, but that is resolved by the synthesis that predestination includes our freely willed actions [for more, see (27) and Objection 1 in Appendix E]. Let’s make this dialectic (58, 66), taken from Norman Geisler’s “Chosen but Free” (73) stand out:
The Geisler Dialectic
Thesis: Free will over-rules sovereign predestination (extreme Arminianism).
Antithesis: Sovereign predestination over-rules free will (extreme Calvinism).
Synthesis: Sovereign predestination includes freely willed actions (moderate Calvinism).
And now to discuss further the previous synthesis that evil is the privation of a preexistent good.
5. Sin is co-creating (exercising free will) apart from God (Golden Rule love). God allows the evil He died to forgive, because He cannot compel us to love. Love is not love if it is not chosen (if it is forced upon us), and so requires free will. Without the possibility of rejecting God’s Golden Rule love (at the root of all sin—a breaking away from the Synthesis mentioned in the Greek Virtue Theory section), there is no possibility to choose it. “In a world where love is the supreme ethic, freedom must be built in,” (3; 118). Evil is a privation of love, like blindness is a privation of sight. Evil is “good messed up.” Sin is not an eternal opposite of good, rather, the target (good) must first exist before it can be missed. “The Greek word hamartia (ἁμαρτία) is usually translated as sin in the New Testament; it means ‘to miss the mark’ or ‘to miss the target’ which was also used in Old English archery,” (11). With moral autonomy comes the ability to go one’s own way, set one’s own standards, yes — “become one’s own law-maker” (44)—but the point of moral autonomy is to be able to adopt God’s requirement (our ultimate fulfillment) as our own—Golden Rule love. Since love is perfectly relating (the original point), then sin is de-relating (missing the point). Our ultimate fulfillment and happiness is realized in oneness with God—sin separates us from God, atonement reunites us. This understanding was developed using the old sacrificial system and Jesus’ final sacrifice—communicating that it is God who provides the means of atonement, it is He who rights the wrong and brings us back to him—communicating, “Yes, you have used the freedom I gave you to go your own way and have separated yourself from Me, but I forgave you for all of that before and beyond the beginning. I created you to share my Golden Rule love with you, to share that I love you no matter what, so much that I would die for you.”
However, it is our choice to accept the truth he has revealed about his Golden Rule love, or accept total separation from God and from his unforced approval—that’s the only alternative… and there must be an alternative in order for there to be a choice to love (see Objection 24 in Appendix E). The ultimate consequence of sin, alternative of Golden Rule love, is hell: “In short, hell is simply one’s freely chosen identity apart from God on a trajectory into infinity” (2; 78). But, remember that ‘the hunger’ (55, 57) isn’t shame or guilt, though such things can ignite it. It isn’t about justice so much as it’s about meaning. It's like you buy everyone a round of drinks—those who are your friends, those who will become your friends, and those who will reject you. Only some people accept it. For those who reject it, you offer it to them all over again. They still don't want it—they don't want a hand-out, they throw it back in your face and ask you who you think you are. Your second offer was pointless, and rather than shoving beer down their throats, you let them go without. The ones who wanted a free beer, enjoyed it. What God is offering (never mind turning water into wine; he who believes in him will never be thirsty!) is eternal life—full being. “‘Sin is: In despair not wanting to be oneself before God. …Faith is: That the self in being itself and wanting to be itself is grounded transparently in God,’ [Kierkegaard]” (2; 162). Speaking of transparency; when our face is down in it... that is where he is... that is when we come to him and are known by him the closest. We don't get our act together and then come to him. That defeats the whole point. If you can't be completely transparent, guts and all, in front of God, then the whole universe is a sham. And it isn't. Hell is the ultimate result of choosing to reject transparency and full existence. Sin is a sort of “denaturizing” and our co-creating apart from God might better be termed “de-creating” as long as one acknowledges that the total creation was complete before it started, including our poor choices (in other words, God is never forced to come up with a “plan b”). The section on Existentialism will discuss further that Golden Rule love must be a choice.
Sin is marketed as moral “independence” though some may view it as “independence from morality.” Those intentionally rebelling against God think they are surpassing him. What they do not realize is that there is no surpassing perfection (69), and that what they are actually doing is degenerating apart from his perfect Golden Rule love (apart from the Vine, we wither). Our freedom to reject love and responsibility to choose love is a built-in part of this grand creation over which God is sovereign—nothing surpasses him, and nothing surprises him. That we choose to reject Golden Rule love, that we choose to sin in his creation, does not equate to his endorsing what we choose—but it does equate to his endorsing “choice” (for he is not a dictator) (see Objection 24 in Appendix E). God, like a good father, allows us to learn from our mistakes (including the mistake of neglecting to nurture our children’s moral sense), rather than dysfunctionaly protecting us from them by a) preventing us from making them, or b) preventing us from experiencing the consequences. C.S. Lewis writes, “(Our) free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then, did God give (us) free will? Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having. A world of (robots) would hardly be worth creating. The happiness which God designs for (us) is the happiness of being freely, voluntarily united to him and to each Other in an ecstasy of love and delight compared with which the most rapturous love between a man and a woman on this earth is mere milk and water. And for that (we) must be free,” (18; 48).
We are all capable of good (see Objection 1 in Appendix E). The Golden Rule is found in the creeds of every major culture throughout history (9 and 10) (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). But, to say we can be good without God (i.e., follow the Golden Rule as if we designed it rather than discovered it—see Objection 1 in Appendix E) is similar to discovering e=mc^2 and maintaining that it is created (71) and needs no physical universe (70; 82) [but Golden Rule love is eternal and essential and describes the love that God is (does not describe how humans always are or how we always behave, but only the being and behavior which will truly satisfy us) (69), whereas e=mc^2 describes the temporal]. If we think doing good on our own, apart from God, makes us good, we have an unanchored definition of good. All definitions of good apart from God’s essential, unmerited love are as sandcastles for the tide (72). Apart from him, we are not free to do good, because if God does not exist, there is no “real” good (fulfilled Golden Rule love) (69, 70). He designed our moral sense and capacity for Golden Rule love (after his image) and apart from his eternal goodness (love), the term “good” in the phrase “freedom to do good” has no essential meaning (is a mere idea) (70). The Golden Rule is found in all cultures throughout history (9 and 10) (see Objection 12 in Appendix E), and it is true if it corresponds to an eternally good God.
If we also think that apart from God, our independent goodness makes us worthy of Golden Rule love, then we are also enslaved in a Pharisaical performance mentality and do not understand God's unmerited love. To think that following the Golden Rule makes us worthy of his love shows that we don’t know that his love, his grace, cannot be bought or lost, that he cannot be manipulated into loving us more or less.
Some have argued that it is too limiting, too stifling to adopt God’s definition of good and love. Many of us grow up in ultra-conservative, Pharisaical, no-dancing, restrictive fellowships which warp our conception of right and wrong, and instead of reevaluating those human-created values to discover (71) the eternal, we abandon the whole project, until we are far enough removed from it to be able to look upon it with fresh eyes. What a blessing it is when we find a fellowship that harbors dialogue which explores what Jesus meant by “I came that they may have life” and “the truth will set you free”—which asks, “What then is the moral-spiritual reality we must acknowledge to thrive? What is the environment that liberates us if we confine ourselves to it, like water liberates the fish?” while anchored to the knowledge that “Love is the most liberating freedom-loss of all,” (2; 47, 49, emphasis added). May we be authentic, liberated beings who accept responsibility for our sin and choose full existence, accepting his unmerited love, transparently basing our identity on what we are made to look like through his eyes. Now we are ready to explore existentialism. Does embracing full existence even mean anything, if we reject the essence of Golden Rule love?
Virtue Revisited
The Virtue of Authenticity—Existentialism
In existentialism, “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” is somewhat answered by emphasizing an authentic character (L1.2, L2), valuing that we take responsibility for our choices, and considering important the consequence of responsible freedom. The answer to the question isn’t as important as, to the essentialist, experiencing it as true, and to the voluntarist (70), creating it (ironically considering it more authentic to design something artificial; L2). Soren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and Emmanuel Levinas will be discussed. Kierkegaard and Levinas are essentialists finding authenticity (referred to earlier as “good faith”) in freely choosing, despite adversity, the human responsibility to love (see Objection 16 in Appendix E), whereas Heidegger and Sartre are voluntarists (70) rejecting discovered (71) purpose and finding authenticity in creating how we think humans should be (L2).
Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) wrote about Angst—the dread felt when burdened with inescapable choice-making. Some suffering angst have wished they did not have free will, that God would take over their will and make all their choices for them, but to relinquish responsibility that is only yours to bear is inauthentic. Kierkegaard also wrote that universal truth is not out there but personal—“Subjectivity is Truth”—and he wasn’t talking about cognitive relativism (42). If moral truth is essentially Golden Rule love, for example, Kierkegaard makes a lot of sense, as love is personal and not out there. This means that Christ's revelation may be objectively true whether or not we subscribe to it—but the rubber meets the road where (the whole point is that) we put our trust in him, love him back—that is the 'real' Truth (point). It means that if examining the evidence for God’s existence leads you to intellectually accept the truth of Christ's revelation—if it doesn't go any further than your brain—if it doesn't sink into your heart—you still don't have the Truth (see Objection 6 in Appendix E). Kierkegaard was angered by clergy who focused on evidence (knowing/believing "that" God exists) and never demonstrated saving faith (knowing God "personally" and believing "in" God). That's why he focused so much on faith. But he wasn't "against" evidence—he just knew nothing can be proved/known with certainty (and that much of Christianity feels like counter-evidence, like the God-man, which seems paradoxical), and that the 'virtue' sort of faith (trust "in" God) is where it is at (but see Objection 24 in Appendix E). It was the inauthenticity (which Sartre will later term “bad faith”) of the external legalism of the Pharisees that Jesus so strongly confronted and warned against. Kierkegaard wrote that we must confront our sin, responsibility, and God’s forgiveness as an individual, but that we progress dialectically through three stages (58, 66) before being able to do this.
The Kierkegaard Dialectic
Thesis: Aesthetic stage of sensuous enjoyment.
Antithesis: Ethical stage of following others’ rules.
Synthesis: Religious stage of enjoying a trusting relationship with God.
We start out in the aesthetic stage of sensuous enjoyment, unconcerned with right and wrong (thesis) until we hunger (57) for meaning and reach the ethical stage (where the Pharisees were stuck), where we commit ourselves to doing right and being good in the eyes of others (antithesis), until we take a leap of faith without reasoned explanation to others, into the religious stage where we are alone with ourselves and God, committing ourselves to him, finding fulfillment in him (synthesis). In this way we “become a true human being, a complete individual and person,” (4; 420). Kierkegaard grounded the answer to “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” in God, eternal love, the Golden Rule, and in so doing, passed all three parts of the litmus [but see (42)]. His thinking was motivated by high-quality fuel and the highest destination, unlike Heidegger and Sartre.
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) wrote that humans differ from things because we are asking, thinking creatures, and to revert back to a thing and objectify ourselves or become absorbed in what “They” (Das Man) do or say, as if They have obvious authority that saves us from having to think things through, is inauthentic. The alternative is to be engaged in the care (Sorge) of life’s details, or be caught in a mood, like Angst, the aimless drifting we feel when the way we’ve always thought of things which anchored us to reality no longer holds and there is nothing permanent to replace it with. Authenticity (“good faith”) to Heidegger is remaining intellectually flexible and independent of such anchors. All we can count on (anchor ourselves to), to Heidegger, is that we humans are a "being-unto-death" (22). Christians do not faithfully accept that, but realize that even though we can know, we are not omniscient and our understanding of the Unchanging Anchor is apt to change. [Does Heidegger attempt to answer original question, or merely stress authenticity? His voluntarism fails L2 (70), his track record with the Jews fails L1.3 and L3 (70), and if he doesn’t answer the question, he fails all of L1 (70) and is running on empty to nowhere.]
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), along with Dostoevsky (1821-1881), and Nietzsche (1844-1900), thought “no God” meant “no absolute moral rules” (L2) and, unlike Dostoevsky, he was an atheist. Unlike Nietzsche thought, the only responsibility existentialist-atheists release themselves from, according to Sartre, is the responsibility to a higher power, whether or not one exists (Nietzsche thought the fact that we did not cause our own existence means our actions are determined and that we are not responsible for them, but see the section Free to Be or Not to Be…). There is no master plan, life is absurd, we must create our own values (subjectivism; individual voluntarism, 70) (L2) and be our own example (though Nietzsche would say the virtues we create, ironically despite our being determined and irresponsible, are our own and not for others), and this realization makes us feel anguish. If we shoulder responsibility when we choose (despite angst)—we are authentic. If we try to make others (including God, our pastor, or the old “the devil made me do it” excuse) or circumstances responsible for what we choose, or if we choose to not choose—that is an inauthentic choice, a choice made in “bad faith”—a self-defeating, inauthentic lie.
In reaction to the belief that essence (or virtue) is a natural part of reality and precedes our existence (thesis), he said “existence precedes essence” (5d) (antithesis)—that we are not characterized by anything other than how we actually behave ‘after’ we exist. Again, to refuse to choose (create, L2), to go along with what supposedly came before, is a choice made in “bad faith” (don’t mistake his language as inconsistently admitting it is a real privation of good when we refuse to create—he didn’t believe in essential good). However, essence is "essential" and can only be discovered (71)—it isn't something to be created (though it is something to be freely chosen—stay tuned) after we exist—and so Sartre should have used a term other than essence, because to put it 'after' existence is to annihilate it. He admitted as much when he argued that there is no human nature—that we choose (create) ourselves, and in so doing, choose all men (passing L1.3 and L3)…“In choosing myself, I choose man,” (5d).
Never mind that making stuff up (otherwise it’s “bad faith”) is a massive let-down to those who just found out their old ways of thinking are supposedly just as made up. There must be human nature (essence)—the virtue, essence or purpose of humans must be, according to Sartre, to create meaning through choice as an individual (passing L3)—because if there is no human nature, there is no obligatory moral autonomy common to all humans, or bad faith when we do not fulfill this obligation. That Sartre intuits a connection between ‘self’ and ‘all men’ (namely objective freedom) brings the Golden Rule to mind, which acknowledges a similarity in essence between self and the Other (see Appendix G). But Sartre cannot, without contradiction, appeal to that which he attempts to deny (essential obligation). If every self is free, then freedom has objective value—man is the subject who has objective value—man is the object (fact) who is subject (has value). If there is real essence, essential obligation (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), it precedes existence [or eternally exists his essence—is God (Golden Rule love)—the essence after which our essence is patterned—how and why we should be or behave with the Other and self]—and we are free to responsibly choose or reject it, as the ability to love is the freedom to choose love, to lovingly create after the pattern of our creator (synthesis). This has all been leading up to this dialectic (58, 66) from the section on Greek virtue theory…
The Existential Essentialism Dialectic
Thesis: Essence (virtue, final cause, ought, how we should be) is a natural part of reality and precedes our existence (character, formal cause, is, how we are) (Greek essentialism) [is-ought (12) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E)].
Antithesis: Existence precedes essence—we define what it means to be human (Sartre—atheist existentialism) [ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)].
Synthesis: Our essence, our final cause, our virtue, how we should be, is to choose Golden Rule love, justified because it answers the question of Ethics (83), true because it corresponds to a perfect being who exists (chooses) this essence at every moment (69). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
“We are condemned to be free,” (Sartre, “Being and Nothingness”). Sartre failed to see that crediting God as the source of good is not the same as blaming him in bad faith for our choices. The existence of God does not take the choice out of our hands—it gives us the choice (see Objection 13 in Appendix E). Carstens made an astute observation when he said “unless man educates himself to be a competent judge, he is condemned to be ignorant,” (20; 6) and, as mentioned earlier, one could argue God and those who follow his will to be the only competent judges (never separating “unmerited love” and “judge” and not judging those who miss out on the point due to their caregivers neglecting the nurturing of their moral sense). This isn’t to say that the ‘how’ of L1.1 requires omniscience, or the ‘why’ cannot be implemented—one can choose the best of the available options (if one cannot swim, one cannot be blamed for being unable to save the drowning man, for it was not an option) (63, post 385). Free will is actually the gift, not condemnation, of a God who knows love must be voluntary and who will not force us to blindly follow his will (Golden Rule love). The objectification of God’s will can only happen through subjective choice. To abuse free will is to make ourselves slaves to sin, and to create slaves of the Other, as when we fail to educate our children in the Way to freedom, to God’s unmerited love.
Carstens is fond of referring to creator and monster in “The Knife and the Wound Philosophy” (20). In his language, though he would disagree with what is being expressed here, God is the essential Creating (Loving) Monster (actuality with no potential). his is the essence (image) after which our essence is created (“made in God’s image”), but we must freely co-create with him in order to become competent creating (loving) monsters. Our innate potential for Golden Rule love is actualized in a trusting relationship with him. So, the essence of true creating, of truly existing, is discovered (71) (intuitively known, consciously chosen), not created. If we reject this, we reject full existence, and deny full existence to those around us.
Lastly, Sartre spoke of the dominant gaze of the Other in competition with us—“Hell is other people,” (from “No Exit”). However…
Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1995) preferred to refer to philosophy as the “wisdom of love” rather than as the “love of wisdom.” He considered the beginning point of all philosophy to be our encounter with the Other as distinct from our self, vulnerable, and our responsibility. It might help to imagine a woman or young child stranded on the side of the road, and the triggered urge to protect. Many would object this is not a common impulse (51) to every encounter between humans. Levinas is saying this urge is present in every interaction with the Other to varying degrees. He considered this type of encounter to be fundamental to our nature, happening whether or not we realize it. Levinas considered ethics to be “First Philosophy. … the needs of the Other come before any philosophy about existence,” (4; 430) which differs sharply from Sartre’s view. The face or voice of the Other represents an irreplaceable self distinct from our own. We cannot demand the Other see us this way and behave towards us accordingly, but we must respond according to the way we see them, without promise of a Happy End, of reward, of returned love. To Levinas, this is the truly authentic (responsible) relationship—it is the point. It brings to mind Jesus’ command to “love your enemy,” (Luke 6:32-35) which Kierkegaard might say leaps beyond the ethical realm of the world’s “hate your enemy” into the religious realm of being alone with God and being viewed as foolish by the world. However, for Levinas, you should always put the needs of the Other ahead of your own. Some argue that this goes too far, that it is a self-abusive theory (see L1.3). It does stand in direct contradiction to egoism, a consequentialist theory which considers selfishness a virtue, and which we will now discuss. [Read more Levinas. Do Levinas and Confucius make God too distant?]
Consequentialism Revisited
Weeding out Egoism
In egoism (individual utilitarianism), “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” is answered by emphasizing good consequences (L1.1, L1.3) for the person taking the action, considering a selfish character to be important, and finding it important to act in one’s own self-interest. It is a reaction against the idea that selfless, self-sacrificial behavior indicates a virtuous character and selfish behavior is indicative of a weak moral character. Egoists see it the other way around. Egoism is voluntarist (created, 70, 71) (L2) by default, in that it is not a discovered truth (71), even if it is assumed to be—it is actually a mere construct, not of indifferent nature, but of human will, because it does not pass L1.3, not considering self and the Other to be interchangeable.
Rational laws and codes are not in place to encourage beneficial behavior we cannot avoid doing, or discourage unpleasant behavior we cannot avoid doing. There will be no law prescribing we must breathe and no law condemning all bodily excretions. Tending to our own needs qualifies as both breathing and excreting—breathing, because one is as valuable as any Other self; excreting, because one is not the only valuable self. So there will be no moral codes prescribing, or condemning us when we tend to our own needs, since we do this by nature. But egoism crosses the line of half-honesty (some ‘confess’ we are selfish by nature, namely psychological egoists, leaving out or downplaying that we also have the natural ‘capacity’ for rational empathy, 51) into the territory of calling “good” what is actually evil (and evil what is actually good), when it prescribes that one tend to one’s own self-interest, with regard for the Other only if one’s self is the main beneficiary (failing L1.3, 70).
In truth, we have the capacity for both selfishness and selflessness (rational empathy, 51). Some of us are more selfish by nature, some of us more selfless, but all of us have the potential for both and God can give us strength to include the Other in our focus. Some claim that, if ought implies can (see note 84 and Objection 24 in Appendix E), it is irrational to expect humans to look out for each Other (ought), when we aren’t built that way (cannot), but every time we do look out for each Other (whether or not the behavior is naturally or supernaturally motivated) is evidence we are capable of Other-regarding behavior. However, to be Other-regarding when it does not benefit (especially if it inconveniences) oneself, says the egoist, is to behave immorally towards oneself.
Ayn Rand’s (1905-1982) philosophy of rational self-interest is called Objectivism (52), and is not to be confused with objectivism (little ‘o’), which simply states that there are objective values (some objectivists deny Rand’s theory is objective, as she rejects intrinsic value) (52). She said it this way: “The actor must always be the beneficiary of his action,” (5g). If only she had meant it the way Wolfgang Carstens did when he said, “the actor must always be the recipient of his action” (20) in the sense that the actor must imagine he is receiving his behavior toward the Other (Golden Rule) [she did however ironically affirm a different variation of the Golden Rule (59) (see Appendix G and Objection 12 in Appendix E)]. However, egoism discourages fellow-feeling and a natural concern for the Other, both essential to a cultivated moral sense. Egoism grates against this moral sense when it writes it off as selfishness, while at the same time prescribing against it. Rand contradicts herself, as well as committing the fallacy of the suppressed correlative, by condemning selfless acts while also saying there are no selfless acts because “a ‘selfless,’ ‘disinterested’ love is a contradiction in terms,”(5g) (Objection 16 in Appendix E). However, ‘selfless’ doesn’t mean “disinterested”—it just means the interest is inclusive rather than exclusive of the Other. This can be seen in a dialectic (58, 66)…
(L1.3) The Other and Self Dialectic
Thesis: The Other or out-group should always benefit, whereas self or in-group should never benefit (self-abusive theories). Be a doormat.
Antithesis: Self or in-group should always benefit, whereas the Other or out-group should never benefit (egoistic theories). Be selfish.
Synthesis: In every in-group and out-group, a self is an Other, an Other is a self (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E), so however we should treat Other/self is the same as how we should treat self/Other (56). Also, since we can reason without thinking of the Other (or, for that matter, the self), theories which exalt reason fail to answer this aspect of the question of ethics. Would we even ask how/why we should be or behave if there were no self/Other?
God's Golden Rule love, though self-sacrificial, is neither self-effacing love (remember Kant’s “man made for law” thinking), nor selfish love (review L1.1 and L1.3). One way of applying that in our own lives is to cut the Other slack as we cut slack for ourselves, and vice versa. Our motivation for cutting the Other and self slack is that God cut us slack when we were still acting like buffoons. To avoid selflessness is to be self-effacing, is to neglect the part of ourselves that is made to love, that is common to all selves (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E).
One who asks if "giving, or generosity, is fundamentally about the giver," is really asking whether we love because the person is inherently lovable or deserving of or needful of love—or whether we love because we’ve got love to give. There is selfish giving (which isn’t really giving) and there is Other-focused, selfless giving. Perfect Golden Rule love is to love unconditionally, regardless of good or bad qualities/actions. Loving unconditionally includes disliking negative qualities/actions (and loving anyway). The "good" in the Other is the same as it is in self. Selfness. We are loving the Other as self...nothing more, nothing less. Regardless of all of our good/bad qualities/actions—we all share selfness...and that's good.
One is more likely to commit an act of heroism (selfless act) in the heat of the moment if they regularly practice acts of selflessness (heroism). This is one reason why it is so important to make selfless choices by habit (in behavior, and in thought), so that in the heat of the moment, when there is no time to reason out the right response, when your guard is down, your behavior confirms a pattern of selfless (heroic) past intention, rather than resulting in something you look back on with regret. Keeping our focus on Christ’s sacrifice for us is how we learn to recognize those signals that urge us to focus on self to the detriment of the Other, learn to anticipate them and counteract them with Other-focused (heroic) behavior (40).
Egoism cannot solve moral conflicts (in fact creates an atmosphere of fierce competition) between individuals and contradicts itself by pitting the moral duty of each individual against the moral duty of all other individuals (remember that in the beginning it was established that a good ethical theory must count the self and the Other interchangeably) (failing L1.3, 70). Egoists would only follow the Golden Rule to avoid conflict with the Other if they perceive such avoidance benefits self, rather than living out the rational empathy (51) implicit in this timeless, culture-spanning principle. To say that applied egoism is what is best for everyone (assuming that if we all look out for our own interests, everyone’s interests will be taken care of) is to be Other-regarding—is not strict egoism (to focus on the consequences to myself and the Other is utilitarianism; group egoism). And there is no love in promoting a society of egoists solely for the reason that it is in the self-interest of Number One (failing L1.3, 70). The uncreated (71), eternal, ultimate end (consequences) of both being (character) and doing (conduct), is Golden Rule love that endures all circumstances: love the Other as self. Egoism has cheap fuel because it never intends to get off the ground; it does not acknowledge the real destination (52).
Conduct Revisited
Weeding out Relativism
Relativism answers “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” by requiring that we respect (conduct, L1.1) and be (character, L1.2) tolerant of the norms of Other cultures, considering them equally as valid and beyond criticism as the norms of our own culture (L3), and so, by logical implication, we should conform to our own cultural norms (conduct, L1.1), with the consequence (L1.1) that all cultures will live in harmony. Relativism is cultural voluntarism (70, L2), the view that moral truth is created (69, 71) by the cultural will.
The American anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1887-1948) affirms relativism when she says, “The concept of the normal is properly a variant of the concept of the good. It is that which society has approved. …modern civilization becomes not a necessary pinnacle of human achievement but one entry in a long series of possible adjustments,” (4; 93-94). The basic impulse (51) driving the view that acknowledges as moral truth the values of the majority of a given culture, and that every culture’s values are valid for that culture, is the admirable, merciful feeling that, just as we would not want an Other culture’s values forced upon ours, we should not force our culture’s values on Other cultures—we should instead respectfully and nonjudgmentally seek to preserve cultural freedom and diversity (golden irony, for this is the Golden Rule incorrectly applied, suggesting again the Golden Rule is more basic than any relativistic misapplication—see Appendix G) (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). There is much to be said for respecting and preserving cultural diversity [note that to claim such respect as essential, transcending culture, is to contradict the impulse of tolerance, and that the tolerance of relativism is ineffective in cultures without that impulse (51)], however, the absolutist view of this paper is not that we force our values on (or adopt the values of) cultures that do not share them (ours), but that the Golden Rule is discovered (71) in and transcends the creeds of every major culture while maintaining diversity (and that such diversity does not negate the similarity).
That there are a variety of moral values that conflict with eachother is no argument against there being an essential good against which to measure them (see Objection 11 in Appendix E). If it were, it would mean science is an act of futility, since there are a variety of theories about different things in nature (see Objection 11 in Appendix E). As mentioned earlier, we live against relativism whenever we find ourselves criticizing or praising the social behavior of someone from an Other culture—and this doesn’t mean we are intolerant of all forms of cultural diversity (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). Tolerance of cultural diversity is good, as long as it is not tolerance of social evil, of violations of the universal moral code common to all cultures, whether its members acknowledge it by adhering to or defying it in law or deed. This can be seen in a dialectic (58, 66)…
The Moral Diversity Dialectic
Thesis: Tolerance is best.
Antithesis: Must not tolerate evil.
Synthesis: Celebrate diversity that conforms to Golden Rule love (see Objection 16 in Appendix E).
Although relativism can solve moral conflicts by siding with whatever the majority deems right (logically making all civil disobedience, and so, too, moral progress, automatically immoral, which is more likely to fuel immoral rebellion than moral behavior), it prevents finding common ground and solving moral conflicts in an environment, like the U.S., wherein many varieties of cultures live together, individuals are often members of multiple cultures, and there is no easily definable majority (to which we must apply aforesaid self-contradictory universalized tolerance). Even after the difficult (without an anchor) task of defining what counts as a majority and what constitutes a culture (and which of the cultures/majorities to which one belongs should take precedence), relativism and subjectivism fall apart for the same reasons if we apply the same impulse of tolerance to both cultures (or majorities) and individuals: 1) cultures and individuals are both capable of praiseworthy moral achievements and condemnable moral failures, 2) praiseworthy or condemnable not because of who they are, either as a member of a particular majority (relativism) [tyranny of the majority, is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E)], or as an individual (subjectivism) (the logical fallacy of the ad hominem argument) (notice that relativism is just collective subjectivism, and subjectivism is just individual relativism), but due to valid moral reasoning. As mentioned previously, Tim Keller writes, “If there is no God, then there is no way to say any one action is ‘moral’ and another ‘immoral’ but only ‘I like this,’" (2; 153) (emotivism) and he continues with, “If that is the case, who gets the right to put their subjective, arbitrary moral feelings into law? You may say, ‘the majority has the right to make the law,’ but do you mean that then the majority has the right to vote to exterminate a minority? If you say ‘No, that is wrong,’ then you are back to square one. ‘Who sez’ that the majority has a moral obligation not to kill the minority?” (2; 153). So relativism leaves us without a means of conflict resolution which is true to the reality—a universal moral code.
The assertion that we haven’t discovered a universal moral code (see Objection 11 in Appendix E) is countered by evidence of a universal moral code manifested in the similarity between ethical creeds from various civilizations (9), including how the Golden Rule has its “roots in a wide range of world cultures,” (10) (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). “The so-called Golden Rule is found in negative form in rabbinic Judaism and also in Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. It occurred in various forms in Greek and Roman ethical teaching. Jesus stated it in positive form,” (15). That the negative form (Silver Rule—see Objection 15 in Appendix E) is the flip-side of the positive form can be seen in this dialectic (58, 66)…
The Silver-Golden Dialectic
Thesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) is to not do anything at all.
Antithesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would have them to do you (to avoid doing the Golden Rule—to do nothing) is to actively do to the Other what you would not want done to you (to break the Silver Rule, in bad faith, as Sartre would say—to refuse to choose, to do nothing, is a choice).
Synthesis: To avoid doing the Golden Rule (to do nothing) is to do harm, so in order to avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) you must actively do the Golden Rule. [ See Appendix G: Synthesizing Golden Rule Variations and Competing Ethical Theories. ]
The existence of this universal moral code shows us that enforcing discovered (71) eternal moral truth does not violate cultural diversity, but acknowledges common humanity and common ground which is in common with all cultures. To not hold all cultures accountable to a standard which applies to all cultures (except when contradicting itself by universalizing tolerance) is to insult the moral autonomy of each culture’s members (their status as free persons able to discern moral truth and make moral choices) (failing L1.3 and L3, 70), and is to exclude them from the resulting benefits (see Morality and Legal Justice on universal human rights) of following it.
Truth is not relative, but universal, true for all or none (failing L3, 70). And again, moral truth is not created (69), but discovered (71) (failing L2, 70). It cannot be said that relativism is cultural essentialism (which is racist, classist, etcetera, thinking that certain types of humans are essentially different from others and therefore have different essential moral obligations, also failing L1.3 and L3 (70), and more closely described in Plato’s virtue theory, with its producers, warriors, and rulers), because it is based on the actual doings of the majority [whereas what we do is not always what we ought to do, and since ethics deals with why and how we ought to be or behave with the Other and self (failing L1, 70), and since we should avoid the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E), this is not a positive aspect of relativism]. Note that ‘culture’ is on the ‘nurture’ side of “nature vs. nurture” (49) and so is created (voluntaristic, 70), not discovered (71) (essential).
Now we’re ready to dig in to the ever-edifying, authentic, life-giving feast of God’s love, the banquet of God’s nature set before us, the image in which we are made and which He alone empowers us to maintain…“the resolution of a thousand fruitless searches,” to quote Mr. Gabriel (48). The meaning that exists, or we would not hunger (57) for it…
The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy
1. Truth. Truth is that which corresponds to reality. Reality is that which “is”. A belief can only “always” be true, if that to which it corresponds “always” exists (is real) (69).
2. Justification. Any form of inquiry begins with a question, a guess (hypothesis). A justified belief is an answer/theory justified by evidence/reasons.
3. Justification=/=truth. Ought=/=is. (General truth.) A justified belief does not necessarily correspond to reality, is not necessarily true. We are all familiar with having found out that what we thought we knew was true, turned out to be false. There are different reactions to this “argument from error”. Some hold firm to a critical realism and say that we just have to be flexible to counter-evidence, and that this argument shows that truth is not dependent on the knower (the knower was wrong, at least initially). Others resort to anti-realism, agreeing with the critical realist that we must remain flexible, but saying that it is absurd and ivory-tower-ish to put truth beyond the knower, for how will we ever know it? (For the how, keep reading.) However, the principal users of this argument defect to skepticism and say that truth (which they agree with the critical realist is not dependent on the knower, otherwise truth is a construct) is impossible to know, though the “argument from error” relies on an essentially critical realist premise: we trust the evidence which leads us to realize we were in error. Nevertheless, justification (evidence/reasons) does not guarantee truth (correspondence), and to suggest it does commits the ought-is (82) fallacy (see Objection 3 in Appendix E) [reversed is-ought (12), see point seven].
4. Open to revision. The critical realist, rather than retreating to skepticism or anti-realism, leaves answers/theories open to future revision, while knowing [not with absolute certainty (89), and so with varying degrees of subjective certainty (91), which is faith, defined in point five (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you)] we are at least on the right track and making “real” progress (phlogiston being replaced with oxygen-based combustion, etcetera).
5. Certainty and faith. Absolute subjective certainty is belief that is completely proven to correspond (to be objectively certain) and has no room for doubt so that faith is not required (89). The more absolute certainty is lacking, the more faith (lower levels of subjective certainty) is required. Faith in this context is belief, trust in the evidence, that lacks absolute subjective certainty (in other contexts, it involves interpersonal trust). Faith that lacks justification altogether is blind faith, trust persisting even when there is a complete lack of evidence (or, as Richard Dawkins would say, “in the teeth of evidence,” meaning counter-evidence), and is to be avoided (lest ye be drinking the kool-aid) (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you). Both certainty and faith are stronger when the evidence is stronger, when the answer/theory is more strongly justified (80). One answer which is no longer even considered theory by many scientists (including the Christian head of the Human Genome Project and director of NIH, Dr. Francis Collins) (86), due to the fact that there is so much evidence for it: evolution by natural selection. Still, as mentioned in point 3, justification (evidence/reasons), while providing strong support which may seem to approach certainty (89)—does not guarantee truth. That is not a statement against evolution or any other well-supported answer! However, consider that Kant treated Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics as a priori. This is only an argument against apodictic (absolute) certainty for finite knowers, who will only have varying degrees of subjective certainty (91), which is faith, and which depends on the strength of the evidence/reasons (89). Faith is the reason for scientific progress, as opposed to already knowing everything with absolute subjective certainty (omniscience). (See Objection 4 in Appendix E.)
6. Knowledge (“knowing”) is justified, true belief (81, from Plato’s “Theaetetus”). When our belief is not both justified (point two) and true (point one), we can be 1) right for the wrong (or no) reasons (if you want to learn more about this, google for Gettier problem examples), or 2) wrong despite having good reasons (because we do not have all the relevant reasons, which would have changed our belief). In the first case, our belief is true, but it is not justified (see point seven). In the second case, our belief is justified, but it is not true (see point three). So, knowledge is when belief is both justified and true—when we are right for all the right reasons. Again, this rightness is not dependent on our knowing, on our having all the right reasons (see point three). For finite beings who lack absolute certainty (89), knowing always involves varying degrees of subjective certainty (91), which is faith (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you). If later you find out you were wrong [that your belief did not correspond, or that you were right for the wrong, or no, reasons], then you were not “knowing” in the first place. You only thought you were. But, now you ‘are’ knowing. You are knowing why you were wrong! If you’re still on the verge of collapsing into skepticism, reread points three through five. [ There is an intuitive type of knowing which does not necessarily involve belief, like when spiders know webs, birds know nests, and humans have 'the hunger' of point 12. However, the sort of knowing which involves reason, requires belief. See note 79 for a recent paper on knowing that P, without believing that P by Blake Myers-Schulz and Eric Schwitzgebel. ]
7. Truth=/=justification. Is=/=ought. (General truth.) In point six, we saw that we can be right for the wrong (or no) reasons, that we can have a true belief which is not justified. It would be logically fallacious to say that a belief is justified merely because it corresponds to something in reality. Again, if you want to learn more about this, google for Gettier problem examples. This is also Hume’s is-ought (12) fallacy (see Objection 2 in Appendix E), however, it fuelled his skepticism, so—reread points three through five.
8. Truth=/=justification. Is=/=ought. (Moral truth.) Point seven, Hume’s is-ought (12) fallacy (see Objection 2 in Appendix E), also (and originally!) applies in the case of moral truth. It would be logically fallacious to say that a belief about moral truth is justified merely because it corresponds to something in reality. It is logically fallacious to say that “might makes right” is justified (answers the question of Ethics, 83, and see point two) merely because (say) might always wins in reality. It is logically fallacious to say that the Golden Rule (in essence, treat the Other as self) is justified merely because it corresponds to a being who is always a loving being who always treats the Other as self.
9. Justification=/=truth. Ought=/=is. (Moral truth.) Point three, the ought-is (82), or reverse is-ought (12), fallacy, also applies in the case of moral truth. In point six, we saw that we can be wrong despite having good reasons, when we do not have ‘all’ the relevant reasons (which would have changed our belief)—we can have justified belief that is not true. It would be logically fallacious to say that a belief about moral truth is true (see point one), merely because it is justified (answers the question of Ethics, 83, and see point two). It is logically fallacious to say that because the Golden Rule is justified, it is true to a being whose very existence and every behavior is described by it. (See Objection 3 in Appendix E.)
10. Fallacy of reification. In sum of points six through nine, any belief that is not both justified and true, but is either only justified (ought-is, 82) or true (is-ought, 12), commits the fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 2 and Objection 3 in Appendix E), in that it believes to be true or justificatory something that is not true or justificatory. It, in essence, invents reality.
11. All is not lost. Even if one is not a sceptic about knowing in general, points 8 through 10 might lead one to be a sceptic or nihilist about moral truth, believing that we cannot know moral truth, or that it is a matter of opinion and there is no moral truth to be known. Reread points three through five. Point six says that knowledge (“knowing”) is justified, true belief. That also applies to beliefs about moral truth. In order to count as knowing, a belief about moral truth must be justified and true, it must answer the question of Ethics (83) (see point two), and correspond to reality (see point one).
12. Hunger. We all behave as if our moral conduct is truly justified, or apologize or make excuses for it if it isn’t, and the Golden Rule is found in the creeds of every major culture throughout history (9 and 10) (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). All with a hunger (57) for truly justified meaning, hunger for the answer to “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” We hunger for meaning that exists, or we would not have evolved a hunger for it, just as physical hunger would not have evolved, had there been no nutrients already in existence to satisfy it. [ As mentioned in point 6, there is an intuitive type of knowing which does not necessarily involve belief, like when spiders know webs, birds know nests, and humans have 'the hunger'. However, the sort of knowing which involves reason, requires belief. See note 79 for a recent paper on knowing that P, without believing that P by Blake Myers-Schulz and Eric Schwitzgebel. ]
13. L1.1. How and why. The Golden Rule recognizes that a ‘how’ (conduct theories) without a ‘why’ (consequence theories) is pointless; that a ‘why’ (end) without a ‘how’ (do) is impossible to apply—the Golden Rule is both ‘why’ (love—see Objection 16 in Appendix E) and how (treat the Other as self) (see Appendix G and Objection 9 in Appendix E).
14. L1.2. Be or behave. The Golden Rule sees that the nature of the ‘doing’ (conduct theories) affects the nature of the ‘being’ (virtue theories) and vice versa—the Golden Rule is both what we should do (treat the Other as self), and how we should be (loving). See Appendix G.
15. L1.3. Other and self. The Golden Rule acknowledges self as Other and Other as self, and so rules out self-abusive theories as well as Other-abusive egoism and group egoism (game theory, 78, and see Appendix G and Objection 14 in Appendix E).
16. Justified. The Golden Rule is the only theory in Ethics which sufficiently answers the question of Ethics (83) (see point two), “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” It is the only “justified” theory in Ethics (see Appendix G). In order to be always true (not just “justified”), it must correspond to a being who always is and does what we should be and do—Golden Rule love—treat the Other as self (see point one).
17. Faith. That the Golden Rule is justified, does not guarantee it corresponds to such a being (see point three). Justified=/=true. (Leaving out discussion of theistic voluntarism.) This means that if the only justified theory in Ethics, the Golden Rule, does not correspond, then there is no moral truth. We can either trust (point 5) points twelve through sixteen, or we can defy our hunger (57), defy that upon which all creeds of every major culture in history agree (9 and 10) (see Objection 12 in Appendix E), and trust (point 5) that there is no moral truth. Only one option is true—all else is a construct, a fallacious reification (see point ten), including the beliefs of those like Sam Harris who embrace the possibility of justified beliefs about moral truth, while denying the existence of a being to which those beliefs must correspond in order to be properly “true”. The logic of this, and also points twelve through sixteen, point towards putting faith (see point five) in the Golden Rule and the God it describes. (See Objection 4 in Appendix E.)
The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy (20) answers the great question of ethics, “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” (L1) by emphasizing that the perfect end (consequences) of both being (character) and doing (conduct), is Golden Rule love (treat Other as self) that endures all circumstances. This love is not mere emotion (see Objection 16 in Appendix E), is intentional and rational and can be chosen in the absence of emotion. The fulfillment and happiness it brings transcends and orders our changing emotions. It is not subjective, but also is not divorced from the real experiences of real people.
Laws governing social interaction are relative to socially interacting beings, the way laws of physics are relative to the physical universe. If those laws cease to be, physical and social existence ceases to be, and vice versa. One doesn’t need to be struck by a divine lightning bolt to discover this—merely observe broken homes, dangerous neighborhoods, and prison populations—is there really no need for a Savior? Another similarity is that we know moral absolutes like we know the force holding us to the earth, though it is possible to increase our awareness of both by reading God’s revealed Word and a specialized science textbook, respectively. Right away we notice a difference between physical laws and moral laws. Though you can attempt to violate neither without consequence (46)—you can actually violate moral laws. They do not describe how humans “do” always behave. They do not describe nature. They go beyond nature (69). Whereas the formula for photosynthesis does not include choice, the formula for Golden Rule love requires it. Nature merely hosts the fact of and capability for morality—it cannot prescribe social existence or condemn social disintegration. Oughts are supernatural, either created by man (like all technology) or reflecting (71) God's nature (Golden Rule love), “How and why we should be or behave with the Other and self.” See Objection 17 in Appendix E.
Earlier in the paper it was shown how the impulse of relativism simply misapplies the Golden Rule, which is a more basic and essential aspect of each theory (see Objection 12 in Appendix E, and the Moral Diversity dialectic). Bentham and Mill grounded their universalized happiness principle in our shared need for happiness, whereas Kant grounded his categorical imperative in fairness to everyone’s shared moral sense (see the Love and Logic, “Law was Made for Man” Dialectic). Sartre said we choose our own purpose and grounded this in our shared freedom, whereas Aristotle thought every man’s virtue is built in to reality (see the Existential Essentialism Dialectic, and Appendix F). They were all at least partly right—we are all free and responsible to choose the best purpose (God’s essential Golden Rule love), we all need to be happy (to love and be loved, despite the circumstances), we all share (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E) a moral sense (of love, not merely double-standard and undermined intention), and the highest virtue (love) is the ‘final cause,’ the meaning of life beyond the beginning—treat the Other as self (Golden Rule). See Appendix G.
If Golden Rule love is the virtue which defines all other virtues (the highest purpose), then essentially good reality must be a personal being who is complete Golden Rule love. That being, God, provides the natural universe as the medium from which he forms us, like clay in the Potter’s hands, and in us the ability to discern and participate in the supernatural universe: Golden Rule love (himself). With that discernment we seek answers to “Why are we here?” and “What is the meaning of life?” and “What is the most important goal?”—never finding the answers apart from the Source. We ask those questions because he made us to love, like he made migratory animals to know the way home, like he made spiders to know how to spin geometrical webs, like he made birds to know how to design nests (71). With that discernment we decide whether or not certain God concepts are good or inadequate. The sheep know My voice.
With that discernment this paper has been affectionately titled “The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy,” after the author’s friend Wolfgang Carstens’ “The Knife and the Wound Philosophy,” (KWP). The titles are similar because, as Carstens recognizes, “The Knife and the Wound Philosophy is theoretically no different from the Golden Rule,” (20). If one removes the subjectivist, consequentialist, deterministic inconsistencies from his philosophy, the similarity between the Golden Rule (treat the Other as you want to be treated) and Carstens’ KWP is seen when he writes, “the man must become the recipient of his own action,” and “you are your neighbor” (20). His KWP is stated, “In determining the value of one’s action, one should imagine oneself as the one that acts and as the one that is acted upon in the context in which the action applies,” (20). As mentioned earlier—that self is like the Other and the Other like self, is the genius of the Golden Rule, and of Carstens’ KWP. It captures empathic love, including the principle of universality, that what is good/right (or bad/wrong) for self is also good/right (or bad/wrong) for the Other. But, what is most to be admired in Carstens’ KWP is his poetic use of “knife” and “wound” to refer to actor and recipient, respectively. His poetry is here adopted and only changed a bit, using “sword” and “sacrifice” to refer to actor and recipient (sword because of Hebrews 4:12; sacrifice because of Hebrews 10:10). What Carstens’ KWP lacks is motivation, provided by God’s unmerited Golden Rule love for us properly demonstrated (see Objection 1 in Appendix E) in Jesus’ (sword) taking the lead and switching perspectives with us and dying in our place (becoming sacrifice), fulfilling and foreshadowed by the Old Testament sacrificial system (and prophecies). Carstens argues the Golden Rule (and, by extension he does not extend, his KWP) lacks definite context (see Objection 18 in Appendix E). The reason for this is because it is applicable in every context of human interaction (see also the section below titled “Moral Conflicts: Contextual Absolutism: The Greater Good View”). That it lacks definite context is why God bothered to be specific, and why it is so important to educate ourselves and our children in those revealed specifics of the ‘basics’ we with moral sense know intuitively.
‘Basic’ally, the divine requirement we start with is also our ultimate fulfillment and happiness: Golden Rule love. Happiness is valued but never understood in other ethical theories, and is considered important in this paper. “I came that they may have life, and have it abundantly,” (John 10:10). The question of happiness is one of what really matters, and that we experience a loving relationship with God and each Other is what really matters (6). Happiness—a better word for it might be “blessedness”—is not “an emotion often dependent on outward circumstances,” (7) (see Objection 16 in Appendix E) and it “refers to ultimate well-being and distinctive spiritual joy,” (7). Another way to describe the state of happiness or blessedness is as the peace of God—“not merely a psychological state of mind, but an inner tranquility based on peace with God” (8). Some say there is no quick fix toward happiness, but those who let God in know that this happiness is granted irreversibly in a defining moment, whereas good choices, rather than being a path to happiness, are the output of God through a person who is already at peace with him. True happiness is not earned by good acts, but is God’s gift accepted by faith. Concepts labeled happiness rooted in the temporal can be diminished by the trials and hardships of this life. Experiencing the not always rewarding feeling produced by Golden Rule choices is not the same as the spiritual joy, the inner tranquility, the well-being of intimacy with God and his absolute acceptance which motivates those choices even in the midst of adversity.
On Wikipedia, the Golden Rule is (or was) presented as an ethic of reciprocity (10), distinguishable from deontological (conduct, ‘do’) and consequentialist (‘end’) ethical theories. Because this can be misleading, it must be pointed out that the Golden Rule is not a socially contracted bartering of “tit for tat”—it does not follow the rules of game theory (78, and see Objection 14 in Appendix E). It is rational empathy (51), it is love. That is what made it possible for Jesus to say, “Love your enemy,” and put the onus of “neighborliness” on the one acting (parable of the Good Samaritan). One can smell the scents of the poetic Garden of Eden just thinking about it. “In everything, therefore, treat people the same way you want them to treat you, for this is the Law and the Prophets,” (Jesus, Matthew 7:12). Other ways to say it are “do as you would be done by” (18; 82), treat the Other as you would have them threat you, or treat Other as self.
The Golden Rule (treat the Other how you would want to be treated) includes the Platinum Rule (treat the Other how they would want to be treated), considering we would want the Other to put themselves in our shoes in their interactions with us (however, we would not in the process adopt someone’s values which conflict with God’s values) (56). Recall:
The Platinum-Golden Dialectic
Thesis: Give the Other what they want (over-simple Platinum Rule).
Antithesis: Give the Other what you want (over-simple Golden Rule).
Synthesis: Give the Other what a self in its right mind would want (essence of the Golden Rule, which includes the Platinum Rule).
If correctly applied, one will reach the same conclusion, whatever version of the Golden Rule one uses, be it the Platinum Rule, or the negative form (Silver Rule) referred to in the section on Relativism, because (in the case of the negative form) Sartre was right when he pointed out that even the choice to do nothing is still an act. Notice that if we “do no harm” it is less ‘active’ than doing good (at first glance)—however—consider that ‘not’ doing good, could be considered ‘doing harm’ (so that “doing no harm” would involve actively “doing good”) (62). Recall:
The Silver-Golden Dialectic
Thesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) is to not do anything at all.
Antithesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would have them to do you (to avoid doing the Golden Rule—to do nothing) is to actively do to the Other what you would not want done to you (to break the Silver Rule, in bad faith, as Sartre would say—to refuse to choose, to do nothing, is a choice).
Synthesis: To avoid doing the Golden Rule (to do nothing) is to do harm, so in order to avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) you must actively do the Golden Rule.
To avoid treating the Other how you would not want them to treat you (silver version of Golden Rule), you must actively treat them as you would have them treat you (gold version)—this includes putting yourself in their shoes, as you would want the Other to do the same for you (platinum version) (see Objection 15 in Appendix E). See Appendix G. When Jesus sacrificed himself for us on the cross, he avoided letting our sin get between us and him (Silver Rule), by actively taking it upon himself (Platinum Rule)—all of that fulfilling the Golden Rule, because when we treat the Other the same way, it is the same as treating him that way (Matthew 25:35-40). He was treating us how he wants us to treat him—how he wants us to treat the Other: full of his grace and truth.
The Golden Rule is the basis for a right motivation for confronting the Other, including through “just war”. How would you (or you and your friends) want to be treated if you shut out your conscience(s) and were in the process of unjustly killing someone or many people (quickly, or slowly, through robbing them of resources) and only death could stop you? Would you—the you before shutting out your conscience—not thank the one who saves you from killing? Would you not pity and be angry with the bystander who did nothing?
How would you (or you and your friends) want to be treated if you were in the process of being unjustly killed (quickly, or slowly, through being robbed of resources) and only death could stop your murderer(s)? Would you not thank the one who saves you from being killed, and saves your murderer from killing you unjustly? Would you not pity and be angry with the bystander who did nothing?
Would you, if you chose to remain an inactive bystander and allow people to murder and be murdered, not yourself die in a different way, and allow a different kind of death in the hearts of the murderer and all survivors?
To cease existing would be better than that living hell.
To worship God (Matthew 25:35-46) is to “love your neighbor as yourself”—that is his royal law. James 2:8 NASB note: “The law of love (Lev. 19:18) is called ‘royal’ because it is the supreme law that is the source of all other laws governing human relationships. It is the summation of all such laws (Matt 5:43-48; 22:36-40; Rom 13:8-10, Gal. 5:14)]. In Matt. 22:39, Mark 12:31 and Luke 10:27, Jesus combines the Shema (Deut. 6:5) with the royal law ‘to show that love for neighbor is a natural and logical outgrowth of love for God,’” (NASB note). When we make a moral choice in line with God’s universal moral laws, such choices are just instances of Golden Rule love, and virtue is just a pattern of loving intention; the standard or end (the how and why) for both conduct and character is simply Golden Rule love.
Here’s where he gets specific. Jesus loves (conducts) through us according to the Golden Rule, or the royal law of love, fleshed out in the Ten Commandments (do not worship other gods, do not make any idols, do not misuse the name of God, keep the Sabbath holy, honor your father and mother, do not murder, do not commit adultery, do not steal, do not lie, do not covet), and other guiding principles found in his Word, all a call to Golden Rule love.
Attempt to rewrite the following in Golden Mean style (dialectic of extreme vice, vice of deficiency, and virtue) (58, 66)—
The character He molds us into is a loving one of humility (rather than pride, or setting ourselves up where God, Golden Rule love, belongs; all sins are a type of pride and idolatry, of finding our identity in something besides his eternal love, and setting that up in his place), liberality (rather than greed), brotherly love (rather than envy), meekness (rather than wrath), chastity (rather than lust), diligence (rather than sloth), prudence (distinguishing between what hinders love and what helps further it, rather than, perhaps, lack of discernment), temperance (or restraint, rather than gluttony), justice (ensuring every self’s basic needs are met and rights defended, rather than unfairness), fortitude (or courage to love in even the worst circumstances, rather than cowardliness), faith (assurance of promises we hope for, but do not yet see fulfilled; confidence in the evidence behind the promise, rather than doubting the promise despite the evidence; loyalty and trust rather than disloyalty and distrust), hope [a longing for a heaven, the kingdom of God, which fulfills what this life only arouses, rather than settling for mud pies in the slum (16)] and charity (or unmerited love, rather than putting conditions on love and all its expressions). God’s nature, love, defines all the other virtues, which are just different expressions of love.
We can also refer to more descriptions of Golden Rule love. 1 Corinthians 13:4-8b, 13 says “Love is patient, love is kind and is not jealous; love does not brag and is not arrogant, does not act unbecomingly; it does not seek its own, is not provoked, does not take into account a wrong suffered, does not rejoice in unrighteousness, but rejoices with the truth; bears all things, hopes all things, endures all things. Love never fails; …But now faith, hope, love, abide these three; but the greatest of these is love,”) and Galatians 5:22 says these are the fruits of the Spirit: “Love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control; against such things there is no law,” but see Objection 24 in Appendix E.
One might compare developing virtue to developing one’s athletic ability (1 Cor. 9:24-27; Heb. 12:1-13). One doesn’t become a great athlete after winning one race. Every loving choice we make (conduct), every race we win, contributes to our becoming virtuous (character), to our becoming a great athlete. Golden Rule love is a race that cannot be won in isolation from God. And it doesn’t matter (in a negative way) if someone can run circles around us, because all it means is they will surround us with Golden Rule love. Have you noticed that, if we are honest with ourselves, the sins, or vices (a breaking away from the Synthesis mentioned in the Greek Virtue Theory section), always weigh down or deaden our conscience (moral sense), whereas, with the virtues, the spiritual load is much lighter? God’s Golden Rule love forming us into his image, the original point, is nothing if not spiritual aerodynamics. And all that talk of whether it is more morally praiseworthy to like doing good, or to do good against inclination, is answered by finding out what God has to say about it in Luke 15:1-10: “There will be more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine righteous persons who need no repentance,” (Jesus). God answers the question with “You’re missing the point. I love you. Deal with it.” It isn’t about being morally praiseworthy or superior—perfect Golden Rule love is about loving unconditionally.
The Bible is the only record of a belief in a God of pure love, who forgives everyone and allows those who reject his Golden Rule love for them, to choose hell (defined earlier) (see Objection 24 in Appendix E). Jesus is unique from every founder of a religion. “Jesus did not only teach or expound his message. He was identical with his message. ‘In him,’ say the Scriptures, ‘dwelt the fullness of the Godhead bodily.’ He did not just proclaim the truth. He said, ‘I am the truth.’ He did not just show the way. He said, ‘I am the Way.’ He did not just open up vistas. He said, ‘I am the door.’ ‘I am the Good Shepherd.’ ‘I am the resurrection and the life.’ ‘I am the I AM,’” (3).
Perhaps all the virtues or descriptions of Golden Rule love or how to practice it don’t sit well with you. If so, “For the sake of argument, let’s imagine that Christianity is not the product of any one culture but is actually the transcultural truth of God. If that were the case we would expect that it would contradict and offend every human culture at some point, because human cultures are ever-changing and imperfect. If Christianity were the truth it would have to be offending and correcting your thinking at some place. …Only if your God can say things that outrage you and make you struggle (as in a real friendship or marriage!) will you know that you have gotten hold of a real God and not a figment of your imagination,” (2; 72-73, 114). Jacob became known as Israel when God wrestled with him. Saul became Paul when Jesus blinded him with his light and gave him new direction. The author of this paper was an atheist until God sifted her and refined her and lifted her from the mud (33), and is confident that if that is where you are—that is where you will find him pursuing you.
One criticism of Christianity in general is that there are so many hypocrites who don’t conduct or model their lives according to Christ’s example, either through resembling the world or resembling the legalistic Pharisees. The argument is that Christianity doesn’t work. If it did, every last Christian would be the spitting image of Christ. But only God is ever going to be perfectly good. Christianity is not about being morally superior—it is about an intimate, authentic relationship with our Creator. That we do not become perfect the instant we become a Christian, perfect in the sense of being able to overcome every single temptation in a single bound, points to the fact that we are not and never will be self-sufficient and that the point is God’s unmerited Golden Rule love, holding fast to an intimate loving relationship with God from which nothing can separate us—it is He who cleans the slate and is the author and perfector of our faith. C.S. Lewis writes, “If what you want is an argument against Christianity … you can easily find some stupid and unsatisfactory Christian and say … ‘So there’s your boasted new man! Give me the old kind.’ But if once you have begun to see that Christianity is on other grounds probable, you will know in your heart that this is only evading the issue. What can you ever really know of other people’s souls—of their temptations, their opportunities, their struggles? One soul in the whole creation you do know, and it is the only one whose fate is placed in your hands. If there is a God, you are, in a sense, alone with him,” (18; 168).
We still have one more thing to settle: What if there is a conflict between two or more divine commands (fleshed-out Golden Rule)?
Moral Conflicts: Contextual Absolutism: The Greater Good View
By way of dialectic (58, 66), we are going to resolve two conflicting views on moral conflict resolution:
The Greater Good Dialectic
Thesis: The third-alternative view.
Antithesis: The lesser-evil view.
Synthesis: Contextual (or graded) absolutism, or the Greater Good View [(1), with some adaptations].
Thesis: The third-alternative view.
Some say there is always a third-alternative in an ‘apparent’ moral dilemma [‘apparent’ because by this view there are no ‘real’ dilemmas—if there were, it would mean we are inconsistently obligated to opposites, whereas “ought implies can” (see note 84 and Objection 24 in Appendix E)], that one should never sin to keep from sinning (the ‘lesser evil view’ explained below), and Christians who hold this view believe that God will always deliver the faithful from a moral dilemma by providing a "third alternative," (one or more alternatives) unless we put ourselves in the dilemma by first sinning. That view is called the “third alternative” view.
It is inconsistent to say we can sin our way into moral dilemmas, but that there are no real moral dilemmas. It is also inconsistent to need a third alternative (not that one really ‘is’ needed), unless one acknowledges there is a ‘real’ dilemma to solve. Additionally, real moral dilemmas exist with no third alternative, like “Should the doctor save the mother or baby?” Christians who hold this view think Jesus was never in any real moral dilemma, that there was always a third alternative, but this is false, as he was in a dilemma when he chose not to defend himself at his trial (Lev. 5:1) (as well as other dilemmas)—and he didn’t sin his way into ‘any’ of the real dilemmas with which he was faced.
Sometimes the third-alternative view says that one of the two alternatives in the ‘apparent’ dilemma is better than the other, like telling the truth instead of lying to save a life. However, if we tell the truth rather than lying to save a life (as Kant suggested), we are placing the lower law over the higher. This is not just a misapplication of the Greater Good View because it does not acknowledge the ‘real’ dilemma in not being able to choose ‘both’ the lower and the higher—this view considers the lower and the higher to be on the same level.
God could not be considered good if he held us responsible for what is unavoidable when we choose the higher law because we cannot at the same time choose the lower one. That would be a type of Pharisaical legalism (Mark 2:27). [The objection that if there is a real dilemma, then we are obligated to opposites, is not answered until the Greater Good View.] So the third-alternative view is inadequate.
Antithesis: The lesser-evil view.
Others espouse the lesser-evil view and say there are in fact real moral dilemmas (not just apparent ones), that we do not necessarily sin our way into them, but we must unavoidably sin our way out of them and do the lesser evil (like lie to save a life, rather than tell the truth to a murderer).
If there is ever a time when we “ought” to do something but we cannot do it (instead, we must sin against it)—then “ought implies cannot” (given we know we ought to do it) (see note 84 and Objection 24 in Appendix E), which is unreasonable.
Additionally, this view neglects to answer the objection that if there are ‘real’ dilemmas, then we are obligated to opposites. The lesser-evil view makes it a moral duty to sin in conflict situations, but Golden Rule love (our moral duty) and sin are like oil and water—they don’t mix.
Christians who hold this view suggest Jesus, who is perfect, never had to sin his way out of a moral dilemma because he was never faced with one and/or was delivered from them due to his faithfulness (which reduces to the third-alternative view). However, Christ did deal with moral dilemmas without having to sin his way out of them, which had no third alternative.
When one is determining which of two evils is the lesser one (or which of two goods is greater), one is either resorting to utilitarianism (inadequate) or the Greater Good View (which considers Golden Rule love to be ‘the ultimate end’ in what to do and how to be). So the lesser-evil view is inadequate.
Synthesis: The Greater Good View.
The Greater Good View acknowledges real moral conflicts, that we don’t always sin our way in to them and never have to sin our way out, that our duty is to the higher law, and Christians who hold this view note that a good God does not consider it sin when we cannot choose the lower and the higher simultaneously.
So we are justified, we are doing the Greater Good, we are not sinning the lesser evil, when we follow the higher law and save a victim’s life rather than breaking it (sinning) by following the lower law in telling the truth to his or her would-be murderer. The higher law over-rules the lower one that is still binding (which is why one finds oneself in an ethical bind).
Some argue that this is a kind of situationism, but “the situation is not used to determine what is right, but only to discover which” (1; 425) of the absolute rules applies, so as to select the greater good from among them. For example, telling the truth is a lesser good than saving a life, which is a greater good—this reality is true regardless the situation, but can only be applied in a situation wherein we could either tell the truth or save a life.
To the objection that if there are real conflicts, then we are inconsistently obligated to opposites, this view answers that “greater” goods and “lesser” goods are not opposites, and do not in themselves conflict with eachother (the dilemma is only that we cannot do them both simultaneously). Consider Newton’s first law of motion, the law of inertia that says that an object will maintain its speed and course unless some outside force acts upon it. When an object follows Newton’s third law of motion, “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction”—it does not break the law of inertia. So it is when we cannot obey the lower law because we must obey the higher law—it does not break the lower law.
The Bible has many examples of God approving rather than condemning instances when people acknowledged the higher over the lower, like when God blessed and gave families to the Hebrew midwives who “disobeyed government and lied to the king (Exodus 1:19) in order to save the male babies,” (1; 417).
Note that “Jesus spoke of ‘greater sin’ (John 19:11), ‘greater love’ (John 15:13), ‘greatest commandment’ (Matt 5:19), and ‘weightier matters’ of the law (Matt. 23:23),” (1; 424).
No third alternative is required, and we do not need to sin our way out of a real dilemma between the command against killing and killing in self defense (Exodus 22:2), capital punishment (Gen. 9:6), and in a just war against aggression (Gen. 14) (1; 418)—all which are permitted greater goods.
This isn’t to say that God’s commands and permissions “make” greater goods to be greater—that would be divine voluntarism (70). It is just to say that God’s commands and permissions both reflect and reveal the reality that there are greater goods—the reality available to be discovered (71) by our rationally intuitive conscience. That’s how it was done long before the Bible was widely available—even by the prophets—and it’s how it will be done even if all Bibles disappear. Still, if you get a letter from your lover, you read it, even though you already know how they feel about you. And how many of us really know how God feels about us?
*****
The moral law of Golden Rule love is known with intuitive hunger (57) and discovered (71) using reason. God also reveals or communicates the Golden Rule in various ways, most ultimately on the cross in Jesus’ taking the lead and switching perspectives with us, dying in our place, first fruits of the resurrection, for love without demonstration is not love (see Objection 1 in Appendix E). When we choose him, we are co-creators of the Kingdom of Heaven, whose narrow paths are paved with the example of his Golden Rule love. May we allow his example to ripple through us to the ends of the earth and our resurrection.
Appendix A: Dialectics Glossary
The Scientific Method Dialectic
Thesis: Hypothesis.
Antithesis: Counter-Evidence.
Synthesis: (Revised) Theory.
The Reasoned Faith Dialectic
Thesis: We should have blind faith (fideism).
Antithesis: Don’t drink the Kool-Aid (36).
Synthesis: We should have reasoned faith.
(L1.1) The How and Why (Means and End) Dialectic
(See Objection 9 in Appendix E.)
Thesis: ‘Why’ (the internal end) is more important than ‘how’ (the external means) (consequentialist theories).
Antithesis: ‘How’ (the external means) is more important than ‘why’ (the internal end) (conduct theories).
Synthesis: A ‘how’ (means) without a ‘why’ (end) is pointless; a ‘why’ (end) without a ‘how’ (means) is impossible to apply [Golden Rule is both ‘why’ (love) and how—see Objection 16 in Appendix E on the GR being love].
(L1.2) The Be or Behave Dialectic
Thesis: ‘Be’ is more important than ‘behave’ (virtue theories).
Antithesis: ‘Behave’ is more important than ‘be’ (conduct theories).
Synthesis: The nature of the “doing” affects the nature of the “being” and vice versa. We should be a loving person so that we will be more inclined to do love (Golden Rule), and we should do love so that we will become a more loving person. The word ‘more’ is meant to remind the reader that anyone who asks the question of ethics, anyone who has the question in them, is ‘already’ a loving person who does love (simply by being hospitable to the question) (67). This “doing” and “being” is the only sort of creating and choosing which creates toward the eternal; chooses the eternal (see Objection 13 in Appendix E). If you think of “doing” as a verb, like the “e” of e=mc^2, and if you think of “being” as a noun, like the “mc^2” of the same equation, then it would be right to say that we cannot be (noun/mc^2) without doing (verb/e), and we cannot do (verb/e) without being (noun/mc^2) (62). By the way, check out Chuang Tzu’s theory of mutual production (5j).
This “being” which “behaves” is called “self” (41)—leading to L1.3:
(L1.3) The Other and Self Dialectic
Thesis: The Other or out-group should always benefit, whereas self or in-group should never benefit (self-abusive theories). Be a doormat.
Antithesis: Self or in-group should always benefit, whereas the Other or out-group should never benefit (egoistic theories). Be selfish.
Synthesis: In every in-group and out-group, a self is an Other, an Other is a self (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E), so however we should treat Other/self is the same as how we should treat self/Other (56). Also, since we can reason without thinking of the Other (or, for that matter, the self), theories which exalt reason fail to answer this aspect of the question of ethics. Would we even ask how/why we should be or behave if there were no self/Other?
The Essentialism Dialectic
Thesis: Moral truth (real ought) is created, or voluntarism (70).
Antithesis: There is no (discoverable) (71) moral truth (real ought), because that which is created is not discovered, or nihilism (or skepticism).
Synthesis: Moral truth (real ought) is discovered (71), or essentialism (14, 37). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
See also Appendix C: The Logic of the Essentialism Dialectic.
(The Essentialism Dialectic is fleshed out here: http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2008/08/moral-truth-litmus.html.)
The Moral Realism Dialectic
Thesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are all valid moral truth (relativistic and subjectivist theories, or voluntarism, or anti-realism, 70).
Antithesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are evidence against the possibility of moral truth (nihilistic theories).
Synthesis: Moral truth transcends cultures and individuals and their apparent contradictions and is true (immanent) for all (realism)—providing a basis (along with L1.3) from which to defend the human rights of individuals of every culture (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
The Super-Naturalist Dialectic
Thesis: If moral truth is beyond nature, then it has nothing to do with we who inhabit nature. However, there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature; moral truth is completely natural (philosophical naturalism) (see 50, 52, 53, 54, 66).
Antithesis: It is true that there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature, but making changing nature the basis for unchanging truth commits the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E) (nihilism).
Synthesis: That we hunger (57) for a ‘more’ that nature cannot satisfy, points to the existence of supernatural meaning—we hunger for transcendent meaning that exists immanently, or we would not hunger for it (essentialism). [ If it doesn’t exist (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), this ‘more’ commits the ought-is fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), but that it ‘does’ exist is not its justification, which would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). ] See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
The Anti-Reification Theism Dialectic
Thesis: Voluntaristic theism. God exists because, if he doesn’t, the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics corresponds to nothing and commits the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E).
Antithesis: Atheistic voluntarism/“essentialism”. To conclude God exists in order to give substance to a potential answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics commits the time travel paradox of the closed causal loop—just as an archaeological find making the past true commits that paradox (read Dummett). Though the thesis attempts to avoid committing the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), it commits just that. Therefore, there is no good God, and the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics is a construct or corresponds to something else.
Synthesis: Essentialist theism. Unless there is always a real being who always is and does what we should be and do, to which the answer to the question of Ethics (83) may always correspond (be true), then the answer, even if justified, commits the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (69, 70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E). However, this conflicts with our hunger (57) being a rational hunger for true meaning, not a construct. See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
Aquinas’ Immanent-Transcendent Dialectic
Thesis: All is immanent, all is one, nothing transcends; everything is just the same “thing”…“many” is an illusion (monism—Parmenides and Zeno, pantheists).
Antithesis: There are definitely different “things” (pluralism; Heraclitus and Cratylus, Plato, atomists like Democritus, Leucippus and Lucretius), but they have their being “in” the One—which transcends them (Plotinus; deism).
Aquinas’ synthesis: All that changes “has” its being (“has” its “thingness”) from the Unchanging (which “is” being, “is” “Thingness”), so that the Unchanging One (actuality with no potential, eternal, simple) does not only “transcend” the changing many (actuality with differing potential, temporal, composed), as deists believe, but is “immanent” (60) in it. The One is both transcendent over and immanent in the many.
The Love and Logic, “Law was Made for Man” Dialectic
Thesis: Logic or ethical rationalism if all by itself. Kant’s “man was made for law” thinking.
Antithesis: Love or emotivism if all by itself. Egoism’s “whatever results in my/our definition of happiness” thinking.
Synthesis: Logic and love (“law was made for man” thinking), reason and intuition (L1.1, L1.3). All legislation should conform to the Golden Rule.
Aquinas’ Euthyphro Dialectic
Thesis: Something is right because God wills it (divine voluntarism, 70).
Antithesis: God wills it because it is right (Greek “essentialism”).
Synthesis: God wills in accordance with his good nature (divine essentialism). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
The Existential Essentialism Dialectic
Thesis: Essence (virtue, final cause, ought, how we should be) is a natural part of reality and precedes our existence (character, formal cause, is, how we are) (Greek essentialism) [is-ought (12) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E)].
Antithesis: Existence precedes essence—we define what it means to be human (Sartre—atheist existentialism) [ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)].
Synthesis: Our essence, our final cause, our virtue, how we should be, is to choose Golden Rule love, justified because it answers the question of Ethics (83), true because it corresponds to a perfect being who exists (chooses) this essence at every moment (69). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).
Aristotle’s Golden Mean Dialectic
Thesis: Extreme vice.
Antithesis: Vice of deficiency.
Synthesis: Balance (virtue) between vices of extremism and deficiency.
The Constructive Criticism Dialectic
Thesis: Being destructively critical is an extreme vice.
Antithesis: Being deficiently critical is a vice of deficiency.
Synthesis: The Golden Mean between those vices is to be constructively critical.
The Platinum-Golden Dialectic
Thesis: Give the Other what they want (over-simple Platinum Rule).
Antithesis: Give the Other what you want (over-simple Golden Rule).
Synthesis: Give the Other what a self in its right mind would want (essence of the Golden Rule, which includes the Platinum Rule).
The Theodicy Dialectic
Thesis: God is good and all-powerful.
Antithesis: Evil and suffering are real, so either God is not good, or is not all-powerful to prevent evil and suffering.
Synthesis: God is good and all-powerful when He allows us to choose or reject Golden Rule love-despite-circumstances.
The Privation Dialectic
Thesis: Good and evil are opposites (dualism).
Antithesis: There is no good or evil (because without preexistent good, there can be no evil).
Synthesis: Evil is the privation of a preexistent good.
The Geisler Dialectic
Thesis: Free will over-rules sovereign predestination (extreme Arminianism).
Antithesis: Sovereign predestination over-rules free will (extreme Calvinism).
Synthesis: Sovereign predestination includes freely willed actions (moderate Calvinism).
The Kierkegaard Dialectic
Thesis: Aesthetic stage of sensuous enjoyment.
Antithesis: Ethical stage of following others’ rules.
Synthesis: Religious stage of enjoying a trusting relationship with God.
(The Kierkegaard Dialectic is fleshed out here: http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2008/08/existentialism.html.)
The Moral Diversity Dialectic
Thesis: Tolerance is best.
Antithesis: Must not tolerate evil.
Synthesis: Celebrate diversity that conforms to Golden Rule love (see Objections 16 and 20 in Appendix E).
The Silver-Golden Dialectic
Thesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) is to not do anything at all.
Antithesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would have them to do you (to avoid doing the Golden Rule—to do nothing) is to actively do to the Other what you would not want done to you (to break the Silver Rule, in bad faith, as Sartre would say—to refuse to choose, to do nothing, is a choice).
Synthesis: To avoid doing the Golden Rule (to do nothing) is to do harm, so in order to avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) you must actively do the Golden Rule.
The Greater Good Dialectic
Thesis: The third-alternative view.
Antithesis: The lesser-evil view.
Synthesis: Contextual (or graded) absolutism, or the Greater Good View [(1), with some adaptations].
(The Greater Good Dialectic is fleshed out here: http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2008/08/sword-and-sacrifice-philosophy.html.)
Appendix B: The Four Horsemen and the Hunger
The self-titled Four Horsemen are atheists Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins, and Christopher Hitchens. They have some relevant things to say on ‘the hunger’ (57).
Sam Harris, “The End of Faith” (2004)—
“…there is little doubt that a certain range of human experience can be appropriately described as ‘spiritual’ or ‘mystical’—experiences of meaningfulness, selflessness, and heightened emotion that surpass our narrow identities as ‘selves’ and escape our current understanding of the mind and brain,” (p. 40). “…there is an intimate connection between spirituality, ethics, and positive emotions,” (p. 42). “To say that something is ‘natural,’ or that it has conferred an adaptive advantage upon our species, is not to say that it is ‘good’ in the required sense of contributing to human happiness in the present. Admittedly, the problem of adjudicating what counts as happiness, and which forms of happiness should supersede others, is difficult,” (p. 185). “…we each want to be happy; the social feeling of love is one of our greatest sources of happiness; and love entails that we be concerned for the happiness of others. We discover that we can be selfish together. … The fact that we want the people we love to be happy, and are made happy by love in turn, is an empirical observation,” (p. 187).
Daniel Dennett, “Breaking the Spell” (2006)—
“In any case, if the need, or at least the taste, for this still-unidentified treasure has become a genetically transmitted part of human nature, we tamper with it at our peril,” (p. 83). “…genetic evolution doesn’t foster happiness or well-being directly; it cares only about the number of our offspring that survive to make grand-offspring and so on,” (p. 157). “Might there be either ‘spiritual-experience intolerance’ or ‘spiritual-experience distaste’? There might be. There might be psychological features with genetic bases that are made manifest in different reactions by people to religious stimuli (however we find it useful to classify these). … A ‘spiritual sense’ (whatever that is) might prove to be a genetic adaptation in the simplest sense, but more specific hypotheses about patterns in human tendencies to respond to religion are apt to be more plausible, more readily tested, and more likely to prove useful in disentangling some of the vexing policy questions that we have to face. For instance, it would be particularly useful to know more about how secular beliefs differ from religious beliefs,” (p. 318).
Richard Dawkins, “The God Delusion” (2006)—
“If neuroscientists find a ‘god centre’ in the brain, Darwinian scientists like me will still want to understand the natural selection pressure that favoured it. … why people are vulnerable to the charms of religion and therefore open to exploitation by priests, politicians and kings,” (197). “Moral principles that are based only upon religion (as opposed to, say, the ‘golden rule’, which is often associated with religions but can be derived from elsewhere) may be called absolutist,” (p. 265). “Absolutists believe there are absolutes of right and wrong, … Not all absolutism is derived from religion. Nevertheless, it is pretty hard to defend absolutist morals on grounds other than religious ones,” (p. 266).
Christopher Hitchens, “god is not Great” (2007)—
“So why should I…believe that the firmament is in some mysterious way ordered for my benefit? Or, coming down by a few orders of magnitude, that fluctuations in my personal fortunes are of absorbing interest to a supreme being? One of the many faults in my design is my propensity to believe or to wish this, and though like many people I have enough education to see through the fallacy, I have to admit that it is innate,” (p. 75.) “The study of literature and poetry, both for its own sake and for the eternal ethical questions with which it deals…” (p. 283).
Appendix C: The Logic of the Essentialism Dialectic
The Essentialism Dialectic
Thesis: Moral truth (real ought) is created, or voluntarism (70).
Antithesis: There is no (discoverable) (71) moral truth (real ought), because that which is created is not discovered, or nihilism (or skepticism).
Synthesis: Moral truth (real ought) is discovered (71), or essentialism (14, 37).
H: that which satisfies our hunger (57) for true meaning
O: a construct to which we are obligated
T: moral truth
—
M: morality
C: created morality
D: discovered morality
_____________________________
C1-5: Moral truth is created.
N1-5: There is no moral truth, because if there were, it would be discovered.
D1-5: Moral truth is discovered.
A1-5: All agree (given).
C1: No D is H/T, No H is D, No T is D
N1: All D is H/T, All H is D, All T is H/D
D1: All D is H/T, All H is D, All T is H/D
A1: No D is O, No O is D, All H is T, All T is H, All O is C
C2: All O is H/T, All H is O/C, All T is O/C
N2: No O is H/T, No H is O/C, No T is O/C
D2: No O is H/T, No H is O/C, No T is O/C
A2: All O is C, No O is D, No D is O, All H is T, All T is H
C3: All M is C, No M is D
N3: All M is C, No M is D
D3: Some M is C/D
A3: All HOTCD is M, No C is D, No D is C
C4: Some M is O, Some C is H/O/T
N4: No M is O, No C is H/O/T
D4: No M is O, No C is H/O/T
A4: All HOTCD is M, No C is D, No D is C
C5: Some M is H/T
N5: No M is H/T
D5: Some M is H/T
A5: All HOTCD is M, No C is D, No D is C
Thesis: A1-A4 (given); C1-C5.
Antithesis: N1 (-C1), N2 (-C2), N4 (-C4), N5 (-C5).
Prothesis: A1-A4 (given); N3 (+C3).
Synthesis: A1-A4 (given); D1 (N1, -C1), D2 (N2, -C2), D3 (-N3, -C3), D4 (N4, -C4), D5 (-N5, +C5).
The only place where the thesis and antithesis agree with eachother, but disagree with the synthesis is C3/N3. C3/N3 assumes that the differences between cultures means all morality is created. D3 sees GR (Golden Rule) as basic to all cultures (see Objection 12 in Appendix E).
C5, and A1-A4 (given) don’t sit well with C3/N3 or N5 AND see antithesis, necessitating D3/D5.
This is incorrect:
discovered, none, created
created, discovered, none
none, created, discovered
discovered, created, none
none, discovered, created
created, none, discovered
...because you basically circle back eventually, whichever your starting point (be it ‘discovered’ ‘created’ or ‘none’), but you’re dealing with the same sentences all the time…nothing new…so that makes no sense. The one I’ve come up with (the one we end up with in the list) follows the most logically. You could probably test the sentences in each of the dialectics syllogistically (or something?) for validity, and find that my dialectic is the one left standing, but…I haven’t gotten that far.
Appendix D: Quiz: Are You an Essentialist or a Voluntarist?
Seven questions, followed by three possible outcomes:
Upon what should human (rights) laws be based?
*Humans should stop making baseless laws (at best, the base is impossible to know) and let nature take its course. (N/S)
*Human (rights) laws should reflect the fallible will of legislators, per culture, or reflect laws which are constructs of human evolution. (V)
*Human (rights) laws should reach across cultural boundaries and reflect discovered, essential moral standards. (E)
________________________________________
Is moral truth created or discovered?
*There is no discoverable essential moral truth, and we are under no obligation to a construct. (N/S)
*Moral truth is not essential to reality, but is created-a construct of will or nature. (V)
*Moral truth is essential to reality, discovered with our reason and intuition. (E)
________________________________________
How is moral truth discovered?
*We discover moral truth with our reason (rules out error) and intuition (resonates). (E)
*We create moral truth with our will, or it is a construct of nature. (V)
*There is no discoverable essential moral truth, and we are under no obligation to a construct. (N/S)
________________________________________
What is the source of what is "good"?
*There is no discoverable, essential "good" and we are under no obligation to a construct. (N/S)
*Human will is the source of what is "good", God's will is the source of what is "good", or "goodness" is a construct of human evolution. (V)
*God wills in accordance with his good, loving nature—he is what is essentially good (He did not have to develop virtue, but is the virtue he helps us to develop). (E)
________________________________________
For whom is moral truth (happiness/goodness/love) "true"?
*There is no discoverable essential moral truth, and we are under no obligation to a construct. (N/S)
*Moral truth is relative to individual, group, or all humans, and will not survive them. (V)
*Moral truth is common ground discovered by all with a rationally intuitive conscience. (E)
________________________________________
Is purpose/virtue created or discovered?
*Essence precedes (human) existence-our purpose/virtue exists to be discovered in the eternal (God’s essence is his existence, and vice versa). (E)
*There is no discoverable essence (purpose/virtue), and we are under no obligation to a construct. (N/S)
*Either purpose is a construct of human evolution, or "existence precedes essence" (Sartre) and we create our own purpose individually (according to Sartre, appealing to human nature or Authority is a cop-out). (V)
________________________________________
How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?
*How we should be, what we should do, the ultimate end, is Golden Rule love (God). (E)
*There is no discoverable essential moral truth, and we are under no obligation to a construct. (N/S)
*The answer is defined by self or group, or is a construct of evolution. (V)
________________________________________
If you mostly answered (N/S)—
You are a nihilist or skeptic. You either think there is no moral truth, created or discovered, or you think it is impossible to know what is true when it comes to morality. If you think there are things that are really, truly wrong, like abuses of the church, or napalming babies—you might want to rethink your position. If you have ever felt wronged or felt someone else was wronged—you might want to rethink your position. If you have ever admired someone for their good character—you might want to rethink your position. You may "believe" there is no discoverable moral truth—but you live as if you "know" there is discoverable moral truth. Really, you are an essentialist at heart, since you will not allow for a temporary, artificial construct to pass as truth.
If you mostly answered (V)—
You are a voluntarist; your convictions are floating over an abyss. You think moral truth is created, not discovered, or you 'discover' it where it cannot be found. If you value love as the highest good, you don't think it is an eternal good discoverable by all rationally-intuitive consciences, but that it is self- or group-defined, or a construct of evolution. You either believe that our purpose is a construct of human evolution, or that "existence precedes essence" (Sartre) and we create our own purpose individually (that appealing to human nature or Authority is a cop-out). If God is in this picture, He arbitrarily wills that something is good, rather than being the essential source of goodness and willing in accordance with his good nature, but you most-likely believe that goodness is a construct of human will, or human evolution. You either believe human (rights) laws should be based in the arbitrary will of God, the fallible will of legislators, per culture, or that they should reflect laws which are constructs of human evolution. Since you do not acknowledge essential moral truth, your position reduces to nihilism, which violates your rationally-intuitive conscience.
If you mostly answered (E)—
You are an essentialist, standing on solid ground. You believe moral truth is essential to reality, discovered with our reason (rules out error) and intuition (resonates)—rather than created by human will or evolved with human nature. You believe that how we should be, what we should do, the ultimate end, is Golden Rule love (God). You believe happiness/love/goodness is common ground discovered by all with a rationally intuitive conscience: loving the Other as we love ourselves. You believe essence precedes existence-our purpose/virtue exists to be discovered in the eternal, whose essence is his existence, and vice versa. You believe God wills in accordance with his good, loving nature—He is what is essentially good (he did not have to develop virtue, but is the virtue He helps us to develop). You believe human (rights) laws should reach across cultural boundaries and reflect discovered, essential moral standards.
Appendix E: Glossary of Answered Criticisms of the Golden Rule
Most of these answered criticisms are found throughout this paper. Some are extra.
Objection 1. No-God objection: A) There is no God, or if there is, there is no evidence that s/he or it is love [in fact, B) all the evil in the world is actually evidence that he is evil, if not lacking omnipotence], therefore, there is no being strong enough to love perfectly, to which the Golden Rule may correspond—or, C) there does not need to be (we can be good without God). D) Is the good right because God wills it (does God create moral truth?), or does God will what is good because it is right (does God discover moral truth?) (Euthyphro Dilemma, and see L2)—either way, isn’t moral truth created or discovered outside himself? And, E) wouldn’t a God of love be a weak, soft God, not an omnipotent God—and if he couldn’t choose other than Golden Rule love, wouldn’t that mean he is not omnipotent? Finally, F) how can he be our “virtue” if virtue must be developed?—a perfect being cannot develop virtue!
Rebuttal: A through F are not answered in order, but they are all answered. Watch closely. A) “There is no God” is a faith assumption, no more certain (89) than “There is a God”—both assumptions require faith in the strongest evidence (see Objection 5 if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you). C) Though we are all capable of good (84) (but see Objection 24), B) if there is no God to which it corresponds, there is no real good (and so no real evil—which is the privation of good, but also what makes good a possible choice—if evil were not possible, free will, and thus Golden Rule love, would not be possible) (see the Privation Dialectic, as well as the Geisler Dialectic, in Appendix A). That we feel there is a real good (and its real privation, evil), is a clue [though, not proof, (89)] to there being F) a God to which a real standard of goodness always (69) corresponds, always describes (is true)—he is the virtue-pattern which in ourselves is the potential we hunger to actualize. A) That hunger (57), the Golden Rule being found in the creeds of every major culture in history (9 and 10) (see Objection 12), and that the Golden Rule is the only theory which fully answers the question of Ethics (83) and is not ruled out by the Moral Truth Litmus—all are good reasons to have faith that there is a being to which the Golden Rule corresponds, a satisfaction to our hunger. Still, love is not love without demonstration, so we must add to that Jesus’ demonstration of Golden Rule love on the cross, and the OT prophecies which foreshadowed it. When Jesus sacrificed himself for us on the cross, he avoided letting our sin get between us and him (Silver Rule), by actively taking it upon himself (Platinum Rule)—all of that fulfilling the Golden Rule, because when we treat the Other the same way, it is the same as treating him that way (Matthew 25:35-40). He was treating us how he wants us to treat him—how he wants us to treat the Other: full of his grace and truth. D) As for the Euthyphro Dilemma and virtue—moral truth is not created, and God did not have to discover it, as he wills in accordance with his eternally good nature. E) As for a God of love being weak or omnipotent—all power based on anything other than Golden Rule love is actually weakness, and all choices not based on Golden Rule love lead to slavery (see the Theodicy Dialectic in Appendix A).
Objection 2. Is-ought problem: If we cannot derive an ought from nature (is) (12), then why do you assume God exists and attempt to derive all valid oughts from God's nature (12)? The Golden Rule is not justified by the existence of the perfection (69) (especially the “assumed existent” perfection) which it describes, otherwise it commits the is-ought (12) fallacy of reification.
Rebuttal: Correct, we cannot derive an ought from nature, nor can we derive it from God’s nature. The ought is justified only if it answers the question of Ethics (83). It is illogical to assume God’s (the real ought’s) existence (to beg the question), and it is not done in this paper.
Objection 3. Ought-is problem: If a naturalist cannot arrive at objective moral truth by starting from a preexisting (50) norm (ought) (82), then why do you attempt to prove God exists just because the Golden Rule is the only justified theory in Ethics (the only theory that fully answers the question of Ethics) (83)? The Golden Rule is not true (there is no God to which it corresponds) merely because it is justified, otherwise it commits the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70).
Rebuttal: Correct, we cannot say that a being exists to which the Golden Rule or some preexisting ought corresponds, just because they ‘are’ oughts. “Wishing for a thing does not make it so.” Note that this paper does not attempt to prove anything with absolute subjective certainty (89)—only to offer reasons for faith (subjective certainty) (see Objection 5 if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you).
Objection 4. Faith problem: You could just opt to reject the Golden Rule as objective moral truth. Just because it passes the litmus (or at least is not ruled out by it), does not guarantee its truth (82). Faith is required—don’t drink the kool-aid!
Rebuttal: True, faith is required, but not blind faith. No one has absolute subjective certainty (89)—all have varying degrees of subjective certainty (91)—and that is faith…so faith is fueled by reasons, with which this paper is full (see Objection 5 if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you). Faith is the reason for scientific progress, as opposed to already knowing everything with absolute subjective certainty (omniscience). See the section “A Word on Faith and the Moral Truth Litmus” inside the section “Why Ethics?” at the beginning of this paper, and also see points 5 and 17 at the beginning of the section “The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy” in this paper.
Objection 5. Fideists: We should just trust in the revelation of the Bible. This paper goes through a lot of trouble to explain why the Golden Rule is the only viable theory of moral truth, when all we needed to do was search the Scriptures, and live out the great principle in our lives. Stop saying “IF there is moral truth” and “IF there is a real ought”—there most certainly (89) is, thou heretic!!!
Rebuttal: In order to filter true revelation from false, reason is required. Truth will always withstand the fire of reason. All else is idolatry. Was it heresy when (if) Job questioned God? Was it heresy when Paul "kicked against the goads"? Was it heresy when Moses couldn't speak alone? Was it heresy when (if) Jonah ran the other way? There are many more examples to use. Even if they didn't happen as recorded, 'how' they were recorded is worth noting. Did God cast them out? If it is heresy, perhaps it is not unforgivable. Perhaps God would rather have heresy and wrestling, than apathy and group-think. Our happiness is not found in certainty or proof (89) of God’s existence, but in trusting God—that is where faith comes in (42). See the section “A Word on Faith and the Moral Truth Litmus” inside the section “Why Ethics?” at the beginning of this paper, and also see points 5 and 17 at the beginning of the section “The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy” in this paper.
Objection 6. Kierkegaard: Having objective evidence of the real ought (God, described by the Golden Rule) is a mere shadow of actually living it out.
Rebuttal: You rock, Kierkegaard!!! (See also Objection 24.)
Objection 7. Kant: “If you don’t want to help others, just claim you don’t want or need help from them!” (4; 225).
Rebuttal: The Golden Rule (treat the Other how you would want to be treated; love Other as self) includes the Platinum Rule (treat the Other how they would want to be treated), considering we would want the Other to put themselves in our shoes in their interactions with us. So you should put yourself in the shoes of a person who genuinely needs help and help them even if, in the same situation, you would not ask for it (and seriously reconsider asking for it).
Objection 8. Granting negative and positive rights means helping people who should be helping themselves.
Rebuttal:
The Platinum-Golden Dialectic
Thesis: Give the Other what they want (over-simple Platinum Rule).
Antithesis: Give the Other what you want (over-simple Golden Rule).
Synthesis: Give the Other what a self in its right mind would want (essence of the Golden Rule, which includes the Platinum Rule).
A self in its right mind would not want to be helped (to take resources from the Other) when it should be helping itself. Also see L1.3, as this is a variation of it.
Objection 9. If over-emphasizing the “end” leads to justifying evil “means”—then making the Golden Rule the ultimate “end” justifies evil “means”. On the other hand—if over-emphasizing the “means” leads to justifying evil “ends”—then making all means conform to the Golden Rule can justify evil “ends”.
Rebuttal: A ‘how’ (external means) without a ‘why’ (internal end) is pointless; a ‘why’ (inward end) without a ‘how’ (outward means) is impossible to apply [Golden Rule is both ‘why’ (love) and how]. See L1.1. (Could Moore rightly object to this?)
Objection 10. There can be no moral truth apart from the minds (consciousnesses) of humans, therefore moral truth is mind-dependent, contradicting the second and third parts of the litmus.
Rebuttal: The only mind-dependent facts are facts “about” minds, however—their truth is still not justified by the existence of the mind(s) of which they are about, for that would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2). In addition, if there is moral truth (see Objection 5 if “if” sounds heretical to you), it does not always correspond to the minds of humans, but to an eternally perfect mind.
Objection 11. There are too many cultural differences for there to be a universal moral code. Besides, there is no evidence of a universal moral code.
Rebuttal: Cultural disagreement does not rule out a universal moral code, much like student disagreement does not rule out right answers on a math quiz. The assertion that we haven’t discovered a universal moral code is countered by evidence of a universal moral code manifested in the similarity between ethical creeds from various civilizations (9), including how the Golden Rule has its “roots in a wide range of world cultures,” (10) (see objection 12). “The so-called Golden Rule is found in negative form in rabbinic Judaism and also in Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. It occurred in various forms in Greek and Roman ethical teaching. Jesus stated it in positive form,” (15).
Objection 12. To say that the Golden Rule, or some version of it, is found in the creeds of every major culture throughout history (9 and 10) either reverts to relativism, or is intolerant of cultural diversity by suggesting that it transcends culture.
Rebuttal: Hm, in a bit of a catch-22**. However, truth is true for all or none (L3), and that the Golden Rule is found in the creeds of every major culture throughout history (9 and 10) is evidence that it transcends culture, rather than being a product of culture. The fact that it is immanent in the creeds of every major culture rules out the possibility that it is intolerant of cultural diversity.
Objection 13. The Golden Rule is created through our choosing it. As Sartre said, “existence precedes essence”—“in choosing myself, I choose man”. (Alternatively—it is bad faith to choose the Golden Rule—we should make stuff up.)
Rebuttal: Ah—another catch-22*. However, this creating, this choosing, is the only sort of creating and choosing which freely creates toward the eternal; responsibly chooses the eternal. See L1.2.
Objection 14. The Golden Rule is inherently selfish, follows the rules of game theory (78), especially if you consider that in following it, we find true satisfaction. It all boils down to getting something in return. Otherwise, it violates “ought implies can”.
Rebuttal: Selfishness is when we choose to get satisfaction out of something other than treating the Other as self. However, the sort of satisfaction that comes from that is cheap. On Wikipedia, the Golden Rule is (or was) presented as an ethic of reciprocity, distinguishable from deontological (conduct) and consequentialist ethical theories. Because this can be misleading, it must be pointed out that the Golden Rule is not a socially contracted bartering of “tit for tat”—it does not follow the rules of game theory (78). It is rational empathy (51), it is love. That is what made it possible for Jesus to say, “Love your enemy,” and put the onus of “neighborliness” on the one acting (parable of the Good Samaritan). One can smell the scents of the Garden of Eden just thinking about it. See the section “Weeding out Egoism” and Objection 24 (84).
Objection 15. There are different versions of the Golden Rule, and all of them are lacking in some way—for example, the Silver Rule is met by doing absolutely nothing. How do you know which one is true, if one of them is even true?
Rebuttal: If correctly applied, one will reach the same conclusion, whatever version of the Golden Rule one uses, be it the Platinum Rule, or the negative form (Silver Rule), because (in the case of the negative form) Sartre was right when he pointed out that even the choice to do nothing is still an act. Notice that if we “do no harm” it is less ‘active’ than doing good (at first glance)—however—consider that ‘not’ doing good, could be considered ‘doing harm’ (so that “doing no harm” would involve actively “doing good”) (62). To avoid treating the Other how you would not want them to treat you (silver version of Golden Rule), you must actively treat them as you would have them treat you (gold version)—this includes putting yourself in their shoes, as you would want the Other to do the same for you (platinum version). Every version is the same rule, so every version reaches the same conclusion. If one of them is true, all of them are true.
Objection 16. Describing the Golden Rule as love is misleading. Love is merely an emotion, usually associated with romantic love. The Golden Rule isn’t love.
Rebuttal: Golden Rule love that endures all circumstances is not mere emotion, is intentional and rational and can be chosen in the absence of emotion. The fulfillment and happiness it brings transcends and orders our changing emotions. It is not subjective, but also is not divorced from the real experiences of real people. See the section “A Natural Capacity for Discovering the Supernatural Standard” in this paper.
Objection 17. The Golden Rule is not a moral law. There is no moral law. I can do whatever I want, whenever I want—totally unlike not being able to break the law of gravity.
Rebuttal: Laws governing social interaction are relative to socially interacting beings, the way laws of physics are relative to the physical universe. If those laws cease to be, physical and social existence ceases to be, and vice versa. One doesn’t need to be struck by a divine lightning bolt to discover this—merely observe broken homes, bad neighborhoods, and prison populations—is there really no need for a Savior? Another similarity is that we know moral absolutes like we know the force holding us to the earth, though it is possible to increase our awareness of both by reading God’s revealed Word and a specialized science textbook, respectively. Right away we notice a difference between physical laws and moral laws. Though you can attempt to violate neither without consequence (46)—you can actually violate moral laws. They do not describe how humans “do” always behave. They do not describe nature. They go beyond nature (69). Whereas the formula for photosynthesis does not include choice, the formula for Golden Rule love requires it. Nature merely hosts the fact of morality—it cannot prescribe social existence or condemn social disintegration. Oughts are supernatural, either created by man (like all technology) or reflecting (71) God's nature (Golden Rule love), “How and why we should be or behave with the Other and self.”
Objection 18. The Golden Rule is too general, it lacks definite context. It can’t really help me with my situation, or any other particular situation, for that matter.
Rebuttal: It applies in every particular situation in every context of human interaction—it is the similarity among all the differences. In moral conflicts, refer to the “Moral Conflicts: Contextual Absolutism: The Greater Good View” section in “The Sword and Sacrifice Philosophy” section of this paper.
Objection 19. How do you determine who to include in “self” and who to include in “Other”? I am not like the Other, and the Other is not like me. I’m totally different, or the Other is totally different. I’m superior/inferior, or the Other is superior/inferior. I am the only self—all other humans are completely Other.
Rebuttal: If that were true, you wouldn’t bother communicating it. If you bother communicating it, you must recognize some sort of similarity. Communication can only occur when there is a similarity in ‘being’ between sender and receiver, while communicating ‘love’ (the Golden Rule) can only occur when such recognition is followed up by consciously, actively acknowledging that sameness in being between self and the Other. To actively deny that sameness will result in communication break-down. Any being with characteristics with which we can identify, even if we can't identify with all of their characteristics, is a being we should treat as self. The more characteristics they have with which we can identify, the more like "self" they will feel, whereas the more characteristics they have with which we cannot identify, the more like "Other" they will feel—but, if they have "any" characteristics with which we identify—they are to be treated with the Golden Rule. That isn't to say that our feeling determines self/Other—it is only to say that we are not obligated to the impossible [ought implies can (see note 84 and Objection 24)]—we can only do the best with what we are able to do, as far as figuring out self/Other. If we recognize self-characteristics, but do not acknowledge them in Golden Rule behavior—that is bad faith. See also Objection 1, and note 65.
Objection 20. The Golden Rule either leads to me being a placater or a slave, and it lets all the bad guys go free, or it justifies harsh penalties and war, which I strongly oppose.
Rebuttal: Another catch-22*. Holding someone (or a group of people, family-size up to global-community) responsible for their violation of and adherence to (just) laws respects their moral sense, as well as the moral sense of all affected by their violation or adherence, ultimately God. Moral indignation is a logical emotional reaction to an offense against moral sense; doing nothing to correct such an offense is morally wrong and leads to social deterioration of varying degrees. On holding violators accountable, Tim Keller writes, “There are many good reasons that we should want to confront wrongdoers. Wrongdoers have inflicted damage and … it costs something to fix the damage. We should confront wrongdoers—to wake them up to their real character, to move them to repair their relationships, or to at least constrain them and protect others from being harmed by them in the future. Notice, however, that all those reasons for confrontation are reasons of Golden Rule love. The best way to love them and the other potential victims around them is to confront them in the hope that they will repent, change, and make things right,” (2; 189-190). One could consider being held accountable for one’s actions a sort of right, but not a very fun one. If those in your life who were supposed to care about you, never cared how you acted—would you feel loved? That is why the strength of a society is the Godly family unit, and why its disintegration predicts the downfall of society.
Objection 21. All the theories in Ethics are attempts to solve problems left unsolved by the Golden Rule. Going back to the Golden Rule is going back to the old unsolved problems.
Rebuttal: The Golden Rule was compared to every theory in my first Ethics textbook (4), indicating there is something very basic going on with it. Every theory had problems. Only the Golden Rule, correctly understood, solves those problems.
Objection 22. Seph: "‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,’ …of course means that if you are a masochist you would like others to treat you poorly, and will thus treat them poorly as well...probably not the best social program.”
Rebuttal: A masochist is not following the Golden Rule when s/he treats him/herself poorly, and s/he knows it, or else s/he would have no idea of what "treat poorly" means in order to put it into action. It is like a twisted game of “opposite day”. See also: www.ichthus.yuku.com/topic/115/t/Golden-Rule-dialogue-with-Zoot.html for similar answered objection. In applying the Platinum version of the Golden Rule, we would not adopt an Other’s value if it does not apply the Golden Rule to self or Other.
Objection 23. The Golden Rule is too simple. (Alternative: The Golden Rule is too complicated—is-ought, ought-is, reification—whaaa???)
Rebuttal: Another catch-22*. I refer you to William of Occam’s razor, which might also make you say “whaaa???” unless you’re already familiar with it. Have you never heard a kid say, “How would you like it if someone did that to you?” or “Why?”
Objection 24. I’m doomed. God hates me. I always break the Golden Rule—I have no motivation or willpower to change that, and this all seems to violate “ought implies can” (84). I’ll never measure up. Who cares—who needs a God who would send me to hell for not being him? At least I don’t smite people to hell who don’t know me or don’t want to hang out with me.
Rebuttal: God loves you no matter what you do or don’t do, but he won’t force you into a relationship with him like some dictator—no one goes to hell who doesn’t choose it. Be motivated ‘by’ God’s love to express instances of Golden Rule love (that is possible—it does not violate “ought implies can”), rather than being motivated to earn it—it is impossible to earn something that is free.
***
*Every catch-22 is a thesis and anti-thesis, and every rebuttal is its synthesis. Every thesis and antithesis in this paper could be taken as objections, and every synthesis could be taken as rebuttals—see the Dialectics Glossary in Appendix A. Some of them are mentioned in the above answered objections, but this is not an exhaustive list.
Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable)
These dialectics are put into one appendix for closer examination. They are related, but not interchangeable.
The Essentialism Dialectic
Thesis: Moral truth (real ought) is created, or voluntarism (70).
Antithesis: There is no (discoverable) (71) moral truth (real ought), because that which is created is not discovered, or nihilism (or skepticism).
Synthesis: Moral truth (real ought) is discovered (71), or essentialism (14, 37).
See also Appendix C: The Logic of the Essentialism Dialectic.
(The Essentialism Dialectic is fleshed out here: http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2008/08/moral-truth-litmus.html.)
The Moral Realism Dialectic
Thesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are all valid moral truth (relativistic and subjectivist theories, or voluntarism, or anti-realism, 70).
Antithesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are evidence against the possibility of moral truth (nihilistic theories).
Synthesis: Moral truth transcends cultures and individuals and their apparent contradictions and is true (immanent) for all (realism)—providing a basis (along with L1.3) from which to defend the human rights of individuals of every culture (see Objection 12 in Appendix E).
The Super-Naturalist Dialectic
Thesis: If moral truth is beyond nature, then it has nothing to do with we who inhabit nature. However, there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature; moral truth is completely natural (philosophical naturalism) (see 50, 52, 53, 54, 66).
Antithesis: It is true that there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature, but making changing nature the basis for unchanging truth commits the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E) (nihilism).
Synthesis: That we hunger (57) for a ‘more’ that nature cannot satisfy, points to the existence of supernatural meaning—we hunger for transcendent meaning that exists immanently, or we would not hunger for it (essentialism). [ If it doesn’t exist (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), this ‘more’ commits the ought-is fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), but that it ‘does’ exist is not its justification, which would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). ]
The Anti-Reification Theism Dialectic
Thesis: Voluntaristic theism. God exists because, if he doesn’t, the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics corresponds to nothing and commits the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E).
Antithesis: Atheistic voluntarism/“essentialism”. To conclude God exists in order to give substance to a potential answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics commits the time travel paradox of the closed causal loop—just as an archaeological find making the past true commits that paradox (read Dummett). Though the thesis attempts to avoid committing the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), it commits just that. Therefore, there is no good God, and the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics is a construct or corresponds to something else.
Synthesis: Essentialist theism. Unless there is always a real being who always is and does what we should be and do, to which the answer to the question of Ethics (83) may always correspond (be true), then the answer, even if justified, commits the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (69, 70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E). However, this conflicts with our hunger (57) being a rational hunger for true meaning, not a construct.
Aquinas’ Euthyphro Dialectic
Thesis: Something is right because God wills it (divine voluntarism, 70).
Antithesis: God wills it because it is right (Greek “essentialism”).
Synthesis: God wills in accordance with his good nature (divine essentialism).
The Existential Essentialism Dialectic
Thesis: Essence (virtue, final cause, ought, how we should be) is a natural part of reality and precedes our existence (character, formal cause, is, how we are) (Greek essentialism) [is-ought (12) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E)].
Antithesis: Existence precedes essence—we define what it means to be human (Sartre—atheist existentialism) [ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)].
Synthesis: Our essence, our final cause, our virtue, how we should be, is to choose Golden Rule love, justified because it answers the question of Ethics (83), true because it corresponds to a perfect being who exists (chooses) this essence at every moment (69).
Appendix G: Synthesizing Golden Rule Variations and Competing Ethical Theories
None of the competing theories in Ethics, only the Golden Rule, answers the Question aspect of the Moral Truth Litmus: Moral truth must describe the answer to “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?”
(L1.1) The How and Why (Means and End) Dialectic
(See Objection 9 in Appendix E.)
Thesis: ‘Why’ (the internal end) is more important than ‘how’ (the external means) (consequentialist theories).
Antithesis: ‘How’ (the external means) is more important than ‘why’ (the internal end) (conduct theories).
Synthesis: A ‘how’ (means) without a ‘why’ (end) is pointless; a ‘why’ (end) without a ‘how’ (means) is impossible to apply [Golden Rule is both ‘why’ (love) and how—see Objection 16 in Appendix E on the GR being love].
(L1.2) The Be or Behave Dialectic
Thesis: ‘Be’ is more important than ‘behave’ (virtue theories).
Antithesis: ‘Behave’ is more important than ‘be’ (conduct theories).
Synthesis: The nature of the “doing” affects the nature of the “being” and vice versa. We should be a loving person so that we will be more inclined to do love (Golden Rule), and we should do love so that we will become a more loving person. The word ‘more’ is meant to remind the reader that anyone who asks the question of ethics, anyone who has the question in them, is ‘already’ a loving person who does love (simply by being hospitable to the question) (67). This “doing” and “being” is the only sort of creating and choosing which creates toward the eternal; chooses the eternal (see Objection 13 in Appendix E). If you think of “doing” as a verb, like the “e” of e=mc^2, and if you think of “being” as a noun, like the “mc^2” of the same equation, then it would be right to say that we cannot be (noun/mc^2) without doing (verb/e), and we cannot do (verb/e) without being (noun/mc^2) (62). By the way, check out Chuang Tzu’s theory of mutual production (5j).
This “being” which “behaves” is called “self” (41)—leading to L1.3:
(L1.3) The Other and Self Dialectic
Thesis: The Other or out-group should always benefit, whereas self or in-group should never benefit (self-abusive theories). Be a doormat.
Antithesis: Self or in-group should always benefit, whereas the Other or out-group should never benefit (egoistic theories). Be selfish.
Synthesis: In every in-group and out-group, a self is an Other, an Other is a self (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E), so however we should treat Other/self is the same as how we should treat self/Other (56). Also, since we can reason without thinking of the Other (or, for that matter, the self), theories which exalt reason fail to answer this aspect of the question of ethics. Would we even ask how/why we should be or behave if there were no self/Other?
Earlier in the paper it was shown how the impulse of relativism simply misapplies the Golden Rule, which is a more basic and essential aspect of each theory (see Objection 12 in Appendix E, and the Moral Diversity dialectic). Bentham and Mill grounded their universalized happiness principle in our shared need for happiness, whereas Kant grounded his categorical imperative in fairness to everyone’s shared moral sense (see the Love and Logic, “Law was Made for Man” Dialectic). Sartre said we choose our own purpose and grounded this in our shared freedom, whereas Aristotle thought every man’s virtue is built in to reality (see the Existential Essentialism Dialectic, and Appendix F). They were all at least partly right—we are all free and responsible to choose the best purpose (God’s essential Golden Rule love), we all need to be happy (to love and be loved, despite the circumstances), we all share (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E) a moral sense (of Golden Rule love, not merely double-standard and undermined intention), and the highest virtue (Golden Rule love) is the ‘final cause,’ the meaning of life beyond the beginning—treat the Other as self (Golden Rule).
The Golden Rule (treat the Other how you would want to be treated) includes the Platinum Rule (treat the Other how they would want to be treated), considering we would want the Other to put themselves in our shoes in their interactions with us (however, we would not in the process adopt someone’s values who is not applying the Golden Rule to self or Other) (56).
The Platinum-Golden Dialectic
Thesis: Give the Other what they want (over-simple Platinum Rule).
Antithesis: Give the Other what you want (over-simple Golden Rule).
Synthesis: Give the Other what a self in its right mind would want (essence of the Golden Rule, which includes the Platinum Rule).
If correctly applied, one will reach the same conclusion, whatever version of the Golden Rule one uses, be it the Platinum Rule, or the negative form (Silver Rule) referred to in the section on Relativism, because (in the case of the negative form) Sartre was right when he pointed out that even the choice to do nothing is still an act. Notice that if we “do no harm” it is less ‘active’ than doing good (at first glance)—however—consider that ‘not’ doing good, could be considered ‘doing harm’ (so that “doing no harm” would involve actively “doing good”) (62).
The Silver-Golden Dialectic
Thesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) is to not do anything at all.
Antithesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would have them to do you (to avoid doing the Golden Rule—to do nothing) is to actively do to the Other what you would not want done to you (to break the Silver Rule, in bad faith, as Sartre would say—to refuse to choose, to do nothing, is a choice).
Synthesis: To avoid doing the Golden Rule (to do nothing) is to do harm, so in order to avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) you must actively do the Golden Rule.
To avoid treating the Other how you would not want them to treat you (silver version of Golden Rule), you must actively treat them as you would have them treat you (gold version)—this includes putting yourself in their shoes, as you would want the Other to do the same for you (platinum version) (see Objection 15 in Appendix E). When Jesus sacrificed himself for us on the cross, he avoided letting our sin get between us and him (Silver Rule), by actively taking it upon himself (Platinum Rule)—all of that fulfilling the Golden Rule, because when we treat the Other the same way, it is the same as treating him that way (Matthew 25:35-40). He was treating us how he wants us to treat him—how he wants us to treat the Other: full of his grace and truth.
In case you’re still wondering how to apply such a general rule:
The Greater Good Dialectic
Thesis: The third-alternative view.
Antithesis: The lesser-evil view.
Synthesis: Contextual (or graded) absolutism, or the Greater Good View [(1), with some adaptations].
(The Greater Good Dialectic is fleshed out here: http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2008/08/sword-and-sacrifice-philosophy.html.)
See also Objection 18 in Appendix E.
References and Notes
Send any corrections to ichthus77@hotmail.com. Thankyou. Feel free to share this paper (in whole) with anyone you think would find reading it worthwhile.
All Bible quotes are from Zondervan’s NASB Study Bible, 1999.
Much of the content of this paper originated in various invaluable discussions I engaged in at www.ILovePhilosophy.com, www.ILoveOpinions.com and www.ichthus.yuku.com (to you I am deeply indebted). A heart-felt thank-you as well to Dad, who planted the seed of this paper in me by saying, “There are two options: 1) either there is a purpose and you are going towards it or away from it, or 2) there is no purpose except the purpose you create,” to Mom, Lolly and Cobra, MSebring, Seph and MoL, Nick Carter, Dave Haaz-Baroque and FBC Recovery (Facebook), and to the folks at Philosophy Chat Forum, Richard Dawkins’ (old) forum, and Project Reason’s forum—all have been fresh eyes and a much-needed crucible in the forging of this paper.
Not that it is a forgery…
(1) Norman L. Geisler, Paul D. Feinberg Introduction to Philosophy; A Christian Perspective (Baker Books) 1980. Much of what I know about philosophy from a Christian perspective comes from this book.
(2) Tim Keller The Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism (Dutton, Penguin Group) 2008. Check out http://ichthus.yuku.com/forums/67/t/Reason-for-God-Book-Discussion.html!
(3) Ravi Zacharias Jesus among Other Gods (Thomas Nelson) 2000.
(4) Nina Rosenstand The Moral of the Story: An Introduction to Ethics (McGraw-Hill, Inc) 2003. It is interesting to note that the Golden Rule is not presented as an ethical theory in its own right (as it is on Wikipedia, as an ethic of reciprocity), but is referred to sporadically in each chapter as a sort of yardstick or litmus (see Objection 21 in Appendix E). Much of what I know about the field of ethics from a secular perspective comes from this book.
(5) “The Philosophical Quest: A Cross-Cultural Reader” Second Edition, ed. Presbey, Gail M., et. al. (McGraw-Hill, Inc) 2000. The following selections influenced this paper:
a. Plato, The Symposium
b. Plato, The Parable of the Cave
c. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World As Will and Idea
d. Jean-Paul Sartre, There Is No Human Nature
e. Immanuel Kant, Moral Duty
f. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism
g. Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness
h. Martin Luther King, Jr., Non-Violence and Social Change
i. Malcolm X, By Any Means Necessary
j. Chuang Tzu, Knowledge and Relativity
(6) See Mark 12:28-31; Deuteronomy 6:5; Leviticus 19:18; Romans 13:8; Galatians 5:14
(7) Excerpt from study note on Matthew 5:3, Zondervan’s NASB Study Bible, 1999.
(8) Excerpt from study note on Philippians 4:7, Zondervan’s NASB Study Bible, 1999.
(9) C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 95-121. In this appendix are “assembled many of these creeds” (1; 362). It’s in my list of to-reads [finished reading on January 16, 2009; very good]. The quote is from (1). The section on theodicy in this link is interesting: www.iep.utm.edu/m/mencius.htm (thanks Xunzian). Some verses on generally revealed morality: Luke 6:32-35; Romans 1:19; 2:14. Also, check out http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethic_of_reciprocity and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights (See Objection 12 in Appendix E.)
(10) Golden Rule: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethic_of_reciprocity
(11) Sin: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sin
(12) See also L2, 69 and 70. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature www.gutenberg.org/etext/4705; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem The is-ought fallacy occurs when someone attempts to justify an “ought” with an “is”. It is a form of reification (70). See points 7 and 8 at the beginning of the section, “The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy” in this paper. (See Objection 2 in Appendix E.)
(13) Beth Moore, “When Godly People Do Ungodly Things” (B & H Publishing Group, 2002).
(14) My use of the words ‘essence’ and ‘essentialism’ may or may not conform to the way they are used here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essence http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Essentialism You can also look up ‘voluntarism’ to compare how it is used on Wikipedia with how I use it here. See notes 37 and 70. A helpful link: http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2008/01/god-wills-it-right-because-he-is-good.html
(15) Excerpt from study note on Matthew 7:12, Zondervan’s NASB Study Bible, 1999.
(16) C.S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory (New York: Harper Collins, 1980). The quote is from (2).
(17) Emmanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals [qtd. in (20)] (5e is excerpted from this).
(18) C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Macmillan, 1965 as qtd. in (2), or from my copy, Harper Collins, 1980).
(19) Martin Luther King, Jr. “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” — www.stanford.edu/group/King/popular_requests/frequentdocs/birmingham.pdf
(20) Wolfgang Carstens’ “The Knife and the Wound Philosophy” (2003)—which inspired this paper, and to which this paper is a reply. A friend.
(21) Lack of rational empathy (51) with future self contributes to poor planning: www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/oldarchive/bbs.mealey.html
(22) Compare Heidegger’s Dasein with these concepts: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatta (no atman) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atman_(Buddhism) God didn't create the "ego" or self for us to go de-creating it. If there were no egos/selves, Golden Rule love would be impossible. God is himself an ego/self, and essential Golden Rule love. How can there be compassion where there is detachment so as to avoid suffering? The idea is to love despite suffering...a strong love, rather than a weak love which would rather detach than endure. God calls us to go beyond fight-or-flight—He calls us to stand and love (see Objection 1 in Appendix E). The closest Christianity gets to the “no self” concept is “dying to self” (62, 63), which is quite different. One cannot be selfless, one cannot love, without a self. See also notes 41 and 65 and Objection 19 in Appendix E.
(23) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism See also notes 25, 41, 65 and Objection 19 in Appendix E.
(24) Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden (New York: Basic Books, 1992). [qtd. in (2)] See also Appendix B: The Four Horsemen and the Hunger.
(25) Eleonore Stump lecture on non-Cartesian dualism at a Veritas forum at University of Michigan: http://www.veritas.org/Media.aspx#/v/716
(26) Dr. Francis Collins lecture on ‘faith and reason’ and theistic evolution at a Veritas Forum at U.C. Berkeley: http://www.veritas.org/Media.aspx#/v/661 See also www.BioLogos.org.
(27) http://www.examiner.com/x-26772-Modesto-Apologetics-Examiner~y2009m11d27-Free-to-be-or-not-to-be-part-2
(28) Logos as Word, Zondervan NASB note John 1:1: Word. Greeks use this term not only of the spoken word but also of the unspoken word, the word still in the mind—the reason. When they applied it to the universe, they meant the rational principle that governs all things. Jews, on the other hand, used it as a way of referring to God. Thus John used a term that was meaningful to both Jews and Gentiles.
(29) David Keirsey, Please Understand Me II (Prometheus Nemesis, 1998).
(30) Karl Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain (Routledge, 2000).
(31) Bertrand Russell, “A History of Western Philosophy” (Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1972).
(32) Walter Isaacson, "Einstein and Faith" —
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1607298,00.html
(33) My Testimony: www.Ichthus77.blogspot.com/2008/08/my-testimony.html
(34) God: www.ichthus77.blogspot.com/2008/10/gods-essential-nature.html
(35) Love defined:
http://bible.crosswalk.com/Concordances/TorreysTopicalTextbook/ttt.cgi?number=T349
www.godandscience.org/love/biblicallove.html
(36) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Jones#Deaths_in_Jonestown
(37) Note that my first exposure to the distinction between essentialism and voluntarism (70) is in Appendix 12: Extreme Calvinism and Voluntarism, of (73). A good read. See note 14. Take the quiz “Are you an essentialist or a voluntarist?” in Appendix D.
(38) www.ichthus77.blogspot.com/2008/10/leftover-legalism-vs-love.html
(39) C.S. Lewis, “A Grief Observed” in The Complete C.S. Lewis Signature Classics, (Harper Collins, 2002).
(40) Something I’ve been chewing on a lot: www.ichthus77.blogspot.com/2008/11/blind-will-vs-free-will.html
(41) There are some who try to argue that there really is no self (22), or that self is all there is (23). Such issues seem trivial in light of the whole field of ethics. If ‘self’ or ‘the Other’ is illusion, then the whole field of ethics is asking silly questions. Remember the ethical theories studied in the field of ethics in philosophy pertain to normative social behavior, to how and why we should be or behave with the Other and self. Recall that we live against nihilism, skepticism and subjectivism whenever we find ourselves criticizing or praising the Other’s social behavior, and we live against relativism whenever we find ourselves criticizing or praising the social behavior of someone from an Other culture. It doesn’t really matter how we behave with the Other or ourselves if a) we don’t exist, and/or b) no Other exists. One might argue that, since ethics matters to us, both self and the Other exist. If that argument didn’t work, one might ask why no one else can tell you what you are thinking unless God (or future technology) gives them access to your private thoughts. Have you ever tried to keep a secret from yourself? It’s impossible. That it is possible to keep a secret from the Other testifies to the existence of both self and the Other. Enough silliness. Something cool: (25).
(42) As for Kierkegaard’s flavor of fideism (not to be confused with cognitive relativism), Kierkegaard thought that—because “Subjectivity is Truth”—to require objective evidence would annihilate Truth—make it meaningless. Golden Rule love is about subjective faith, not objective certainty (89), as John Nash discovered in the movie “A Beautiful Mind” (marriage proposal scene). Kierkegaard would still agree that subjective love without objective demonstration is not love (see Objection 1 in Appendix E)—faith “that” God is love, believing strong evidence of God’s loving us, though it cannot be proved with certainty (89) (certainty being reserved for the omniscient) (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if the lack of certainty sounds heretical to you), is a prerequisite to putting faith “in” him. Blind faith is what leads to drinking the Kool-Aid (36). A genuine leap of faith is a rational one. Kierkegaard did have arguments for God’s existence, however, he thought it offensive to require proof (89) from God of the certainty of his existence. But, would you really marry someone, put faith in someone, who never showed you love…someone for whom there is no evidence of their existence? You cannot be certain of the future when you say “I do”—but you have a pretty good idea the person you are marrying exists and (if you’re marrying for love) loves you—faith trusts the promise which is objectively evident. It is a leap, as Kierkegaard said, beyond mere belief “that” into belief “in”—but belief “that” (strong evidence) is still a prerequisite to belief “in” (trusting his promise). Kierkegaard’s main point, though, is a good one—our happiness is not found in certainty or proof (89) of God’s existence, but in trusting God (see Objection 6 in Appendix E). No one ever has certainty about anything, but that does not stop everyone from trusting certain beliefs, certain people. If it did, love would be impossible to realize.
(43) Litmus Work: http://ichthus.yuku.com/topic/45/t/SSP-Litmus-Work.html
(44) Someone who is definitely not superfluous, and probably got the idea from somewhere else, as all ideas are pretty much from somewhere else. ;^D
(45) You may ask, “If we are made in God’s essence, why can’t we go with human essentialism and trim God out of it?” The answer is that, though our essence reflects the eternal, it is created and will pass away unless God keeps it in existence (fails L2, 70). To be satisfied with a Golden Rule which does not correspond to any real ought (but merely practice it), is like arriving at e=mc^2, blowing something up, but dropping all reference to the universe. It commits the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)—and if you genuinely embrace love as our essence, you will not turn away the source of that love. Don’t you want to know the One you are modeled after?
(46) See Objection 17 in Appendix E.
(47) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_E._Duncan_III
(48) From the song “In Your Eyes” by Peter Gabriel.
(49) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nature_versus_nurture
(50) www.naturalism.org/normativity.htm (see 52, 53, 54, 66)
(51) Note that none of our impulses, drives, instincts, etcetera, are either moral or immoral, but are morally neutral—it is what we do with them that is moral or immoral. Acting on impulse does not release one from responsibility, and acting on seemingly moral impulses does not make the act moral, because, again, impulses (drives, instincts, etcetera) are neither moral nor immoral (no matter what it seems). Sometimes empathy can lead to immoral behavior when, for example, someone harbors a murderer out of empathy. Empathy guided by an individual following the Golden Rule will be referred to as rational empathy. Note two things: 1) if a culture or individual lacks an impulse, it does not necessarily rule that impulse out as being a natural one (rather than a learned one, like the craving of the addict), as we, having free will, can counteract or neglect our impulses so that they occur less and less—and 2) even if an impulse is natural, nature cannot prescribe.
(52) “The name 'Objectivism' derives from the principle that human knowledge and values are objective: They are not intrinsic to external reality, nor created by the thoughts one has, but are determined by the nature of reality, to be discovered by man's mind.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivism_(Ayn_Rand) This is an example of a theory claiming to be discovered (71) that is actually voluntaristic (70), as it rejects intrinsic value. A mind can discover nothing about the nature of reality that is not intrinsic to reality’s nature (there is nothing upon which to base a claim about reality’s nature that rejects its truth is intrinsic to the nature of reality): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivity_(philosophy) (this view is referred to as Platonic ethical objectivism, but without the critique given above. It should more properly just be termed essentialism, since Plato was not wholly correct. Any theory that would go extinct with humans is not based on the essential nature of reality—it is voluntaristic (a construct, not of indifferent nature, but of human will, 70). (see 50, 53, 54, 66)
(53) “Many secular philosophies also take a morally absolutist stance, arguing that absolute laws of morality are inherent in the nature of human beings, the nature of life in general, or the universe itself. For example, someone who believes absolutely in nonviolence considers it wrong to use violence even in self-defense.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_absolutism (see 50, 52, 54, 66)
(54) Naturalist view of purpose: “Human purpose is intuited through the innate direction of human nature, for human nature consists of a set of inherent drives which 'necessarily' evolved as a guide toward fulfilling the 'needs' requisite for our success as a species. Our 'acquired understanding' of evolutionary principles allows us to 'augment' our comprehension of 'intuited' innate drives, by applying 'evidential reason' to verify and adapt their 'general' direction into 'specific' behaviors that fulfill our needs in the novel and/or artificial habitats of our modern circumstance. By correctly 'identifying innate drives', and the 'essential function they evolved to serve'; one can logically interpret how this functional relation applies to our modern circumstance, thereby practicing correct behavior by appropriately channeling and balancing our inherent motivational influences.” www.happinessonline.org/MoralCode/LiveWithTruth/p31.htm (see 50, 52, 53, 66)
(55) ‘The hunger’ (57) isn’t shame or guilt, though such things can ignite it. It isn’t about justice so much as it’s about meaning, and our inability to “create” genuine, authentic meaning (71). “A guilty conscience that precedes sincere repentance is the conviction of the Holy Spirit. A guilty conscience following sincere repentance is condemnation that is not coming from God,” Beth Moore (13). 2 Corinthians 7:10 (Godly sorrow versus worldly sorrow); Luke 7:40-43 (s/he whom He forgives more, loves more); 1 John 3:19-20 (for the over-sensitive conscience).
(56) A criticism of the Golden Rule from my friend Seph: "‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,’ …of course means that if you are a masochist you would like others to treat you poorly, and will thus treat them poorly as well...probably not the best social program.” A masochist is not following the Golden Rule when s/he treats him/herself poorly, and s/he knows it, or else s/he would have no idea of what "treat poorly" means in order to put it into action. It is like a twisted game of “opposite day”. See also: www.ichthus.yuku.com/topic/115/t/Golden-Rule-dialogue-with-Zoot.html (and see Objection 22 in Appendix E). In applying the Platinum version of the Golden Rule, we would not adopt an Other’s value if it does not apply the Golden Rule to self or Other.
(57) From C.S. Lewis’ sermon “The Weight of Glory”— www.doxaweb.com/assets/doxa.pdf (Lewis is talking about heaven, but heaven is simply a relationship with God described by the Golden Rule. The kingdom of heaven is within you, on earth, when you do his will, which is in accordance with his Golden Rule nature.) See note 55. There is not a culture in existence or in history which has not demonstrated this hunger in an attempt to answer “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” It is no coincidence that some version of the Golden Rule is found in the creeds of every major culture in history (9 and 10) (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). See also Appendix B: The Four Horsemen and the Hunger.
(58) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dialectic A dialectic process resolves what appeared to be a contradiction [ends in "synthesis" between thesis and antithesis by keeping the parts of both thesis and antithesis which correspond to reality (and so are consistent), and discarding the parts that do not correspond to reality]. If the synthesis does not stand—let there be another antithesis to tear it down, and another synthesis be put in its place...because all doubt implies alternative belief. Is this not also the scientific method (see 66)? Look:
Scientific method: hypothesis—counter-evidence/evidence—(revised) theory
Dialectic method: thesis—antithesis/prothesis—synthesis
The antithesis is like evidence which makes you modify or abandon your hypothesis/theory—but that is no argument against forming hypotheses or working theories. If you observe any dialectic(s) in this paper that I failed to catch and make note of—please bring it to my attention.
(59) Nina Rosenstand, the author of my old ethics text, worded it this way: “the limit of your own liberty is the liberty of the other person,” (4; 277). This could be restated thusly: “The rights of the self/Other end where the rights of the Other/self begin”—that’s just the Golden Rule, restated: “Respect the rights of the Other, as you would have them respect your rights.” Although Rand did not mesh with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., they agree when he reportedly says, "The right to swing my fist ends where the other man's nose begins.”
(60) www.seslisozluk.com/?word=immanence&from=imminance
(61) http://www.examiner.com/apologetics-in-san-francisco/good-101-what-is-moral-truth-and-what-is-immoral-truth
(62) Thanks to can zen (Bob) on The Reason Project forum, for drawing this out. http://www.reasonproject.org/forum/viewthread/14391/P45
(63) Thanks to burt on The Reason Project forum, for drawing this out.
http://www.reasonproject.org/forum/viewthread/14390/P15
(64) Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, qtd here: http://www.csse.monash.edu.au/~aland/reviews/sexton.rev.html Thanks to Gad from The Reason Project forum for helping me understand how (24) and (64) fit together.
http://www.project-reason.org/forum/viewthread/14391/P240 See also Appendix B: The Four Horsemen and the Hunger, and note 77.
(65) See also note 22 and Objection 19. To answer the question of who to include in “Other” (thanks Only_Humean at ILovePhilosophy.com for reminding me of it http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=172631)—any being with characteristics with which we can identify, even if we can't identify with all of their characteristics, is a being we should treat as self. The more characteristics they have with which we can identify, the more like "self" they will feel, whereas the more characteristics they have with which we cannot identify, the more like "Other" they will feel—but, if they have "any" characteristics with which we identify—they are to be treated with the Golden Rule. That isn't to say that our feeling determines self/Other—it is only to say that we are not obligated to the impossible [ought implies can (see note 84 and Objection 24 in Appendix E)]—we can only do the best with what we are able to do, as far as figuring out self/Other. If we recognize self-characteristics, but do not acknowledge them in Golden Rule behavior—that is bad faith. // Communication can only occur when there is a similarity in ‘being’ between sender and receiver, while communicating ‘love’ (the Golden Rule) can only occur when such recognition is followed up by consciously, actively acknowledging that sameness in being between self and the Other. To actively deny that sameness will result in communication break-down. Thanks to can zen (Bob) again, on The Reason Project forum, for bringing up that ‘intersubjectivity’.
http://www.project-reason.org/forum/viewthread/14391/P105/#184793
(66) Dawkins has recently changed his mind to support his fellow Horseman, Sam Harris, who argues that nature is the source of objective moral truth:
http://www.examiner.com/x-26772-San-Francisco-Apologetics-Examiner~y2010m3d27-Dawkins-changes-mind-for-Harris-objective-moral-truth Note that the dialectic (thesis, antithesis/prothesis, synthesis) is synonymous with the scientific method [hypothesis, counter-evidence/evidence, (revised) theory] (see 58) and so science ‘can’ help us reason to moral absolutes—that is the purpose of the Moral Truth Litmus, by ruling out theories which do not pass it. However, see all discussion of the “real ought”. If there is no God (real ought), then to say the Golden Rule is ‘real’ and not just ‘concept’ commits the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E) (see 50, 52, 53, 54) (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you). See also Appendix B: The Four Horsemen and the Hunger.
(67) Thankyou to PavlovianModel146 for his critique of the Moral Truth Litmus in the introduction:
http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/phpbb/viewtopic.php?f=42&t=171119
(68) Thankyou to Ein Sophistry for drawing this (and 69) out:
http://www.project-reason.org/forum/viewthread/14391/P390
(69) A belief is only “always” true, if that to which it corresponds “always” exists (is real). Moral statements are only always true, if there is always a being to which they correspond (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you). We know that humans are not always good, so they do not qualify as such a being. If there is justified moral truth, it is justified if it answers “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” and it is always true only if it corresponds to an Other/self who always is and does what we should be and do (an eternally perfect being—God). If God (perfection) does not exist, to call the Golden Rule “moral truth” commits the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), just as to say the Golden Rule is justified by God’s existence commits the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70). The Golden Rule, if moral truth, describes a being (82) who always is and does what we should be and do (God), but it is not justified by his existence (12). This is one way to think of it: The Golden Rule is the map, and God is the territory. If there is no territory, the map describes nothing [to suggest that it does, commits the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)]. But this is a map which describes how territories ‘ought’ to be (perfection)—and so we cannot rely on the mere existence of the territory to tell us whether or not the map is true [to do so would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70)]. See 68. See this article: http://www.examiner.com/x-32233-Modesto-Apologetics-Examiner~y2010m7d23-Jonathans-lightbulb-and-the-science-of-morality For how this relates to “ought implies can”—see note 84 and Objection 24, Appendix E.
(70) See also L2, L3 and 69. Fallacy of reification, or voluntaristic fallacy: http://www.examiner.com/apologetics-in-san-francisco/apologetics-101-what-are-some-common-logical-fallacies Any claim to objective moral truth, which fails the litmus, or commits the is-ought fallacy (12), or the ought-is fallacy (82), commits the fallacy of reification. For voluntarism, see also notes 14, 37. (See Objection 2 and Objection 3 in Appendix E.)
(71) That moral truth is discovered, not created, means that we know it intuitively (see notes 9 and 57), rather than it being constructed. Sometimes we don’t “know” that we already know something—like spiders don’t “know” that they know how to spin webs, but they also don’t need to learn (discover) it, because—they intuitively know it. We intuitively know moral truth, but in order to “know” we know it—we must discover that we already (intuitively) know it. Moral truth is known intuitively, and we are able to articulate it and discover more about it using reason. See note 68. Note that we are not each “discovering” what is right for us personally—unless it is right for us personally, because it is right for all persons. See note 42.
(72) Inspired by Jimi Hendrix’ “Castles Made of Sand,” Wolfgang Carstens’ “The Thin Edge of Staring,” and, of course, Jesus, Matthew 7.
(73) Norman L. Geisler, “Chosen But Free” Second Edition, Bethany House, 2001.
(74) Adapted from a discussion with W. Collins:
http://www.project-reason.org/forum/viewthread/14391/P285/#188198
(75) Thanks to Grey Wolf and others in the room June 17, 2010, for drawing this out:
http://www.philosophychatforum.com/styles/prosilver_se/template/irc/chatapplet.html
(76) My understanding of critical realism comes from the book “Epistemology” (Continuum, 2005) by Christopher Norris.
(77) Although I am a huge fan of the meme, I must quote a straw man definition found in this groundbreaking chapter: “Another member of the religious meme complex is called faith. It means blind trust, in the absence of evidence, even in the teeth of evidence,” Richard Dawkins, “The Selfish Gene”. See also note 64. http://www.rubinghscience.org/memetics/dawkinsmemes.html
(78) Game theory: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory#Philosophy Note its connection with egoism.
(79) “Knowing That P without Believing That P” Myers-Schulz, Schwitzgebel:
http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzPapers/KB-100802.pdf
(80) http://www.examiner.com/apologetics-in-san-francisco/faith-101-do-we-need-less-faith-or-is-faith-strengthened-as-evidence-increases
(81) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology#Justification
(82) See also L3. The ought-is fallacy is the reverse is-ought fallacy (12), and both are forms of reification (70). The ought-is fallacy occurs when someone tries to say that something is true, merely because they have justification. See points 3 and 9 at the beginning of the section “The Sword and the Sacrifice Philosophy” in this paper. (See Objection 3 in Appendix E.)
(83) “How and why should we be or behave with the Other and self?” (L1)
(84) “Ought implies can” is an old principle of common sense acknowledging we are not obligated to do the impossible. It is present in the civil code of the Roman Empire (4). Egoists try to say selflessness is impossible (when they aren’t saying it is actually selfishness—see Objection 14 in Appendix E) and that to consider it an obligation is to violate “ought implies can”. One might also argue that constant perfection is impossible for finite beings, however, instances of following the Golden Rule (corresponding to perfection) are not impossible—and see Objection 24 in Appendix E.
(85) Bertrand Russell, “What Is Truth?” http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/articles/correspondence-a.pdf
(86) See “The Language of God” by Dr. Francis Collins. See also 26.
(87) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eudaimonia & http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ataraxia
(88) http://www.mandm.org.nz/2010/09/walter-sinnott-armstrong-and-the-moral-scepticism-objection-to-divine-commands.html
(89) Science cannot provide proof: http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-scientific-fundamentalist/200811/common-misconceptions-about-science-i-scientific-proof
A little start on evidence: http://www.examiner.com/apologetics-in-san-francisco/reasons-for-faith-101-what-are-some-clues-to-god-s-existence
(90) “Moral Landscape” edition of Philosophers’ Carnival:
http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2010/10/philosophers-carnival-cxv.html
(91) Author’s version of Dawkins’ belief scale: http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2010/10/new-new-theism.html
TO DO:
Version for kids
Discussion questions for each section (review old ethics homework for questions).
Choose a few common ethical dilemmas, which repeat in Ethics discussions, relevant to current events, and work them out at the end of each theory to show how each theory is incompatible with all the other theories, and only the Golden Rule is sufficient. Use Kiersey for characters, set it all up in introduction. There will be resolution of time-travel paradoxes Squish all this into the examples—check Mister Mobius folder for more:
—Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac
—Lying to would-be murderer / to public
—one from Malbus’ paper
—“the bleeding man” (philo club)
—natural rights (who help? / emergency)
—just war / harsh penalties / terrorism (liberty vs. security) (indiv. vs. society)
—encouragement in face of economy
—google moral dilemma, review Ethics text
—knowing is half the battle / grace vs. works
—legislating morality / harm principle…homosexuality (intersex issues), abortion, sep church/state (prayer, medical treatment, clothing), adultery, euthanasia
—getting over someone else’s (internalized) guilt trip
—taking/giving resources (socialism vs. capitalism/competition)
—human rights across cultures
—knowing good intuitively/instinctively, choosing intentionally, sinning unintentionally, learning from it that “the good” was always good
—love that endures circumstances (pain/pleasure)
—Ivan’s reasoning from Brother’s Karamazov
—Job, predestination
—religious/worldly love/acceptance vs. Gospel
—responsibility/freedom, ought implies can
—higher/lower pleasures judged via GGV
—contrasting and synthesizing virtue/duty/purpose
—nonhuman wanting to become human—what it means to be human
Many application examples after the end of the essay (5-14-10: different stories, choose your own ending). Need to show how core values don’t change with the tides. Need to show how GR is culturally tolerant yet challenging.
Reread EVERYONE... post some more relevant gems throughout.
Severe segue shortage.
[quote]The character He molds us into is a loving one of humility (rather than pride, or setting ourselves up where God, love, belongs; all sins are a type of pride and idolatry, of finding our identity in something besides his eternal love, and setting that up in his place), liberality (rather than greed), brotherly love (rather than envy), meekness (rather than wrath), chastity (rather than lust), diligence (rather than sloth), prudence (distinguishing between what hinders love and what helps further it, rather than, perhaps, lack of discernment), temperance (or restraint, rather than gluttony), justice (ensuring every self’s basic needs are met and rights defended, rather than unfairness), fortitude (or courage to love in even the worst circumstances, rather than cowardliness), faith (assurance of promises we hope for, but do not yet see fulfilled; confidence in the evidence behind the promise, rather than doubting the promise despite the evidence; loyalty and trust rather than disloyalty and distrust), hope [a longing for a heaven, the kingdom of God, which fulfills what this life only arouses, rather than settling for mud pies in the slum (16)] and charity (or unmerited love, rather than putting conditions on love and all its expressions). God’s nature, love, defines all the other virtues, which are just different expressions of love.[/quote]
1) Do the vices/virtues match up, are they described accurately? 2) I’d like to try to do this Golden Mean style. 3) Largely influenced by C.S. Lewis’ “Mere Christianity” but it had been a while since I read it, and I need to read it again to check accuracy. 4) Maybe it should be in a table… it’s rather longish. But I prob’ly won’t do that.
2/21/09—Wondering if I should just cut the section on Heidegger.
3/7/09 “I wish I could write well. I would write something about two people who share love between them as if it were fire in the midst of darkness (like in City of Ember, the way they thought of their city)—thinking that their fire matters, even if only to them, and for that time (a sort of "them against nihilism" mindset)... thinking that there is no eternal fire... and being okay with that. And then finding out (through revelation)—there is an eternal fire... and their fire is in his image. That would be a beautiful movie. 'Course you'd have to add a lot more to it.” Maybe it wouldn’t just be revelation? Maybe it would be my litmus? In that book, there would be tons of gems like “...and we have evolved a strong compensatory innate disgust mechanism to make us keep our distance,” (Dennett, Breaking the Spell).
3/2/09 I was reading an argument against objective values recently that I had started writing shortly before God brought me back, and need to remember to address all that stuff in this paper. It's weird, looking back on all that. (8/23/10 Pretty sure I’ve completed that and then some…but it’s been a while since I looked at the paper.)
3/22/09 "an individual’s moral sense…underdeveloped or lacking due to childhood trauma or neglect" Back up with referenced research.
3/29/09, 8/23/10 [quote]The fact we are born with the ability for rational empathy (51), as mentioned earlier, does not mean it has been put in our heart against our will—without it, we would have no will, as it is part of what makes our will possible. Studies show (21) that the reason certain individuals who lack rational empathy (51) have such a hard time navigating through life is that they cannot empathize with their own self in the future, in planning, in order to act in their own best interest—this is a crippling obstacle to the will (an obstacle God can remove, but not against our will).[/quote] If lacking rational empathy (51) means lacking will, then there is no will against which to remove the obstacle—think this through better [will is not synonymous with desires…it is what we do with the chosen desire?...lacking will, the obstacle is the desire which persists in the absence of conflicting will? Can God remove the desire—can God grant renewed will? Would that ‘irresistible’ grace—would it be so for everyone, regardless their having a will or not? Perhaps there ‘is’ a will…what effect does ‘lacking rational empathy’ (51) really have on the will?]. How do robots (sociopaths) “get” the Golden Rule? I removed the quoted text until I’ve got it figured out.
4/15/09: Did Plato think The Good was God (Schuyler)? Which words am I capitalizing that I shouldn’t, and vice versa?
4/23/09 What did Adler say about Hume’s is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (vs. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy)? Forgot details. Explain the fallacy/fallacies more, rather than leaving out the controversy.
10/06/09—reread Euthyphro for virtue theory section
2/26/10—I may wait to refer to the Golden Rule until the last section, because referring to it in the litmus seems to confuse people that the litmus begs the question. For another day.
4/13/10—Fix all the long sentences and misuses of semi-colons.
6/3/2010 1) An entire section explaining evidence that the Golden (including silver and platinum versions) Rule is found in the creeds of every major culture throughout history (9 and 10).
6/6/10, 8/23/10 answering criticism that there are more categories than “created” “discovered” and “neither/skepticism”) needs a whole section explaining why those ‘more’ actually fit into the three categories (and that there is “really” only one).
9/24/10 “The Golden Rule is the ‘intuited value not definable in terms of something else…that ‘ought’ to be followed in one’s intentions and actions,’ (1; 409) … hmm…see question I posted here: http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/3528 Apply this in particular to L1.1—doesn’t it basically say “the good (how/why) is good (why/how)”? Is that okay? See Obj.9 in Appendix E. // Also, I think Sartre and Kierkegaard have some stuff to say about L1.2 (be/behave…nothingness and all that).
11/14/11 – the whole ‘ought implies cannot’ thing is bothering me (intentionalism section)…and bees are buzzing about ‘ought implies can/is’. Considering an epilogue.
***Any philosophers who have read my paper and, from that, know exactly what sort of study plan or reading list would benefit me—please feel free to lend your expertise!***
