Saturday, October 30, 2010

Appendix A: Dialectics Glossary

Appendix A: Dialectics Glossary

The Scientific Method Dialectic

Thesis: Hypothesis.
Antithesis: Counter-Evidence.
Synthesis: (Revised) Theory.


The Reasoned Faith Dialectic

Thesis: We should have blind faith (fideism).
Antithesis: Don’t drink the Kool-Aid (36).
Synthesis: We should have reasoned faith.

(L1.1) The How and Why (Means and End) Dialectic

(See Objection 9 in Appendix E.)

Thesis: ‘Why’ (the internal end) is more important than ‘how’ (the external means) (consequentialist theories).
Antithesis: ‘How’ (the external means) is more important than ‘why’ (the internal end) (conduct theories).
Synthesis: A ‘how’ (means) without a ‘why’ (end) is pointless; a ‘why’ (end) without a ‘how’ (means) is impossible to apply [Golden Rule is both ‘why’ (love) and how—see Objection 16 in Appendix E on the GR being love].

(L1.2) The Be or Behave Dialectic

Thesis: ‘Be’ is more important than ‘behave’ (virtue theories).
Antithesis: ‘Behave’ is more important than ‘be’ (conduct theories).
Synthesis: The nature of the “doing” affects the nature of the “being” and vice versa. We should be a loving person so that we will be more inclined to do love (Golden Rule), and we should do love so that we will become a more loving person. The word ‘more’ is meant to remind the reader that anyone who asks the question of ethics, anyone who has the question in them, is ‘already’ a loving person who does love (simply by being hospitable to the question) (67). This “doing” and “being” is the only sort of creating and choosing which creates toward the eternal; chooses the eternal (see Objection 13 in Appendix E). If you think of “doing” as a verb, like the “e” of e=mc^2, and if you think of “being” as a noun, like the “mc^2” of the same equation, then it would be right to say that we cannot be (noun/mc^2) without doing (verb/e), and we cannot do (verb/e) without being (noun/mc^2) (62). By the way, check out Chuang Tzu’s theory of mutual production (5j).

This “being” which “behaves” is called “self” (41)—leading to L1.3:

(L1.3) The Other and Self Dialectic

Thesis: The Other or out-group should always benefit, whereas self or in-group should never benefit (self-abusive theories). Be a doormat.
Antithesis: Self or in-group should always benefit, whereas the Other or out-group should never benefit (egoistic theories). Be selfish.
Synthesis: In every in-group and out-group, a self is an Other, an Other is a self (65; Objection 19 in Appendix E), so however we should treat Other/self is the same as how we should treat self/Other (56). Also, since we can reason without thinking of the Other (or, for that matter, the self), theories which exalt reason fail to answer this aspect of the question of ethics. Would we even ask how/why we should be or behave if there were no self/Other?

The Essentialism Dialectic

Thesis: Moral truth (real ought) is created, or voluntarism (70).
Antithesis: There is no (discoverable) (71) moral truth (real ought), because that which is created is not discovered, or nihilism (or skepticism).
Synthesis: Moral truth (real ought) is discovered (71), or essentialism (14, 37). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).

See also Appendix C: The Logic of the Essentialism Dialectic.

(The Essentialism Dialectic is fleshed out here: http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2008/08/moral-truth-litmus.html.)

The Moral Realism Dialectic

Thesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are all valid moral truth (relativistic and subjectivist theories, or voluntarism, or anti-realism, 70).
Antithesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are evidence against the possibility of moral truth (nihilistic theories).
Synthesis: Moral truth transcends cultures and individuals and their apparent contradictions and is true (immanent) for all (realism)—providing a basis (along with L1.3) from which to defend the human rights of individuals of every culture (see Objection 12 in Appendix E). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).

The Super-Naturalist Dialectic

Thesis: If moral truth is beyond nature, then it has nothing to do with we who inhabit nature. However, there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature; moral truth is completely natural (philosophical naturalism) (see 50, 52, 53, 54, 66).
Antithesis: It is true that there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature, but making changing nature the basis for unchanging truth commits the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E) (nihilism).
Synthesis: That we hunger (57) for a ‘more’ that nature cannot satisfy, points to the existence of supernatural meaning—we hunger for transcendent meaning that exists immanently, or we would not hunger for it (essentialism). [ If it doesn’t exist (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), this ‘more’ commits the ought-is fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), but that it ‘does’ exist is not its justification, which would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). ] See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).

The Anti-Reification Theism Dialectic

Thesis: Voluntaristic theism. God exists because, if he doesn’t, the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics corresponds to nothing and commits the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E).
Antithesis: Atheistic voluntarism/“essentialism”. To conclude God exists in order to give substance to a potential answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics commits the time travel paradox of the closed causal loop—just as an archaeological find making the past true commits that paradox (read Dummett). Though the thesis attempts to avoid committing the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), it commits just that. Therefore, there is no good God, and the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics is a construct or corresponds to something else.
Synthesis: Essentialist theism. Unless there is always a real being who always is and does what we should be and do, to which the answer to the question of Ethics (83) may always correspond (be true), then the answer, even if justified, commits the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (69, 70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E). However, this conflicts with our hunger (57) being a rational hunger for true meaning, not a construct. See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).

Aquinas’ Immanent-Transcendent Dialectic

Thesis: All is immanent, all is one, nothing transcends; everything is just the same “thing”…“many” is an illusion (monism—Parmenides and Zeno, pantheists).
Antithesis: There are definitely different “things” (pluralism; Heraclitus and Cratylus, Plato, atomists like Democritus, Leucippus and Lucretius), but they have their being “in” the One—which transcends them (Plotinus; deism).
Aquinas’ synthesis: All that changes “has” its being (“has” its “thingness”) from the Unchanging (which “is” being, “is” “Thingness”), so that the Unchanging One (actuality with no potential, eternal, simple) does not only “transcend” the changing many (actuality with differing potential, temporal, composed), as deists believe, but is “immanent” (60) in it. The One is both transcendent over and immanent in the many.

The Love and Logic, “Law was Made for Man” Dialectic

Thesis: Logic or ethical rationalism if all by itself. Kant’s “man was made for law” thinking.
Antithesis: Love or emotivism if all by itself. Egoism’s “whatever results in my/our definition of happiness” thinking.
Synthesis: Logic and love (“law was made for man” thinking), reason and intuition (L1.1, L1.3). All legislation should conform to the Golden Rule.

Aquinas’ Euthyphro Dialectic

Thesis: Something is right because God wills it (divine voluntarism, 70).
Antithesis: God wills it because it is right (Greek “essentialism”).
Synthesis: God wills in accordance with his good nature (divine essentialism). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).

The Existential Essentialism Dialectic

Thesis: Essence (virtue, final cause, ought, how we should be) is a natural part of reality and precedes our existence (character, formal cause, is, how we are) (Greek essentialism) [is-ought (12) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E)].
Antithesis: Existence precedes essence—we define what it means to be human (Sartre—atheist existentialism) [ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)].
Synthesis: Our essence, our final cause, our virtue, how we should be, is to choose Golden Rule love, justified because it answers the question of Ethics (83), true because it corresponds to a perfect being who exists (chooses) this essence at every moment (69). See Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable).

Aristotle’s Golden Mean Dialectic

Thesis: Extreme vice.
Antithesis: Vice of deficiency.
Synthesis: Balance (virtue) between vices of extremism and deficiency.

The Constructive Criticism Dialectic

Thesis: Being destructively critical is an extreme vice.
Antithesis: Being deficiently critical is a vice of deficiency.
Synthesis: The Golden Mean between those vices is to be constructively critical.

The Platinum-Golden Dialectic

Thesis: Give the Other what they want (over-simple Platinum Rule).
Antithesis: Give the Other what you want (over-simple Golden Rule).
Synthesis: Give the Other what a self in its right mind would want (essence of the Golden Rule, which includes the Platinum Rule).

The Theodicy Dialectic

Thesis: God is good and all-powerful.
Antithesis: Evil and suffering are real, so either God is not good, or is not all-powerful to prevent evil and suffering.
Synthesis: God is good and all-powerful when He allows us to choose or reject Golden Rule love-despite-circumstances.

The Privation Dialectic

Thesis: Good and evil are opposites (dualism).
Antithesis: There is no good or evil (because without preexistent good, there can be no evil).
Synthesis: Evil is the privation of a preexistent good.

The Geisler Dialectic

Thesis: Free will over-rules sovereign predestination (extreme Arminianism).
Antithesis: Sovereign predestination over-rules free will (extreme Calvinism).
Synthesis: Sovereign predestination includes freely willed actions (moderate Calvinism).

The Kierkegaard Dialectic

Thesis: Aesthetic stage of sensuous enjoyment.
Antithesis: Ethical stage of following others’ rules.
Synthesis: Religious stage of enjoying a trusting relationship with God.

(The Kierkegaard Dialectic is fleshed out here: http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2008/08/existentialism.html.)

The Moral Diversity Dialectic

Thesis: Tolerance is best.
Antithesis: Must not tolerate evil.
Synthesis: Celebrate diversity that conforms to Golden Rule love (see Objections 16 and 20 in Appendix E).

The Silver-Golden Dialectic

Thesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) is to not do anything at all.
Antithesis: To avoid doing to the Other what you would have them to do you (to avoid doing the Golden Rule—to do nothing) is to actively do to the Other what you would not want done to you (to break the Silver Rule, in bad faith, as Sartre would say—to refuse to choose, to do nothing, is a choice).
Synthesis: To avoid doing the Golden Rule (to do nothing) is to do harm, so in order to avoid doing to the Other what you would not want done to you (to do the Silver Rule) you must actively do the Golden Rule.

The Greater Good Dialectic

Thesis: The third-alternative view.
Antithesis: The lesser-evil view.
Synthesis: Contextual (or graded) absolutism, or the Greater Good View [(1), with some adaptations].

(The Greater Good Dialectic is fleshed out here: http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2008/08/sword-and-sacrifice-philosophy.html.)

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