Saturday, October 30, 2010

Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable)

Appendix F: Six Moral Realist Dialectics (Non-interchangeable)

These dialectics are put into one appendix for closer examination. They are related, but not interchangeable.

The Essentialism Dialectic

Thesis: Moral truth (real ought) is created, or voluntarism (70).
Antithesis: There is no (discoverable) (71) moral truth (real ought), because that which is created is not discovered, or nihilism (or skepticism).
Synthesis: Moral truth (real ought) is discovered (71), or essentialism (14, 37).


See also Appendix C: The Logic of the Essentialism Dialectic.

(The Essentialism Dialectic is fleshed out here: http://theswordandthesacrificephilosophy.blogspot.com/2008/08/moral-truth-litmus.html.)

The Moral Realism Dialectic

Thesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are all valid moral truth (relativistic and subjectivist theories, or voluntarism, or anti-realism, 70).
Antithesis: Conflicting cultural and individual norms are evidence against the possibility of moral truth (nihilistic theories).
Synthesis: Moral truth transcends cultures and individuals and their apparent contradictions and is true (immanent) for all (realism)—providing a basis (along with L1.3) from which to defend the human rights of individuals of every culture (see Objection 12 in Appendix E).

The Super-Naturalist Dialectic

Thesis: If moral truth is beyond nature, then it has nothing to do with we who inhabit nature. However, there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature; moral truth is completely natural (philosophical naturalism) (see 50, 52, 53, 54, 66).
Antithesis: It is true that there is no reason to believe there is anything beyond nature, but making changing nature the basis for unchanging truth commits the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E) (nihilism).
Synthesis: That we hunger (57) for a ‘more’ that nature cannot satisfy, points to the existence of supernatural meaning—we hunger for transcendent meaning that exists immanently, or we would not hunger for it (essentialism). [ If it doesn’t exist (see Objection 5 in Appendix E if “if” sounds heretical to you), this ‘more’ commits the ought-is fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), but that it ‘does’ exist is not its justification, which would commit the is-ought fallacy (12) of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E). ]

The Anti-Reification Theism Dialectic

Thesis: Voluntaristic theism. God exists because, if he doesn’t, the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics corresponds to nothing and commits the ought-is (82) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E).
Antithesis: Atheistic voluntarism/“essentialism”. To conclude God exists in order to give substance to a potential answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics commits the time travel paradox of the closed causal loop—just as an archaeological find making the past true commits that paradox (read Dummett). Though the thesis attempts to avoid committing the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E), it commits just that. Therefore, there is no good God, and the answer to the question (hunger) of Ethics is a construct or corresponds to something else.
Synthesis: Essentialist theism. Unless there is always a real being who always is and does what we should be and do, to which the answer to the question of Ethics (83) may always correspond (be true), then the answer, even if justified, commits the ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (69, 70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E). However, this conflicts with our hunger (57) being a rational hunger for true meaning, not a construct.

Aquinas’ Euthyphro Dialectic

Thesis: Something is right because God wills it (divine voluntarism, 70).
Antithesis: God wills it because it is right (Greek “essentialism”).
Synthesis: God wills in accordance with his good nature (divine essentialism).

The Existential Essentialism Dialectic

Thesis: Essence (virtue, final cause, ought, how we should be) is a natural part of reality and precedes our existence (character, formal cause, is, how we are) (Greek essentialism) [is-ought (12) fallacy of reification (70) (see Objection 2 in Appendix E)].
Antithesis: Existence precedes essence—we define what it means to be human (Sartre—atheist existentialism) [ought-is fallacy (82) of reification (70) (see Objection 3 in Appendix E)].
Synthesis: Our essence, our final cause, our virtue, how we should be, is to choose Golden Rule love, justified because it answers the question of Ethics (83), true because it corresponds to a perfect being who exists (chooses) this essence at every moment (69).

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